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This thesis examines the most powerful constructions of Soviet nuclear identity at 
three stages of nuclear decision-making (acquisition, the arms race, disarmament) 
throughout the course of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United 
States from 1941 until 1991. Most importantly, it elaborates on the significance of this 
identity to the enactment and justification of Soviet nuclear policy from Joseph Stalin 
to Mikhail Gorbachev. Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War was broadly 
attributed in the International Relations (IR) literature to security/deterrence concerns, 
the Soviet desire for ideological and military superiority over the US, and the 
psychology of the Soviet leaders. By adopting a poststructuralist gender-mindful 
identity-focused approach, this thesis explores not why these nuclear policies were 
enacted, but how they were made possible seeing nuclear identity as both constitutive 
of and a product of policy. This direction of inquiry has been traditionally overlooked 
within the literature on nuclear proliferation but can be utilised to answer important 
unanswered questions. 
 
Through analysis of the official speeches, notes, private conversations, press releases, 
and autobiographical reflections of Soviet leaders, this thesis demonstrates that 
representations of identity mattered when it came to nuclear policy in the Soviet 
Union. First, it argues that the articulation of an aggressive, competitive, and hyper-
masculine superpower identity grounded in the strength of the military-industrial 
complex was interlinked with nuclear weapons acquisition and with the politics of a 
rapid nuclear build-up. However, the evolution of Soviet nuclear identity enabled a 
different course of policy, moving from the rapid arms race to the most significant 
arms reduction in history under the leadership of Gorbachev in the late-1980s. 
Consequently, the second argument is that the continuous construction and 
reinforcement of a cooperative, ethical, and paternalistic nuclear identity grounded in 
human security and total nuclear abolition eventually made disarmament possible. In 
exploring various nuclear identity constructions in the Soviet Union over time, this 
thesis makes a significant contribution to ideational IR scholarship on nuclear 
proliferation as well as to the poststructuralist identity/policy literature and feminist IR 
studies. It deepens our comprehension of the Soviet case, with implications for 
ii		



































This thesis explores decisions regarding nuclear weapons made by the Soviet Union’s 
government during the Cold War from 1941 until 1991. It does so by looking at how 
the Soviet leaders related themselves to being in possession of nuclear weapons 
through the process that is described as ‘nuclear identity construction’. Traditionally, 
nuclear policy in the Soviet Union was understood as a power-maximising practice 
and as a response to security threats posed by nuclear weapons in the United States. 
However, these explanations do not tell us the whole story. This thesis argues that the 
meaning of nuclear identity is determined by how leaders talk about their opponents 
in relation to themselves in the context of nuclear policy. It is through the way that 
they talk about themselves and nuclear weapons that nuclear policy comes into being. 
This thesis uses what is known as ‘discourse analysis’, which looks at how people give 
meaning to things through their use of written and spoken language. It analyses Soviet 
leaders’ speeches, documents, notes, memoirs, and conversations to explore the 
specific structures of their language. This analysis examines three time periods when 
the most important Soviet nuclear decisions were made, namely, the decision to 
develop the first Soviet nuclear weapon in the 1940s; the decision to compete with the 
US by continuously improving and building more weapons from the early 1950s to 
the mid-1980s; and the decision to reduce the number of weapons in the late-1980s.   
 
The analysis reveals that Soviet nuclear identity and nuclear policy were deeply 
interconnected throughout all three time periods analysed. This helps us to make 
sense of nuclear decisions that the USSR leaders made and how they made them. I 
argue that when Soviet nuclear identity emerged as competitive, aggressively 
masculine and grounded in military strength and power, it enabled the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and a dangerous nuclear competition between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. However, changes in the direction of policy may occur as seen from 
the continuous arms reductions in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Thus, my second 
argument posits that when nuclear identity was constructed and reinforced as 
cooperative, peaceful, and grounded in protecting human life and abandoning nuclear 
ambitions, it enabled disarmament and arms control. As such, this thesis emphasises 
that change in how state leaders view the usefulness of nuclear weapons is possible 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
Even though a nuclear weapon has not been detonated since 1945 and the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis may now be considered ancient history to the young generation, 
nuclear weapons possession remains as one of the most serious security issues that the 
world is facing. Despite the tremendous efforts of anti-nuclear activists, academics, 
nuclear experts, international organisations such as the United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and some state leaders, nuclear weapons are still here 
in quantities that would annihilate the whole civilization within seconds. At this very 
moment, Russia has 1 572 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (Kristensen and Korda, 
2020: NP). Perhaps, they are there to protect the Russians from whoever dares to 
attack their land. But when accompanied by the president Vladimir Putin’s statements 
such as:  
We are in the unique situation in our contemporary history in which 
they’re [the US] trying to catch up with us […] Our equipment must be 
better than the world’s best if we want to come out as the winners. This is 
not a game of chess where we can sometimes accept a tie (Putin, 2019),  
 
and by actions such as the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty in 2019 by Russia and the US, then the events of the Cold War and the 
dangerous arms race between the Soviet Union and the US become more than just 
‘ancient history’. It is history that we can learn from now, because the Soviet Union’s 
Cold War rivalries seem to remain in modern day Russia, as seen from Putin’s 
statement. If nuclear weapons remain a serious threat to humanity, then we need to 
learn how we got here not just in terms of the number of warheads, but in terms of the 
embedded understandings about Russia’s nuclear Self. International Relations (IR) 
literature on nuclear proliferation may provide some answers.1 
 
The ‘nuclear proliferation puzzle’ refers to the theoretical scholarly debate over how 
nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation can be explained and whether future 
proliferation can be predicted (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 43). According to Ogilvie-White 
(1996: 43), there is much confusion within existing literature on nuclear proliferation. 
	
1 Throughout the thesis I use capital letters to distinguish between International Relation (IR) 
and History as academic disciplines and international relations and history as subject matters. 
	 2	
First, the concept of ‘nuclear proliferation’ is not always adequately defined. Second, 
the literature does not always make it clear which aspect of nuclear proliferation (e.g. 
causes, effects or future predictions) is being addressed. Finally, the secrecy 
surrounding the subject of nuclear proliferation and scarcity of official documents 
leads to difficulties with establishing and, most importantly, accessing reliable 
evidence (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 43). When reliable information is difficult to obtain 
due to the limited number of cases of nuclear proliferation and secrecy “strategic 
concepts and heuristics developed by political scientists can become even more 
influential than would normally be the case” (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 44).  
 
To avoid any issues with definitions, it is worth clarifying concepts relevant to this 
thesis before continuing. The term ‘proliferation’ in the context of nuclear weapons is 
not understood in its traditional non-nuclear sense as a rapid multiplication or 
increase, rather it is a process of acquisition, spread, and numerical expansion of 
nuclear stockpiles. In this sense, non-proliferation can be defined as refusal to acquire 
and the prevention of spread of nuclear weapons. Disarmament here is understood as 
numerical decrease in the number of nuclear weapons. Expansion of stockpiles by 
states that already possess nuclear weapons is referred to as vertical proliferation, the 
spread of nuclear weapons to other states - as horizontal proliferation (Gusterson, 
1999: 114).  
  
For many decades, the issues of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in IR 
literature were understood through a materialist lens, predominantly neorealism and 
neoliberalism. The focus on security, rational deterrence, states’ power-maximising 
practices, and bureaucratic politics dominated thinking about nuclear weapons in the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War (see e.g. Berman and Baker, 1982; Cockburn, 
1983; Jervis, 1978; 1982-83; Waltz, 1979; 1981). The collapse of the Soviet Union 
and a halt to the USSR-US arms race in 1991 raised questions about materialist 
understandings of states’ nuclear behaviour and opened up space for more critical IR 
paradigms to explore this issue and to take it beyond objectivist, positivist nature of 
rationalist approaches (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2010: 2). 2  It is worth noting, 
however, that some non-positivist work has been done before the end of the Cold War 
	
2 Throughout the thesis, ‘rationalist’ refers to the theoretical IR approaches that emphasise 
material power considerations over ideational factors, namely neorealism and neoliberalism.  
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(see e.g. Cohn, 1987), but it was often marginalized in journals that were not 
frequented by security scholars (Rublee and Cohen, 2018: 318). 
 
The proliferation of research on the subject of nuclear politics since the mid-1990s 
until the present day seems to indicate that IR scholars moved away from conventional 
understandings of states’ motivations regarding nuclear weapons with many ideational 
factors coming to the forefront of their research. These include psychology of state 
leaders (see e.g. Hymans, 2006b), international norms (see e.g. Rublee, 2009, 
Tannenwald, 2007), beliefs (see e.g. Biswas, 2014), and identities. Among all factors, 
identity-focused approaches took centre stage in the ideational scholarship on nuclear 
proliferation and non-proliferation (see e.g. Ballbach, 2016; Das, 2010; Duncanson 
and Eschle, 2008; Singh, 2006; Ritchie, 2008; 2010). This theoretically and 
empirically rich work has largely advanced our understanding of why and how states 
proliferate or forgo nuclear weapons acquisition, emphasising that if we are serious 
about achieving total disarmament, we must first understand how states’ identity 
constructions are embedded in their decisions regarding nuclear weapons. 
 
In particular, poststructuralist and feminist IR approaches provide an in-depth 
understanding of how we got here in terms of states’ conceptions of Self and nuclear 
weapons. These scholars emphasise the centrality of discourse to the issues of nuclear 
proliferation. Notably, feminist approaches demonstrate that state leaders’ discourse 
about nuclear weapons is deeply gendered (see e.g. Cohn, 1987; Cohn et al., 2005; 
Duncanson and Eschle, 2008). They criticise rationalism for being gender-blind and 
overlooking the fact that powerful ideas about gender shape all aspects of states’ 
nuclear policy. In this sense, states can be seen to continuously attach masculine 
attributes to the possession of nuclear weapons, and within gendered hierarchies the 
more ‘masculine’ side is traditionally privileged over the more ‘feminine’ side (Cohn et 
al., 2005: 4). Understanding and deconstructing these hierarchies can help us progress 
towards disarmament. Poststructuralist approaches also emphasise that identities are 
hierarchical, whereby states construct the Self that is juxtaposed to the threatening 
external Other. As such, nuclear weapons proliferation becomes legitimate and 
necessary to protect the Self (Ballbach, 2016: 410). Both feminist and poststructuralist 
approaches are equipped to shed light on the blind spots left by rationalist scholars 
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and to uncover crucial aspects of how state identity constructions enable nuclear 
policy. Nevertheless, one state that we do not know much about when it comes to the 
relationship between identity constructions and nuclear policy is the USSR. 
 
Much has been written in the IR literature about the fierce nuclear competition that 
took place between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War 
nearly bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear war. However, our understanding 
about the biggest proliferator of nuclear weapons remains rooted in rationalist 
paradigms, namely neorealism and the domestic politics approach. While these 
theoretical approaches offer an invaluable contribution, they do not provide us with 
the whole picture of what exactly happened in the Soviet Union. How did the Soviets 
make a decision to build the bomb? How did they end up with 45 000 nuclear 
warheads in 1986? How did they manage to significantly reduce this number?  
 
Some answers are provided if we turn to the contributions of historians. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a great deal of documentation related to the 
Soviet nuclear project and the Cold War became declassified and available to public. 
Historical accounts capture evidence that was previously unavailable such as personal 
reflections of USSR’s leaders, notes from secret meetings, personal reflections of high-
ranked Soviet military officials and nuclear scientists working on the Soviet nuclear 
project. This evidence demonstrates that Soviet decision-making during the Cold War 
was not always rational. For example, Holloway (1994: 365) argues that Soviet 
nuclear policy during the rule of Joseph Stalin was incredibly emotional and reflected 
not only Stalin’s “malevolent and suspicious” personality, but also a deep-rooted 
consciousness of backwardness vis-à-vis the West. In a related vein, Craig and 
Radchenko, (2018) attribute Nikita Khrushchev’s aggressive nuclear policy to his 
desire to be recognised as an equal by the US. Thus, History makes it clear that ideas, 
beliefs, and identities had an important role to play in Soviet nuclear policy-making. 
While identity-focused IR approaches to nuclear proliferation deepen our 
understanding of other cases of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation, they 
commonly overlook the case of the Soviet Union. It is this gap in identity-focused 
ideational literature on nuclear proliferation that this thesis takes as its stating point.  
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Why is it important to explore the connection between identity and Soviet nuclear 
policy during the Cold War? First, because we live and will continue to live for a 
while with consequences of the decisions made during this turbulent period of our 
history and evidently there is more to Soviet nuclear policy than rational deterrence 
and security calculations. Second, it is important, because the Soviets went from 
stockpiling thousands of warheads beyond retaliatory capability to advocating global 
disarmament and rapidly reducing their nuclear stockpiles. This represents a crucial 
moment in nuclear history that we need to understand if we are to achieve change 
now. Third, rationalist explanations are self-fulfilling – if states have to arm in order to 
defend themselves, then we are stuck in never ending security dilemmas. If identity is 
important, it means the world can be different. Finally, there is an element of an 
academic curiosity. IR as a predominantly Western discipline tended to focus on the 
behaviour of the United States during the Cold War even in its more critical post-
positivist studies (see e.g. Campbell, 1992). There is thus a space to fill in our 
knowledge of the ‘other side’ of Cold War identity politics. 
 
Objectives, Arguments, and Approach of the Thesis 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the connection between identity 
constructions and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War and to inform upon the 
significance of this identity to the making of Soviet nuclear decisions. An important 
aspect of studying and understanding identity is the realisation that shared meanings 
and intersubjective structures can shape international relations and objects of security 
just as much as material interests (Fierke, 2007: 56). Looking at the objects of security 
through the ‘identity lens’ allows to see them as being produced through a dynamic 
process rather than just being static: “The question then changes from one of who or 
what the referent object of security is, to how security identities are constructed” 
(Fierke, 2007: 99).  Therefore, principally this thesis asks: ‘how was identity at the 
heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons policy?’ 
 
This thesis is broadly situated within the body of ideational identity-focused IR 
research on nuclear proliferation discussed above to which it seeks to contribute. 
More specifically, it is situated at the intersection of two groups of overlapping 
identity-focused literatures. The first group is the body of poststructuralist research on 
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identity and policy, from which this thesis draws its theoretical understanding of 
identity as relationally constituted within policy discourses and performatively enacted 
through policy, and from which thesis derives its methodological approach and 
methods. Poststructuralism-informed approaches have been largely underrepresented 
in the ideational literature on nuclear proliferation. However, a handful of studies add 
a wealth of detail with regards to the mutually-constitutive relationship between 
identity constructions and nuclear policy. In order to provide a more focused account 
of Soviet identity and nuclear policy, this thesis adopts and elaborates upon Ballbach’s 
(2016) concept of a ‘nuclear state identity’ defining it as encompassing political elites’ 
beliefs in the historical connection between power, recognition, and nuclear weapons 
and as representing how elites perceive their state as a power in light of nuclear 
proliferation and non-proliferation. The second group of literature is the body of 
feminist IR research on nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Their contributions 
have been significant in drawing attention to how ideas about gender shape all aspects 
of how nuclear weapons are perceived and addressed by states and how the status of 
a nuclear power is constructed as a particularly masculine status. As such, a nuclear 
state identity is also conceptualised as masculine.  
 
On the basis of these literatures and the gaps in the IR research on Soviet nuclear 
policy outlined above, this thesis seeks to answer three research questions: 
 
1. How did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity? 
2. How did Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time? 
3. How did nuclear identity constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions 
possible? 
 
To answer these questions, this thesis draws on a poststructuralist discourse analysis, 
which it applies to the official Soviet elite discourse on nuclear weapons and non-
official sources such as personal notes, private conversations between high-ranked 
Soviet officials, and personal written accounts of those directly involved in Soviet 
nuclear project. It also draws from a large number of secondary sources in order to 
situate Soviet nuclear identity and policy in broader historical and social contexts. This 
thesis focuses on three time periods when the most significant nuclear decisions in the 
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USSR were made. These are: the period of nuclear weapons acquisition (1941-1949); 
the period of the arms race or rapid vertical nuclear proliferation (1953-1964); and the 
period of détente and disarmament (1964-1991). At relevant moments, this thesis also 
consults texts from the main Soviet Cold War rival – the United States – in order to 
illustrate that nuclear identity constructions were not unique to the Soviet Union, 
which helps us to see the Cold War as not just the battle of material capabilities, but a 
battle of nuclear identities. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that nuclear identity considerations were to a large extent at 
the heart of Soviet nuclear policy. It argues that when a nuclear identity emerges as 
competitive, hyper-masculine, and constituted in juxtaposition to the very radical 
external Other, it enables and necessitates nuclear weapons acquisition and the 
politics of aggressive nuclear armament. The simultaneous construction of moral 
superiority and responsibility to ‘save’ the world from the danger posed by the Other’s 
nuclear weapons further legitimises nuclear acquisition and the arms race, making it 
unquestionable and silencing competing discourses. When these constructions 
become dominant and stable, they preclude the possibility of reaching an agreement 
on arms control and disarmament. This thesis then argues that when nuclear identity 
constructions evolve to cooperative, paternalistic, peaceful, and constructed in 
relation to the Other that is still different, but no longer dangerous and threatening, it 
enables change in the direction of nuclear policy making disarmament desirable. It 
also argues that the simultaneous construction of ethics and responsibility to get rid of 
ALL nuclear weapons adds legitimacy to the politics of disarmament. However, this 
thesis cautions that despite the potential for change, powerful ideas of masculinity do 
not disappear from the way states perceive nuclear weapons and more needs to be 
done to devalue them. 
 
By answering the three research questions outlined above this thesis makes several 
contributions to the field: first, it makes an empirical contribution by taking our 
understanding of the Soviet case beyond rationalist IR approaches to nuclear 
proliferation and by re-emphasising the significance of identity constructions to states’ 
nuclear policy; second, it makes a theoretical contribution to poststructuralist research 
on identity/policy nexus by expanding our application of poststructuralism to nuclear 
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identity and policy and by fleshing out the lesser known case; and third, it contributes 
to feminist IR scholarship on nuclear proliferation by exposing the gendered nature of 
Soviet nuclear discourse and demonstrating that the link between ideas about 
masculinity and the possession of nuclear weapons is prone to change and 
destabilisation. 
 
Before continuing, I should clarify that this thesis presents an interrogation and critique 
of the rationalist approaches to Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War through its 
adoption of a poststructuralist, gender-mindful, and interpretive approach. While it 
intervenes at the level of the way nuclear weapons are talked about, it does not seek 
to advocate a particular policy solution. However, my own posture is antinuclear, and 
I am sympathetic with the feminist IR cause and the position of those who continue to 
struggle against the existence of nuclear weapons and to campaign for nuclear 
weapons abolition. Thus, what this thesis does advocate is that identities and nuclear 
policies are not fixed and are susceptible to change over time and space.   
 
Structure of the Text 
 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters, of which this introduction is the first. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 engage with rationale, theoretical framework and methodological 
considerations employed in this research. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss the empirical 
evidence derived from the analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons discourse. Finally, 
Chapter 8 focuses on the conclusions that can be drawn from the discussion of Soviet 
nuclear identity and policy in empirical chapters and the implications of the findings 
for IR studies of nuclear proliferation and for the future research. The more detailed 
content of each chapter is outlined below. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, situates this thesis in the existing IR literature on nuclear 
proliferation. It discusses the key contributions to our understanding of nuclear policy 
in the Soviet Union that are rooted in neorealism and the domestic politics approach 
and elaborates upon the existing gaps in this body of research thus fleshing out the 
broad rationale of this thesis. Next, it focuses on the contributions of ideational 
identity-focused approaches to our knowledge of nuclear proliferation and restraint 
emphasising the significance of poststructuralist and feminist IR accounts to 
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understanding the close connection between identity constructions and policy. This 
chapter also discusses in greater detail the historical accounts of Soviet nuclear policy 
arguing that IR scholars have much to learn from their detailed examination of the 
Soviet case and the role that non-rational factors such as ideas and beliefs played in 
Soviet nuclear policy-making. It concludes by highlighting the utility of adopting a 
poststructuralist gender-mindful approach to achieve the main objectives of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 delves into the poststructuralist gender-mindful theoretical framework 
through which this thesis seeks to explore the connection between identity and Soviet 
nuclear policy. Drawing from poststructuralism-informed understanding of identity, it 
discusses the implications of conceptualising identity as articulated through foreign 
policy discourses and constituted in relation to one or multiple Others. It also 
emphasises the understanding of identity central to this thesis as both a constitutive 
and a product of nuclear policy, and the importance of being analytically open to the 
more ambiguous ways, in which states may construct their identity and policy through 
the articulation of various Others along the three dimensions: spatial, temporal, and 
ethical. The chapter further highlights the relevance of incorporating a gender lens into 
the analysis in order to flesh out how identities in nuclear weapons discourse are 
constructed in hierarchical difference with the privileged masculine traits being 
traditionally attributed to the possession of nuclear weaponry. Finally, it clarifies the 
concept of ‘a nuclear identity’ conceptualising it as discursive, relational, and 
masculine. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the methodology and methods employed to achieve the 
objectives of this thesis. First, it elaborates on the significance of the concept of 
‘discourse’ to poststructuralist research introduced in Chapter 3 arguing that nuclear 
policy is a discursive practice. Drawing principally on Lene Hansen’s (2006) 
poststructuralist discourse theory, it discusses the implications of adopting discursive 
ontology and non-causal epistemology highlighting the significance of language and 
the performative-constitutive relationship between identity and policy. On this basis, it 
develops an interpretive strategy that informs the analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons 
discourse. Finally, it discusses the practicalities of poststructuralist discourse analysis 
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focusing on the process of selecting texts, applying the analysis to them, and important 
issues of reliability, validity, and generalisability.  
 
Chapter 5 begins the empirical analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions 
focusing on the period of nuclear weapons acquisition under the rule of Joseph Stalin 
from the early 1940s until the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949. It explains that Soviet 
nuclear identity emerged within the dominant Soviet ‘catch up and overtake’ 
discourse four years before the first nuclear test. The chapter introduces the three 
dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity that emerged from the analysis of relevant texts: 
competition, masculinity, and peacekeeping. It argues that when a nuclear identity is 
constructed as competitive, hyper-masculine, and threatened by the radical external 
Other, it enables and necessitates nuclear weapons acquisition. In addition, when this 
nuclear identity is simultaneously constructed as peace-loving, moral, and 
responsible, it adds legitimacy and necessity to the acquisition. 
 
Chapter 6 continues to explore Soviet nuclear identity constructions focusing on 
Nikita Khrushchev’s rapid arms race between the USSR and the US from 1953 until 
1964. It examines how the three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity established in 
Chapter 5 manifested themselves during this time period and notes that as the Soviets 
started to move forward in the competition with the US, their nuclear identity 
transitioned into an aggressively macho superpower identity. The chapter argues that 
these constructions enabled some of the most dangerous and bizarre events of the 
Cold War such as the testing of the militarily useless ‘Tsar’ Bomba’ and the 1962 
Cuban missile crisis. It also argues that the existence of these constructions and the 
continuous aggressive ‘Othering’ of the US made the achievement of an arms control 
agreement difficult, if not impossible despite the Soviets simultaneously reinforcing the 
peace-loving dimension of their nuclear identity. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the transition from Khrushchev’s arms race to the period of 
détente and disarmament under the leaderships of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1985) and 
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991). It reveals that during Brezhnev’s rule Soviet nuclear 
identity constructions were particularly contradictory, because on the one hand it 
became less aggressive and competitive, yet, on the other hand, the Soviets continued 
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to arm at an ever more rapid pace. The chapter follows the complete transformation of 
Soviet nuclear identity from competitive to cooperative and from hyper-masculine to 
paternalistic grounded in human security and in the idea of being a global leader of 
disarmament. It also reveals that the Soviet external Other – the US – was no longer 
constructed as a radical aggressive Other, rather it was portrayed as non-progressive 
due to its negative response to disarmament proposals. As such, this chapter argues 
that the constructions of cooperative, peace-loving, paternalistic, and responsible 
nuclear identity acting in pursuit of human security and global disarmament enabled 
the change in the direction of Soviet nuclear policy. 
 
The final chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the findings of the thesis and informs upon 
their significance to understanding Soviet nuclear policy. It then highlights the 
empirical and theoretical contributions that this thesis makes through its exploration of 
a lesser known case of nuclear proliferation and through the way it explains how 
change in the policy direction became possible. It concludes by recognising that 
identity constructions to a large extent shaped Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold 
War and by emphasising that although challenging, the change is possible through the 
deconstruction of hierarchies existing in nuclear weapons discourse. Finally, it 
















Chapter 2. Review of the Literature: International Relations Approaches to 
Nuclear Proliferation  
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 established that this thesis examines the most prominent constructions of 
Soviet nuclear identity from the period of nuclear weapons acquisition in the 1940s 
through the rapid arms race until the disarmament period in the late 1980s. Its purpose 
is to investigate the significance of this identity to the course of Soviet nuclear policy 
in order to first, deepen theoretical comprehension of states’ motivations to go 
nuclear, to proliferate vertically, and to disarm; second, in order to expand our 
understanding of nuclear policy in the Soviet Union beyond accepted realist 
paradigm. To reiterate, this thesis asks: ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons policy?’ Broadly, it speaks to the IR literature on nuclear weapons 
proliferation and non-proliferation - a complex theoretical debate seeking to generate 
understanding of states’ motives for acquiring, forgoing, maintaining, and 
relinquishing nuclear weapons. This chapter examines key contributions and 
shortcomings of this literature. It does so to map out the existing explanations of 
nuclear proliferation and disarmament; to identify where among them scholars placed 
the case of Soviet Union’s nuclear programme; and to flesh out the connection 
between identity constructions and nuclear policy. Although these literatures provide 
an invaluable source of knowledge, they contain notable silences to which this thesis 
is designed to speak.  
 
First, Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War has been traditionally examined by 
realist scholars and attributed to power-maximising practices and rational calculations 
of deterrence based on the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This stance 
formed conventional wisdom on Soviet nuclear behaviour. However, the so-called 
widening and deepening of security studies agenda after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 revealed sufficient flaws in realist predictions and understanding of the 
logic of nuclear proliferation and international relations in general. As a result, a new 
strand of literature appeared that centred on the examination of ideational factors at 
the heart of states’ decisions to go nuclear or to disarm. However, these scholars have 
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not revisited the Soviet case. 3  Therefore, our understanding of Soviet nuclear 
behaviour during the Cold War remains largely rooted in realist cost-benefit analysis. 
Second, constructivist identity frameworks utilised in ideational literature on nuclear 
proliferation can prove insufficient to capture the complex process of identity 
construction and its linkages to the enactment and legitimation of nuclear policy. This 
point will be addressed in greater detail in the third section of this literature review. 
Poststructuralist approaches, however, can provide a deeper insight into the 
connection between a state’s identity and nuclear weapons projects.  
 
Scott Sagan (1996) developed three theoretical models for understanding why states 
proliferate nuclear weapons or choose restraint: ‘the security model’, ‘the domestic 
politics model’, and ‘the norms model’. This chapter is roughly structured around the 
key assumptions of each model and is divided into four parts.  First, it critically 
examines neorealist approaches to nuclear proliferation (with emphasis on state 
security, power, and raison d’état – national interest) and outlines its contributions to 
knowledge about Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. Second, it looks at the 
domestic politics model of nuclear proliferation and restraint and its contributions to 
the Soviet case. Third, this chapter evaluates ideational literature on nuclear 
proliferation and locates identity-focused approaches within it. The last section 
presents a brief discussion of scholarship from historians. Evaluated sources provide 
compelling evidence that Soviet nuclear policy was not always rational or security 
driven, and identity constructions to a large extent shaped this policy throughout the 
Cold War. The conclusion section accentuates the utility of poststructuralism for a 
more in-depth understanding of identity/policy nexus and emphasises how this thesis 
on Soviet nuclear policy is designed to fill the existing gaps in the relevant literature.  
 
Neorealist Perspectives on Understanding Nuclear Proliferation 
Conventional IR wisdom about Soviet and US nuclear behaviour during the Cold War 
lies with one or another variant of realism, which sees security as crucial to states’ 
survival (see e.g. Frankel, 1993; Jervis, 1978, 1982-83, 1986; Mearsheimer, 1993; 
Thayer, 1995; Waltz, 1979; 1981; 1990). Neorealist scholars posit that nuclear 
	
3 ‘Ideational’ is understood here as idealist, which refers to a theoretical emphasis on the 
influence of ideas (identities, emotions, perceptions etc.) and generally encompasses critical IR 
approaches. 
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weapons are acquired as a rational response to protect state interests through 
defensive and sometimes offensive means. States develop nuclear weapons when 
faced with a threat to their security, which cannot be resolved, and these weapons act 
as a deterrent in order to prevent armed conflicts between nuclear states (Ogilvie-
White, 1996: 45), or to act as a deterrent against traditional armed conflicts (May, 
1994: 534). In this sense, nuclear weapons are acquired as a response to emerging 
nuclear threats in order to balance power with the rival state (Sagan, 1996: 59). This 
often results in states being faced with the security dilemma, which exists when “many 
of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease security of others” 
resulting in competitive behaviour (Jervis, 1978, cited in Glaser, 1997: 171).  
According to Suchman and Eyre (1992: 147), neorealist theories rely on the so-called 
logic of consequence, which means that the process of decision-making consists of, 
first, determining one’s goals and one’s options; second, determining how one’s 
alternatives map onto one’s goals; and finally, selecting an alternative that maximises 
the achievement of one’s goals. In this sense, nuclear policy is a rational and 
calculated practice. The security dilemma lies at the core of this logic – when a state 
develops nuclear weapons to balance against its rivals, it poses a nuclear threat to 
another state in the region, which then has to develop its own nuclear programme to 
maintain security (Jervis, 1978; Sagan, 1996: 58). The history of nuclear proliferation 
thus presents itself as a strategic chain and it constitutes essential empirical evidence 




Figure 2.1 The History of Nuclear Proliferation. Source: May, M. M. (1994) ‘Nuclear Weapons 
Supply and Demand’, American Scientist, 82(6): 526-537. 
Figure 2.1 shows that approximately every five years since 1945 – a year that marked 
the one and only usage of nuclear weapons in warfare by the US - a state has acquired 
a nuclear-weapons capability. From the neorealist perspective this ‘trend’ can be 
explained by the fact that these states either perceived a threat to their survival or were 
faced with the situation where nuclear weapons could “significantly increase their 
voice in matters that mattered to survival” (May, 1994: 534). For instance, after the US 
demonstrated that nuclear weapons were possible in 1945 and due to the emerging 
tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, it was strategically essential for the 
Soviets to develop nuclear weapons as a response to those newly emerging threats 
(May, 1994: 534). In the same vein, from the neorealist perspective, British and French 
nuclear programmes were developed shortly after, as these states needed to protect 
themselves from the Soviet Union and its nuclear weapons. As emphasised by 
Hymans (2006a: 456), neorealist logic relies on the notion that non-nuclear 
guarantees are insufficient for a state’s long-term security and that “friends today may 
become enemies tomorrow”.  
The nuclear behaviour of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was commonly 
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understood by neorealists as a form of power-maximising practice and as a response 
to the growing security threats and competition with the US (see e.g. Jervis, 1978; 
Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979, 1981, 1990). Kenneth Waltz (1990: 733) stresses 
that during the arms race of the 1950s massive retaliation was crucial for Soviet and 
US survival, because, adhering to the traits of defensive neorealism, one must have the 
capability to destroy an adversary in order to deter them from striking first. In Theory 
of International Politics, Waltz (1979: 185) claims that nuclear weapons are the 
ultimate guarantors of a state’s survival as they induce caution and restraint. In this 
sense, more nuclear weapons will be better for international stability. This position 
became known as ‘proliferation optimism’. Although nothing is guaranteed, in Waltz’s 
view, nuclear weapons do make wars less likely as they are associated with deterrent 
strategies, which promise less damage than war-fighting strategies (1979: 185). These 
strategies call for caution and hence reduce the incidence of war. The fear of 
escalation and disadvantages of striking first show that nuclear weapons reverse the 
logic of conventional wars. Thus, based on “easy calculations of what one country can 
do to another”, armed nuclear conflicts will be avoided at all costs (Waltz, 1990: 734).  
In accordance with this logic, the Soviet Union was acting rationally and defensively 
during the Cold War in order to ensure its survival and to balance against the US. 
Offensive neorealist John Mearsheimer also sees security threats as the main 
determinants of states’ arming behaviour. However, in comparison to Waltz, he 
suggests that states’ ultimate goal is to increase their power, not to preserve it. In this 
case, in an anarchic international system, states will strive to achieve hegemonic status 
in order to gain maximum security for themselves (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21).  
Mearsheimer (2001: 170) posits that the Soviet Union was a great expansionist power 
and thus, its nuclear behaviour can be understood as a power-maximising practice in 
the struggle with the US to become hegemonic. It is only logical that in this case great 
powers would prevent the spread of nuclear technology to other states. In this vein, 
Potter (1985: 468) argues that Soviet non-proliferation efforts between the mid-1950s 
and early 1980s were driven by its military and political interest in preventing other 
states from developing nuclear arsenals and threatening Soviet security and expansion.  
 
When assessing the efficacy of neorealist approaches to understanding nuclear 
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proliferation, critics often emphasise their poor predictive power, their inability to 
explain cases of non-proliferation, and their overreliance on security influences 
(Ogilvie-White, 1996: 48). For instance, Mearsheimer (1993: 50) argued that it was the 
US’s mistake to encourage Ukraine to abolish its nuclear weapons, as they are an 
imperative to maintaining peace between Ukraine and Russia. In addition, he 
predicted that Ukraine was likely to keep its nuclear arsenal despite what other states 
say (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 58).  Mearsheimer’s predictions with regards to Ukraine 
were inaccurate, as it did transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 – shortly after the publishing of his 
article.   
Furthermore, Sagan (1996: 63) asserts that scholars relying on the neorealist paradigms 
obtain empirical evidence, first by looking at the statements of motivation issued by 
the key decision-makers, which may indicate that nuclear choices were made in order 
to serve national and security interests. Second, they analyse a correlation in time 
between the emergence of a plausible security threat and a decision to acquire 
nuclear weapons, which requires working backwards in time from a nuclear decision 
attempting to find a security threat that ‘must’ have influenced it (Sagan, 1996: 63). 
This constitutes a significant weakness of the neorealist approach as it limits the 
analysis of governmental decision-making down to security factors and overlooks 
other possible influences. In addition, despite neorealist predictions, nuclear 
proliferation still remains a rare occurrence.  
Existing critiques of neorealism reject ‘proliferation optimism’, assuming that the 
likelihood of a nuclear strike will increase with the number of ‘nuclear club’ members 
– this position has been referred to as ‘proliferation pessimism’. Kroenig (2015: 112) 
argues that there is a significant logical contradiction at the core of the neorealist 
argument. He highlights that the likelihood of nuclear war is either zero or nonzero, 
but it cannot be both.  In this sense, nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect 
if the probability of nuclear war is non-existent:  
States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and 
states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale conventional 
wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists 
cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing (Kroenig, 
2015: 112).  
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On the other hand, if there is a probability of nuclear war, then the danger increases 
with the spread of nuclear weapons and neorealists cannot conclude that nuclear 
weapons would never be used:  
In sum, either the spread of nuclear weapons raises the risk of nuclear war 
and, in so doing, deters large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no 
danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used, and the spread of nuclear 
weapons does not increase international stability (Kroenig, 2015: 112).  
Despite arguing that in some cases nuclear proliferation is essential, Mearsheimer 
(1993:51) acknowledges that “widespread proliferation would increase the number of 
fingers on the nuclear trigger” – this, he suggests, would consequently increase the 
likelihood of nuclear accidents, unauthorised use, and nuclear terrorism. 
Mearsheimer’s claims, thus, challenge Waltz’s notion of nuclear weapons being the 
ultimate guarantors of peace and stability.  
As mentioned above, Waltz attributed nuclear non-use during the Cold War to 
rational deterrence calculations. However, some scholars contest this view arguing 
that deterrence may not be the underlying reason for states’ non-use of nuclear 
weapons. For instance, Tannenwald (2007: 2) argues that deterrence is an inadequate 
explanation. Instead, she suggests that the so-called peace was often down to sheer 
luck and a powerful taboo that has developed in the global system against the use of 
nuclear weapons and stigmatised them as unacceptable weapons (Tannenwald, 2007: 
2). To develop the ‘luck’ argument further, some scholars emphasise that the spread of 
nuclear weapons increases the chances of accidents that could lead to major 
destructions. For example, Gusterson (1999: 123) notes that there have been at least 
24 occasions of US aircraft accidentally releasing nuclear weapons and at least eight 
incidents where nuclear weapons have been involved in plane crashes or fires. In 
essence, neorealists heavily rely on good luck. 
Furthermore, neorealist approaches do not provide an adequate explanation of vertical 
nuclear proliferation. As noted by Ogilvie-White (1996: 45), if the logic of deterrence 
is followed, then there would be no need for a nuclear arms race. If the US and the 
Soviet Union had been ‘rational’ during the Cold War, the rapid armament beyond 
second-strike capability would not have occurred. To illustrate, Figure 2.2 represents 
the history of global nuclear stockpiles. Deterrence and security explanations cannot 
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justify, for instance, Soviet Union’s decision to stock 45000 warheads in 1986 and an 
overall shrinking of nuclear stockpiles afterwards despite the continuation of the Cold 
War. This suggests that deeper non-rational motives may be at work. 
 
Figure 2.2 The History of Global Nuclear Stockpiles. Source: Burns, R. D. and Coyle III, P.E. 
(2015) The Challenges of Nuclear Non-proliferation. London: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 10. 
 
Another issue is a substantial gap between technical potential and military reality, 
which neorealists do not always explain.  For example, Figure 2.3 represents potential 
versus actual nuclear proliferation and shows that only about one-fifth of the states 
that could have built nuclear weapons have in fact done so. According to Hymans 
(2006a: 458) and Bajema (2010: 60), neorealists over-predict overall proliferation, 
which still remains a rare occasion, and struggle to understand empirical patterns of 
nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation that raise additional questions such as why 
France, but not Germany or Japan? Why India in 1998, but not India in 1968? 
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Germany and Ukraine both perceived threats to their security yet abstained from 
acquiring nuclear weapons despite the technological capability. These instances all 
suggest that neorealism alone is not sufficient enough for understanding the complex 
dynamics of nuclear proliferation across different cases and across time.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Potential vs. Actual Nuclear Proliferation. Source: Hymans, J. E. C. (2006a) The 
Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 4. 
 
As a response to a portion of these criticisms, a number of contemporary scholars 
adopted revised realist frameworks in order to understand nuclear weapons 
acquisition and restraint. For instance, Paul (2000:14) suggests that the combination of 
prudential realism and liberalism offers a more comprehensive account of nuclear 
proliferation and restraint. His explanation of nuclear proliferation posits that states’ 
choices with regards to nuclear weapons will depend on “the degree and type of 
security threats that a non-great power state faces, and the conflict dynamics of the 
region in which it is situated” (Paul, 2000: 14). Nuclear restraint on the other hand is 
governed by considerations of power, norms and prudence. Paul (2000: 150) argues 
that nuclear non-proliferation regimes are not a determining factor in decisions on 
nuclear restraint or nuclear reversals but can play a facilitating role. He claims that the 
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NPT had little impact on states such as Canada, Germany and Japan, because they 
had already chosen to give up their nuclear options before signing the treaty (Paul, 
2000: 151).  However, he acknowledges that the NPT regime becomes more 
important once a state chooses nuclear restraint, as “it provides assurances of similar 
behaviour by other states” and exiting the NPT would “elicit harsher international 
reaction than if it had not joined in the first place” (Paul, 2000: 28). Monteiro and 
Debs (2014: 9) also build their approach on realist security-based view and integrate it 
into a strategic-interaction model. They state that nuclear proliferation is determined 
by strategic interaction between potential proliferators and their adversaries and draw 
on four independent variables: the level of security threat, relative power of 
proliferators, cost of nuclear programme, and level of an ally’s commitment to a state’s 
defence (Monteiro and Debs, 2014: 13). Monteiro and Debs (2014) test their theory on 
five historical cases of nuclear proliferation including the Soviet Union. They 
conclude: “Seen through the lens of our strategic theory, the threat to Soviet survival 
posed by competition with a nuclear-armed United States induced Moscow’s 
willingness to nuclearize” (Monteiro and Debs, 2014: 29).  
After assessing evidence from the Soviet military archives that became available to the 
wider audience following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Jervis (2001: 58-59) 
revisited his own conclusions on cooperation under the security dilemma, adding that 
Soviet offensive actions during the Cold War were not only driven by expansionism 
for security purposes, but by the deeper ideological assumptions that the world was 
shifting towards communism and the Soviet Union had the responsibility to aid this 
progress. In this sense, it was not the anarchic international system that drove Soviet 
actions, but Soviet own perceptions of the system as a form of class conflict. Jervis 
(2001: 46-47) also emphasises that on top of ideological considerations, it was Stalin’s 
personality that made him insecure in the face of American nuclear monopoly: “How 
could Stalin of all people feel secure in a world in which the capitalists, but not the 
Communists, knew how to build nuclear bombs?” This demonstrates how stepping 
away from solely focusing on security and power and revisiting the Soviet case could 
produce a more in-depth understanding of Soviet nuclear behaviour. 
To sum up, it is not my intention to deny the role of power politics and security 
concerns in Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. The neorealist systemic 
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approach with emphasis on the anarchic character of the international system helps us 
to understand states’ nuclear behaviour to a certain extent. One of the things to do, in 
order to avoid conflict, is balance power against each other in order to establish 
peaceful coexistence or, for more powerful states, great power cooperation (Neumann 
and Welsh, 1991: 328). Nuclear proliferation by the USSR and the United States 
during the Cold War to an extent follows the logic of power politics and raison d’état. 
However, neorealism fails to explain adequately a great deal of state activity. While it 
focuses attention on the important supply side of nuclear proliferation, existing 
evidence about the limited number of states that do proliferate contradicts its intuitions 
about the level of demand for nuclear weapons. In addition, this section emphasised 
the neorealist oversimplification of deterrence theory, its preoccupation with power, 
rationality, and security, and its inability to adequately explain vertical nuclear 
proliferation. Hence, in an attempt to understand Soviet nuclear behaviour during the 
Cold War, neorealism can only provide a partial explanation. 
 
The Domestic Politics Approaches   
The domestic politics approaches to nuclear proliferation focus on the role of 
domestic sources that encourage or discourage governments from pursuing a nuclear 
weapons programme. For instance, by utilising organisation theory, Sagan (1996: 64) 
emphasises the influence of individual domestic actors, who may include professional 
militaries, political party leaders, and officials in state-run nuclear research facilities. 
Led by common interests, these actors form coalitions and become strong enough to 
control states’ decision-making processes either through direct political power or 
through their control of information (Sagan, 1996: 64). In this sense, nuclear weapons 
serve specific interests of domestic actors rather than national security interests.  
Sagan (1996: 67) claims that the domestic politics approach is better suited to explain 
nuclear proliferation in India than approaches that rely solely on security, because the 
Indian nuclear project was developed ten years after the possible security threat posed 
by the Chinese nuclear testing. He argues that Indira Gandhi’s decision to conduct 
India’s first nuclear test in 1974 was, first, made with the help from a small group of 
personal advisers and scientists from nuclear establishments. Second, the decision was 
made rather quickly, which suggests that immediate political concerns had more 
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influence than long-term security and energy strategies. Finally, domestic support for 
Gandhi’s government was declining in 1974 due to severe recession and critique from 
domestic opponents. Conducting a nuclear test may have been one of Gandhi’s 
government’s strategies to gain public support and to restore the nation’s faith in her 
government, which indeed worked as support for Gandhi increased by one-third in 
the month after the nuclear test (Sagan, 1996: 68).  
Some scholars utilised the domestic politics approach to explain nuclear restraint. For 
instance, Reiss (1988: 248-263) claims that domestic pressures such as public opinion, 
environmental risks, cost of nuclear weapons programme, and internal political 
changes may serve as sources of nuclear restraint. Sagan (1996: 69) develops this 
point further suggesting that major political changes within states could produce 
nuclear restraint due to several reasons: outgoing government not trusting the 
incoming government with nuclear weapons; a new government not pursuing the 
course chosen by the old government; and newly empowered actors choosing not to 
pursue nuclear programmes due to other interests. This puts an additional emphasis on 
the influence internal political characteristics of the state have on nuclear decisions. 
For instance, in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, nuclear restraint can be explained 
by the emergence of liberalising domestic regimes that value international cooperation 
and access to international markets more than arms racing and economically 
unproductive defence strategies (Chafetz, 1993:133; Sagan, 1996:71). Additionally, 
Ogilvie-White (1996:49) posits that South Africa’s nuclear restraint could be 
influenced by the transition from apartheid to democracy and newly elected de Klerk’s 
attempt to benefit from international economic and political cooperation.  
Another contribution to explaining nuclear restraint using the domestic politics 
approach has been made by Solingen (1994; 2007). Solingen (1994: 137-140) 
develops a global integration model suggesting that liberalising coalitions within states 
who advocate integration into the global economy are less likely to pursue nuclear 
weapons programmes than inward-looking, nationalist, and radical-confessional 
coalitions within states that reject it.  Solingen (2007) advances her argument by 
comparing nuclear decisions made in the Middle Eastern states to East Asian states. 
Her conclusions indeed suggest that states whose leaders or ruling coalitions favour 
integration into the global economy (mainly in East Asia) reject nuclear proliferation, 
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whereas states in the Middle East are more likely to adopt nuclear proliferation 
strategies due to the inward-looking reliance on domestic markets and nationalist 
values. Integrating domestic factors into the explanations of nuclear proliferation and 
restraint fills some gaps left by the neorealist approaches, highlighting that not all 
nuclear decisions can be traced back to security threats or lack of thereof. 
Some authors have used the domestic politics approach to explain the Soviet case. 
The main logic of this approach runs close to the foreign policy analysis literature on 
bureaucratic politics and the military-industrial complex, which focused on the Soviet 
and American military procurement during the Cold War (Sagan, 1996: 64). For 
example, Cockburn (1983: 12) argues that Soviet and US military policy can be 
explained better on the basis of bureaucratic competition between military services 
than as a response to external threats. He emphasises the enormous power of military 
officials and their influence on decisions regarding the Cold War arms race: “It may be 
that the military on either side is engaged not so much in an arms race as in simply 
doing what it wants to do for its own institutional reasons” (Cockburn, 1983: 12). 
According to Evangelista (1984: 601), this kind of approach posits: “weak political 
control over the military allows weapons to be procured that have no genuine 
strategic rationale”.   
Consequently, focusing on internal bureaucratic and organisational factors provides a 
better understanding of the Cold War arms race between the US and the USSR than 
neorealist perspectives. A number of studies conducted during the arms race highlight 
the interaction between internal bureaucratic and external security-related factors that 
impact the qualitative aspect of the race and continuous weapons innovation (see e.g. 
Berman and Baker, 1982; Cockburn, 1983; Evangelista, 1988; Kolkowicz, 1971). The 
approach advanced by Berman and Baker (1982), although distinct from the rational-
actor assumptions, combines the role of Soviet military tradition and organisation, 
geopolitical and historical factors, and perception of threats. They conclude that it is 
predominantly the changing nature of external threats that influenced the development 
of new and more sophisticated weapons in the Soviet Union. In contrast, Cockburn 
(1983: 13-14) argues that external security threats do not precede the decision to 
develop a particular weapons system: “The desire for the new weapon or longer 
production line comes first; only afterward is the threat discovered that the weapon is 
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supposed to meet”. Therefore, in comparison to neorealism, the domestic politics 
approach sheds light on the Soviet vertical nuclear proliferation during the Cold War 
and highlights that internal actors’ interests impact the course of the arms race on top 
of strategic calculations. 
However, Evangelista (1984: 613) argues that the domestic politics approach to Soviet 
nuclear politics derives from analogy to the US and there is no reason to believe that 
the situation in the US would necessarily be duplicated in the USSR, because the US 
represents a weak state with a strong society, whereas the USSR seems to represent the 
opposite. Thus, one cannot assume that what is true for the US is true for the Soviet 
Union. While there is an obvious utility of bureaucratic politics approach to explain 
the escalation of the arms race, these accounts do little to explain how internal state 
dynamics shaped for instance the initial decision to acquire nuclear weapons in the 
USSR. 
The domestic politics approach offers a compelling explanation of certain cases of 
states’ nuclear behaviour, where neorealist theories proved insufficient. For example, 
the US-USSR technological arms race, the emergence of the Indian nuclear 
programme without any significant security threats, or nuclear restraint in Argentina 
despite its defeat by a nuclear power - the UK - in the Falklands War. However, 
similar to neorealism, this approach to nuclear proliferation suffers from homogenous 
models of explanation that do not take into account the fundamental inside differences 
between states. Some accounts also assume that domestic actors are all rational actors 
and neglect the possibility that bureaucracies within states do not always behave 
rationally especially with regards to nuclear weapons (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 50). 
Biswas (2014: 113) emphasises that the domestic politics approach cannot account for 
the enormous ‘allure’ of nuclear weapons among political elites. Nevertheless, as 
noted by Ogilvie-White (1996: 49-50), the domestic politics model constitutes an 
important advance from neorealism in explaining nuclear decisions by departing from 
the assumption that state is a unitary actor, acknowledging that states have multiple 
goals, and reducing neorealist dichotomy between domestic and international politics 




Ideational Approaches  
The end of the bipolar world order brought about new security challenges calling for a 
re-definition of security itself and raising questions about the logic of traditional 
approaches to IR. The reason the end of the Cold War brought about this re-think was 
because traditional IR theories such as neorealism failed to predict it and then had 
difficulty adjusting to the world defined not by great power politics, but by other 
matters (Gaddis, 1992-1993: 18). Out of this context, critical security studies emerged 
with the primary assumption that the international system is a social construction 
(Fierke, 2015: 78). Critical security studies scholars emphasise the way that the 
division of the world into units we call states is not natural or pre-given, but socially 
agreed upon state of affairs, and centering this insight leads to different approaches to 
global politics. To quote the canonical work of a constructivist scholar Alexander 
Wendt, realist notions of self-help and power politics do not derive from the 
anarchical international system, rather, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 
1992: 424).  
Motivated by the need to deepen scholarly understanding of nuclear proliferation, 
several studies have developed approaches incorporating this assumption as an 
alternative to traditional perspectives. They focus on how ideas, beliefs, and identities 
may shape interests and actors’ preferences and “…highlight the importance of 
decision makers’ attitudes about the utility of nuclear weapons for achieving political 
goals in the international arena” (O’Reilly, 2012: 767). A body of work on nuclear 
proliferation that emerged in the past three decades highlights the necessity to move 
outside the limits of rationalist assumptions and invites future researchers to re-think 
nuclear proliferation in general. These scholars aim to go beyond neorealism and 
bureaucratic politics to explain nuclear proliferation, suggesting that nuclear weapons 
may serve other less obvious functions on top of defence and that nuclear policy may 
additionally be driven by factors beyond national interest, security, and power 
calculations. These include norms (see e.g. Paul, 2003; Price, 2007; Rublee, 2009; 
Sagan, 1996; Suchman and Eyere, 1992; Tannenwald, 1999, 2005, 2007), emotions 
and psychology of state leaders (see e.g. Hymans, 2006b; O’Reilly, 2012; Lavoy, 
1993), state identity constructions and beliefs in a certain non-material value of 
nuclear weapons (see e.g. Ballbach, 2016; Biswas, 2014, Duncanson and Eschle, 
2008; Long and Grillot, 2000; Ritchie, 2010, 2013, 2017; Wilson, 2013b). This 
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section begins with the discussion of psychological approaches to nuclear 
proliferation and then moves on to look at identity-focused approaches that are 
divided into constructivist, feminist, and poststructuralist contributions. It is worth 
noting that these ideational studies do not explore the Soviet case, which is why the 
Soviet Union does not feature in the following sections.   
Psychological Approaches 
Psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation emphasise the role individual 
personality types play in nuclear decision-making, building on the assumption that 
psychological traits and personal beliefs and political actions are interlinked. They 
stress the importance of psychology and human actors in nuclear proliferation 
phenomenon, because nuclear weapons programmes are under the control of political 
elites (Hymans, 2006a: 459), and nuclear decisions pose a momentous choice for 
leaders (O’Reilly, 2012: 769). O’Reilly (2012) advances a new analytical framework 
by applying a political psychology approach to nuclear decisions. He posits that 
leaders’ perceptions of themselves and others in the international system strongly 
influence their decisions with regards to nuclear proliferation. His key findings suggest 
that “the decision environment surrounding proliferation outcomes is a strategic one, 
where actions are taken not only based on one’s own interests, but also on the 
expectations and in anticipation of others acting in their own interests” (O’Reilly, 
2012: 786).  
 
Lavoy (1993) introduces the nuclear mythmaker model as a method of understanding 
both nuclear proliferation and restraint: “The strategic beliefs and political activities of 
highly motivated and resourceful individuals are where sources of nuclear 
proliferation can be found” (Lavoy, 1993: 192). He argues that due to the fortunate 
lack of experience with nuclear conflicts, leaders’ beliefs about nuclear weapons are 
sustained by logic and faith and thus constitute myth rather than fact (Lavoy, 1993: 
200). Based on Lavoy’s model, a state is likely to go nuclear when national elites 
emphasise its poor international standing and advance the myth that nuclear weapons 
would somehow improve it. On the other hand, if policymakers or talented and well-
placed experts cultivate the myth of insecurity through nuclear weapons, the 
government is likely to choose nuclear restraint (Lavoy, 1993: 199). For instance, he 
	 28	
discusses the role of India’s leading atomic physicist Homi Bhabha who supposedly 
persuaded Prime Minister Lal Bahadur to launch nuclear weapons programme in 
response to China’s nuclear test in 1964 by engaging in myth-making with regards to 
costs and timings of developing a nuclear bomb.  
Drawing on what he calls “psychological constructivism” and positioning emotion at 
the centre of his analysis, Hymans (2006b) develops a model of leaders’ national 
identity-driven decision-making and conducts a case study of nuclear decisions made 
by leaders in France, Australia, India, and Argentina.  He suggests that proliferation is 
rare, because very few leaders want nuclear weapons. In cases where proliferation 
does occur Hymans (2006b) attributes it to the “oppositional nationalist” identity of a 
state’s leader. In Hymans’ view, leaders can be described as oppositional nationalists 
when they see their nations in ‘us against them’ terms, which generates leaders’ fear of 
the Other, and when they consider their nations to be equal or superior to the external 
Other, which heightens their feeling of pride. In this sense, fear and pride of 
oppositional nationalist leaders are the main drivers of nuclear proliferation. “Driven 
by fear and pride, oppositional nationalists develop a desire for nuclear weapons that 
goes beyond calculation, to self-expression” (Hymans, 2006b: 2). In the same vein, 
Hymans (2006b: 7) argues that nuclear restraint stems not from the external pressures 
of the NPT, but from “the hearts of state leaders themselves”.  Thus, rather than 
compelling with the non-proliferation regime, states choose not to go nuclear due to 
the fact that “few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits” (Hymans, 2006b: 
8).  
Overall, psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation make an important 
contribution through their emphasis on the role of individual beliefs and identities in 
making nuclear decisions.  However, Ogilvie-White (1996: 53) argues that these 
approaches are often too narrow to capture a complex dynamic of nuclear 
proliferation and the relationship between individual beliefs and other factors in the 
proliferation process such as domestic and international political circumstances, 





A growing body of literature places states’ identity construction at the heart of 
understanding nuclear policy drawing from several strands of constructivism, 
feminism, and poststructuralism. Scholars who utilise identity-focused approaches 
offer a deeper insight into why and how states choose a course of their nuclear policy. 
This sub-section outlines the key contributions of constructivism, poststructuralism, 
and feminism to understanding the connection between identity constructions and 
nuclear proliferation. 
 
i. Constructivism: Norms and symbolic value of nuclear weapons 
 
Constructivist norms-based approaches to nuclear proliferation see states’ behaviour 
as being determined by norms and shared beliefs rather than by bureaucratic and 
national security interests (Sagan, 1996: 73). When defining ‘norms’, Sagan posits that 
individual and institutional interests are shaped by routines, rituals and habits that “are 
embedded in a social environment that promotes certain structures and behaviours as 
rational and legitimate and denigrates others as irrational and primitive” (Sagan, 1996: 
74). In this sense, the decision to go or not to go nuclear depends on what is 
considered appropriate and ‘modern’ behaviour. As additionally pointed out by 
Suchman and Eyre (1992: 150), states may acquire arms, because “such actions are an 
inherent part of the role of the independent, modern nation-state”. This takes a 
departure from the conventional realist logic of consequence (actors behaving 
rationally in order to achieve strategic objectives) to the logic of appropriateness 
(actors behaving in accordance with their self-defined identity and beliefs in what is 
expected of them or what is considered appropriate in a given situation). This 
constitutes the fundamental difference between materialist realism and idealist 
constructivism. 
To illustrate, Sagan (1996: 78) discusses the emergence of the French nuclear 
programme in 1951, which through his norms model's perspective was based on the 
French leaders’ belief in the direct link between nuclear weapons and a state’s 
position in the international system. The nuclear plan was put forward by Charles de 
Gaulle and served as a source of French independence and high rank of social 
importance. “As the curtain was drawn over colonial domination, it became clear that 
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the country's grandeur had to be nourished from other sources” (Martin, 1981, cited in 
Sagan, 1996: 78). However, nuclear proliferation history demonstrates that norms can 
be fickle. A major shift in nuclear norms in the late 1960s resulted in the decreasing 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the development of a strong anti-nuclear norm. 
Some scholars attribute this shift to the current non-proliferation regime (see e.g. 
Rublee, 2009: 222; Sagan, 1996: 76; Tannenwald, 1999: 436).  
According to Paul (2003: 137), the nuclear non-proliferation regime constitutes a “set 
of norms, principles, treaties and procedures through which countries pledge not to 
acquire nuclear weapons or help in their acquisition by other states”. In their attempt 
to explain nuclear restraint, norms-based approaches tend to focus on the influence of 
the current non-proliferation regime (specifically its main component, the NPT) on 
states’ nuclear decisions suggesting that two types of norms have emerged with 
regards to nuclear weapons: non-possession norm and an uncodified non-use norm.  
For instance, through the lens of Sagan’s norms model nuclear restraint in Ukraine can 
be seen as compliance with international non-possession norms imposed by the NPT 
based on several arguments. First, newly independent Ukraine joined the NPT as a 
non-nuclear state in an attempt to distinguish itself from nuclear Russia (Sagan, 1996: 
81). Second, the Ukrainian government did what it thought was best to enhance its 
international standing and to position itself as a responsible - that is, not rogue - state. 
The examples of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq (so-called ‘rogue states’) illustrated to the 
Ukrainian officials that nuclear proliferation may not always be a source of 
international prestige (Sagan, 1996: 81). Finally, the Ukrainian government 
experienced external pressures from the US who aimed to convince Kiev that nuclear 
weapons would never deter Russia and that not following the NPT norm would result 
in negative economic consequences (Sagan, 1996: 82). Sagan’s norms model brings a 
constructivist dimension into the picture by suggesting that nuclear decisions may be 
shaped by states’ beliefs in doing what they consider to be the ‘right thing’ or the 
norm.  
Rublee (2009) develops the constructivist insight further by analysing five cases of 
nuclear restraint: Egypt, Libya, Japan, Sweden, and Germany. She concludes that in all 
five cases the nuclear non-proliferation regime did shape states’ interpretation of the 
value of nuclear weapons and, over time, most state elites “absorbed and accepted the 
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normative message of the nuclear non-proliferation regime during the course of 
rethinking what a successful state looked like” (Rublee, 2009: 222). Rublee’s 
conclusions suggest that in order to control nuclear proliferation one needs to 
understand how states conceptualise the value of nuclear weapons. The constructivist 
approach is useful for understanding why states remain non-nuclear despite changed 
security circumstances, although, as Rublee (2009) herself points out, it does not 
provide a complete explanation of nuclear behaviour, because it cannot explain why 
nuclear proliferation occurs in the first place.  
Tannenwald (1999; 2005; 2007) made a major contribution to the discussion of the 
non-use norm, which she calls the nuclear taboo. Tannenwald’s theory is informed by 
a number of empirical anomalies within nuclear history that neorealists are unable to 
explain. For instance, it remains unclear why supposedly deterrent weapons have not 
deterred conventional attacks against nuclear states by non-nuclear states as seen in 
the cases of North Vietnam attacking the US in the Vietnam War, China attacking the 
US in the Korean War, Argentina attacking the UK in the Falklands, and Iraq attacking 
the US and Israel in the Persian Gulf War (Tannenwald, 1999: 434). Additionally, 
another anomaly is that in these cases nuclear weapons remained unused even though 
there was no fear of retaliation from adversaries. Tannenwald accounts these patterns 
of non-use to the development of a strong taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear taboo can be conceptualised as a de facto prohibition against the use of 
nuclear weapons that has developed in the global system (Tannenwald, 1999: 436). 
Paul (2003: 146) and Tannenwald (1999: 463) claim that nuclear weapons acquired 
this status of ‘taboo weapons’ due to their unique destructiveness. In 1991 nuclear 
taboo became more embedded and internalised through processes of stigmatisation; 
those not complying with the taboo “risk being classified as outside the bounds of 
‘civilised’ international society” (Tannenwald, 1999: 463). Similar to approaches 
discussed above, Tannenwald’s analysis brings to light an ideational component of 
nuclear decisions by pointing towards deeper constitutive effects that “create or define 
forms of behaviour, roles, and identities” (1999: 437).  
In a related vein, Long and Grillot (2000: 27) present a model of ideas and outcomes 
that helps to locate beliefs within the nuclear decision-making process suggesting that 
they shape both states’ preferences and strategies. Figure 2.4 presents this model. It 
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shows how states form their preferences in accordance with their basic interests and 
causal beliefs, then, given the preferences, they search for the best available nuclear 
strategy, and finally, choose strategies based on beliefs about expected returns and 
strategic environment, in which decisions are made (Long and Grillot, 2000: 27). 
States’ identities are reflected in their beliefs. Moreover, beliefs about one’s self or 
identity are particularly enduring.  These beliefs help to shape basic interests into 
preferences and eventually become embedded in the state’s goals or preferences 
themselves (Long and Grillot, 2000: 36-37).   
Long and Grillot (2000) use this model of nuclear decision-making to look at the cases 
of Ukraine and South Africa. It follows from their analysis that Ukraine’s and South 
Africa’s nuclear restraint was largely motivated by their leaders’ beliefs about 
becoming a part of the liberal democratic world.  According to Murray (2010: 658), 
securing a stable state identity is an essential objective of states’ foreign policy that 
allows them to be an actor in world politics. In constructivist terms, ‘identity’ can be 
understood as “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about 
self” constituted by both internal and external structures (Wendt, 1992: 397). 
However, as Wendt (1992: 397) argues, identity is not a unitary phenomenon 
susceptible to general definition and the character of internal-external relationship 
varies.  
Figure 2.4 Ideas and Outcomes. Source:  Long W. J. and Grillot, S. R. (2000) Ideas, Beliefs, and 
Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine, The Nonproliferation Review, 7(1): 
24-40. p. 27. 
 
Great powers have historically grounded their identity in military capabilities that 
were understood at the time as symbolic representations of their perceived great 
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power status (Murray, 2010: 665). When discussing characteristics of a ‘symbolic’ 
weapon, Wilson (2013b: 8) draws an analogy between nuclear weapons, 
dreadnoughts, and chariots suggesting that they share a lot in common by being 
“revolutionary, the newest technology, expensive, and impressive” at their time. 
Nuclear proliferation may be partially driven by state leaders’ beliefs in the symbolic 
value of nuclear weapons, which means perceiving them as a source of great power 
and a secure identity. Biswas (2014: 129) fleshes out this symbolic significance 
describing nuclear weapons as luxury fetish commodities, both valuable and deeply 
desirable by states. Nuclear weapons as fetish objects can take on symbolic 
significance through offering status and power:  
 
Fetish objects can acquire symbolic value, but that symbolic value also 
serves to make power ‘real’. It is precisely because nuclear weapons have 
emerged as symbols of power and status that their acquisition (as well as 
rejection) confers ‘real’ power (Biswas, 2014: 130). 
 
In a similar manner, Sagan’s norms model of nuclear proliferation holds that leaders’ 
beliefs in the symbolic significance of nuclear weapons may stem from normative 
underpinnings of nuclear proliferation as shown in the case of the French nuclear 
programme: “For de Gaulle, the atomic bomb was a dramatic symbol of French 
independence and was thus needed for France to continue to be seen, by itself and 
others, as a great power” (Sagan, 1996: 79).  Neorealist explanations would suggest 
that states were forced to do so for survival, while the domestic politics approach 
would focus on the tangible benefits/self-interest. In contrast, constructivist accounts 
argue that states comply with the norm, because they believe it is right or admire those 
who have already done so. Constructivist approaches to explaining nuclear 
proliferation help contend that the normative status attached to nuclear weapons 
and/or non-proliferation has an impact on nuclear decisions. According to Biswas 
(2014: 114), “nuclear weapons can acquire meaning as a particular kind of object and 
marker of status, either in their possession or in their rejection”. These meanings do 
not exist in a vacuum. They are connected to an identity that a state wants to 
articulate. Such identity plays a crucial role in institutionalising certain understandings 
and practices that assign meanings to symbolic material objects such as nuclear 
weapons and construct some policy outcomes as feasible while marginalising others 
(Ritchie, 2010: 468). 
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In a series of studies, Nick Ritchie looks at the connection between British identity and 
the continuous maintenance of the UK’s submarine-based Trident nuclear weapons 
system. According to Ritchie (2010: 484), the core collective identity constructed by 
British political elites generates continuous national interest in remaining a nuclear 
power. Ritchie (2010: 484) shows how this collective identity manifests itself through 
four dimensions: first, Britain’s self-identity as a responsible interventionist ‘pivotal’ 
major power; second, Britain as a key ally to the US; third, Britain’s historical 
competition with France over the role of the leading defender of Europe; and fourth, 
New Labour’s  ‘defensive’ identity. Ritchie (2008: 1) states: “Britain is a nuclear 
weapon state: this is an important part of its identity and it makes thinking about being 
a non-nuclear weapon state very difficult”. This exhibits the historic association 
between being a superpower and possessing nuclear weapons, which produces a 
significant challenge to the current non-proliferation regime.  
 
Similarly to Ritchie, Singh (2016: 100) adopts a constructivist identity-focused 
approach to analyse India’s nuclear identity arguing that it was discursively constituted 
through the images of Self and Other. Singh (2016: 108) concludes that the 
international community’s gradual acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons and the 
signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 in particular were enabled by “India’s 
strategy of constituting itself as a responsible nuclear power”. India’s quest for 
recognition of its nuclear status manifested itself through various means: economic, 
strategic, cultural, diplomatic, and also discursive. Singh’s insights provide a more in-
depth understanding of the Indian government’s motivations to go nuclear than for 
example, Sagan’s domestic politics model, because, in line with constructivist 
arguments, it uncovers the connection between a state’s identity and interests 
suggesting that they are constituted inter-subjectively. The study argues that India’s 
nuclear choices arose from its understanding of itself and the world order and 
emphasises the role of recognition by others in this process. Indian government has 
sought this recognition through various discursive and material means such as 
projecting the defensive posture of India’s nuclear doctrine, the signing of the Indo-US 
Nuclear Deal in 2008, exhibiting adherence to non-proliferation norms, and calling 
for global disarmament (Singh, 2006: 101-102). Singh’s study emphasises the 
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significance of discourse to a state’s nuclear identity construction, because through the 
persistent non-proliferation peace discourse India achieved the recognition as the 
responsible nuclear power by the international community. However, her analysis 
shies away from defining what exactly a state’s nuclear identity is and how it connects 
with nuclear policy decisions. 
 
Das (2010: 150) deepens the connection between state identity construction and 
nuclear proliferation. In her critical constructivist analysis of India’s and Pakistan’s 
nuclear policies, she demonstrates how the constitutive nature of states’ identities may 
re-articulate (in)securities to justify nuclear policy. Drawing from the interpretive 
analysis of David Campbell, she suggests that there are no primary or stable state 
identities, and state insecurities are socially and culturally reproduced through 
representations of a dangerous Other (Das, 2010: 150). “Central to this process of 
constituting a state’s identity is its foreign policy and its construction of danger, which 
serve to consolidate the state’s identity” (Das, 2010: 151). Das (2010: 163) concludes 
that while there was a rational element of realpolitik in Indian and Pakistani nuclear 
politics, it is imperative to consider subjective issues such a nation’s history, religion, 
culture, and ideology. Although both states justified their nuclear projects on the basis 
of geo-strategic considerations, they simultaneously relied on their histories, economic 
and developmental anxieties, and their political leaders’ ideologies in order to interpret 
their national identities and (in)securities (Das, 2010: 164). For example, Pakistan’s 
nuclear (in)security discourse was grounded in terms of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ versus 
Indian ‘Hindu’ bomb. The approach of Das shows how engaging the material realm 
with the interpretive realm could help to better comprehend states’ nuclear choices, 
because it emphasises how when it comes to nuclear weapons, states’ considerations 
go way beyond security and geopolitical concerns. 
ii. Poststructuralism 
Ballbach (2016) also advances an identity-focused approach drawing on 
poststructuralism to explore North Korea’s nuclear state identity construction and how 
it interrelates with its nuclear policy. Ballbach utilises Judith Butler’s work on 
performativity – “the power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration” 
(Butler, 1993, cited in Ballbach, 2016: 394) and also draws upon Lene Hansen’s 
position that there is no causal relationship between states’ identity constructions and 
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foreign policies, but rather “identities are both a product of and a justification for 
foreign policies” (Hansen, 2006, cited in Ballbach, 2016: 396). This claim and its 
crucial significance to the theoretical framework of this thesis will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter. Seeing identity in line with poststructuralist 
assumptions as discursive and relational, Ballbach (2016: 410) concludes that North 
Korea’s nuclear state identity emerged through the citational practices of 
performativity: 
 
As such, North Korea’s nuclear program comes into effect and is 
potentiated as an acceptable and appropriate measure for defending the 
threatened Self against specifically identified Other (s) – primarily the US 
– within framework and scope of specific foreign policy discourses. 
 
 
Ballbach’s application of poststructuralism to understanding a state’s nuclear policy 
presents a direction of inquiry that is underexplored by IR scholars of nuclear 
proliferation. It sheds light on factors that were not formerly considered in relevant 
identity-focused literatures, such as how possessing nuclear weapons may constitute a 
particular trait of a state identity with policy being central to its reproduction. In 
comparison to constructivists, poststructuralists put more emphasis on the fact that 
identities are never fixed. For example, although Wendt (1992) posits that identities are 
important and understands them as non-unitary, he still tends to see them as somewhat 
fixed and pre-given. Ballbach (2016: 392) criticises Wendtian constructivist 
assumptions of pre-given identities, because it disregards the discursive nature of 
identities and the performative-constitutive relationship to foreign policy. A 
poststructuralist approach, he argues, highlights the discursive construction of identities 
and may encompass both emotional and strategic considerations. Poststructuralists 
reject the conventional taken-for-granted assumption that foreign policy is an internally 
mediated response to the external world, instead they see foreign policy as a means 
through which a particular mode of subjectivity is produced and reproduced (Ballbach, 
2016: 395).  
Ballbach’s work is different from other authors in the ideational camp of nuclear 
proliferation studies, because in comparison to constructivism he adopts a non-causal 
epistemology and explores a constitutive significance of North Korea’s nuclear state 
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identity for formulating and debating its nuclear weapons programme. This helps to 
gather a richer understanding of the North Korean case and to take this understanding 
beyond material factors and causality. In addition, Ballbach (2016: 398) introduces the 
concept of a ‘nuclear state identity’, which he sees as a trait of the broader discursively 
constructed state identity associated with reframing Self in terms of a nuclear weapons 
state. North Korean security doctrines and nuclear tests can be understood as the 
performative enactment of this identity trait. Focusing on the constructions of nuclear 
state identity broadens our perceptions of North Korea’s nuclear project beyond the 
political-diplomatic, economic, and even military realm and presents a new 
perspective on the continuous conflict between the international community and North 
Korea.  
iii. Feminism 
Often overlooked by other nuclear proliferation scholars, feminist IR approaches have 
offered a crucial contribution to explaining how identity plays an important role in 
nuclear policy. These studies emphasise how nuclear discourses reproduce gendered 
hierarchies and demonstrate how a gender lens or gendered analysis can help uncover 
the ways in which identities are constructed in relation to difference. Following the 
ground-breaking research of Carol Cohn (1987), feminist IR scholars together with anti-
nuclear women activists have highlighted the gendered nature of nuclear discourse and 
suggested that in order to understand nuclear proliferation, this ‘gender dimension’ 
needs to be taken into account (see e.g. Cohn et al., 2005; Das, 2012; Duncanson and 
Eschle, 2008).  
For instance, Cohn et al. (2005: 1) argue: “ideas and expectations about gender are 
woven through the professional and political discourses that shape all aspects of how 
weapons of mass destruction are considered, desired and addressed”.  To illustrate 
their claim, Cohn et al. (2005: 6-7) look at US post 9/11 nuclear discourse and show 
how it functions to justify the continuous development of nuclear weapons by equating 
it with manliness and potency, while disarmament is presented as feeble, wimpy or 
‘lacking balls’. In addition, they highlight the significance of sexual metaphors used by 
political actors in their representations of nuclear weapons, which creates additional 
excitement and support for the weapons meaning that “the symbolic gendered 
dimensions of nuclear weapons are not trivial; they are an integral part of 
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accomplishing domestic and political objectives” (Cohn et al., 2005: 4). 
In a related vein, Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 546) posit: “gender as a category helps 
us understand the ways in which individual (and collective) identity is socially 
constructed around and through assumptions about male/female sexual difference, or 
the categories of masculinity and femininity”. They use feminist analysis to flesh out the 
contradictions in British identity constructions in light of the UK government plans to 
renew the Trident nuclear programme in 2007. After conducting the discourse analysis 
of the White Paper on Trident, Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 562) conclude that in 
their articulation of Trident renewal, British officials were constructing an identity of a 
“responsible steward” yet remained attracted to the power status and strength that they 
believed nuclear weapons offer. Duncanson and Eschle (2008) make a similar point to 
Ritchie’s studies of the British identity discussed in the constructivist section. However, 
they draw attention to and emphasise how a ‘responsible steward’ is a gendered 
concept and a type of masculinity. This shows how states continuously explore 
different forms of masculinity in order to hold on to powerful weaponry, but at the 
same time construct Self that is ethical, morally sound, and responsible. The gendered 
dichotomised structure of nuclear weapons discourses, unveiled by feminist IR 
scholars, where a ‘masculine’ element is valued higher than a ‘feminine’ one helps us 
to understand states’ desire to acquire and hold on to nuclear weapons. Different forms 
of masculinity become a necessary attribute of a state’s identity that is constructed 
within security discourses. As such, feminist scholars offer an invaluable insight into 
the challenges of achieving disarmament.  
Section Summary  
This section established that when it comes to nuclear proliferation/restraint, ideas, 
beliefs, and identities constructed by state actors matter as much as security, power, 
and deterrence calculations. Ideational approaches discussed in this section present 
alternative viewpoints that are essential to consider if we are indeed aiming to obtain a 
fuller explanation of how, why, and when some states choose to go nuclear and how, 
why, and when some choose nuclear restraint. These approaches challenge 
conventional material understandings of nuclear proliferation and bring in a number 
of factors that may shape nuclear policies of states: psychology of individual leaders, 
norms, beliefs, and ideas about nuclear weaponry. Central to ideational approaches is 
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the notion of identity. Identity-focused studies produce an in-depth understanding of 
states’ nuclear behaviour covering the dimensions that were not in the foreground 
previously. For example, the objective epistemology of neorealist approach does not 
allow for consideration of subjective issues such as a nation’s history, ideology and 
culture that states draw on in order to justify their nuclear policies and to interpret 
their national selves (Das, 2016: 164). Thus, a state’s identity and nuclear decisions 
are closely interlinked.  
This section also established that in comparison to different strands of constructivism, 
a poststructuralist approach takes our understanding of state’s motivations to go 
nuclear beyond causality and captures a complex interplay between discursive nature 
of state identities and their performative-constitutive relationship to foreign policy. In 
addition, feminist IR scholars emphasise the existing gender hierarchies within nuclear 
discourses and masculine attributes attached to nuclear weapons, which enable states 
to articulate masculinised identities and to construct nuclear weapons as desirable. 
Among other identity-focused approaches to nuclear proliferation, poststructuralist 
and feminist insights have often been neglected in IR studies of nuclear proliferation. 
To recap, this thesis asks: ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear 
weapons policy?’ Scholars discussed in this section posed similar research questions in 
their studies and produced compelling in-depth findings. However, their work does 
not explore the case of nuclear proliferation in the USSR, which means that the 
relationship between Soviet identity and nuclear policy remains underexplored. 
Conventional approaches leave a gap in our understanding of the vertical proliferation 
during the Cold War arms race or of the Soviet decision to radically reduce the 
stockpiling of nuclear weapons.  Can identity-focused approaches help us understand 
the Soviet case? What role have ideas about a Soviet identity played in the Soviet 
acquisition, development, and eventual reduction of nuclear weapons? 
An examination of how historians have dealt with the Soviet case indicates that 
identity plays a major role in explaining nuclear behaviour. IR scholars have much to 
learn from their detailed examination of the role of norms, ideas, and beliefs in 
informing the actions and policies of various Soviet leaders and policy makers. This 
literature forms a rich source of data for this study and is also outlined in brief in the 
next section of this literature review. 
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Contributions of Historians 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the openings of the Soviet military archives 
throughout the 1990s, scholars gained access to previously kept secret documentation 
related to the Soviet nuclear project, which greatly contributed to our understanding of 
the Soviet motivations and thinking about nuclear weapons. These sources capture the 
convoluted dynamics of Soviet decision-making and uncover various factors that 
shaped it. It is worth noting that this thesis does not attempt to challenge explanations 
offered by historians. It takes a different ontological and epistemological stance and 
poses a different set of questions. As such, I am not seeking to describe what 
happened and why in order to provide the most accurate historical account. Rather, I 
am interested in demonstrating to an IR audience the role that identity played in Soviet 
nuclear policy, in order to contribute to the IR scholarship that argued that we need to 
go beyond conventional logic to fully understand nuclear policy. This is important, 
because if identity matters, it means change is possible. 
 
The contributions of historians to our understanding of Soviet nuclear policy during 
the Cold War reveal the role identity plays in Soviet nuclear decision-making. They 
highlight that states’ nuclear decisions are not always rational or security-related and 
multiple factors can play a role in motivating them. As mentioned above, after the 
opening of the Soviet military archives, historians generated empirically rich and 
detailed accounts of Soviet behaviour. According to Zubok (2009: xxiii), these new 
sources reveal that the Cold War was much more than a clash of superpowers and an 
acquisition of deadly weapons – “every history is the story of people and their 
motives, hopes, crimes, illusions, and mistakes”. This section outlines some of the key 
histories of Soviet nuclear policy that I refer to throughout the thesis.4  
 
Given the breadth of existing historical accounts of Soviet nuclear policy during the 
Cold War, reviewed studies were divided into several categories relating to the 
individual leaders, the historic period covered, and concrete nuclear policy decisions. 
Some of these studies contribute to several categories simultaneously. Due to the 
totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union, the power of decision-making was often 
	
4 This body of literature is so vast that I cannot be sure that I have looked at them all. 
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concentrated in the hands of the few and reflected their personal backgrounds, views, 
and emotions. As a result, historians widely acknowledge the role of specific Soviet 
leaders either individually or in multiplicity (see e.g. Craig and Radchenko, 2008, 
2018; Fursenko and Naftali, 2006; Holloway, 1988, 1989/90, 1994; Zubok, 2000, 
2009; Zubok and Harrison, 1999). For example, David Holloway in his award-
winning book Stalin and the Bomb provides perhaps the most comprehensive review 
of the Soviet nuclear bomb’s acquisition and the early stages of the arms race after 
Stalin’s death in 1953. Aside from security and resistance to political pressure from the 
US, Holloway (1994: 364-371) highlights an incredibly emotional nature of Soviet 
nuclear policy making. First, he argues that this policy reflected a deep-rooted 
consciousness of backwardness vis-à-vis the West and a necessity to overcome this 
backwardness, which was entrenched in the official Soviet ideology of being a 
socialist state that would lead the world from capitalism to communism (Holloway, 
1994: 365). Second, the initiation of the Soviet nuclear project had a lot to do with 
Stalin’s “malevolent and suspicious personality” and his attempts to show the US that 
he will not be intimidated.  Finally, Holloway (1994: 369) uncovers that Stalin’s 
motives to acquire the bomb actually included preparations for the new world war 
against the US, from which he believed the Soviets would emerge as a victorious 
superpower.  
 
Holloway falls into the category of historians who also look at the sequence of Soviet 
policy-making focusing on decision-making processes, actions, and ideas in relation to 
the stage of acquisition of nuclear weapons (see e.g. Artyomov, 2013; Craig and 
Radchenko, 2008; Holloway, 1994, 1981). Some historians discuss the Soviet initial 
decision to go nuclear in the context of either broader Cold War politics or the general 
historical development of nuclear weapons (see e.g. Alperovitz, 1995; Bernstein, 
2001; Cirincione, 2007; DeGroot, 2005; Gaddis, 1989, 1997, 2005; Grogin, 2001; 
Hanhimäki and Westad, 2003; Rhodes, 1988, 1995, 2007). The overall insight 
provided by these scholars emphasises extensive spy networks deployed by the Soviets 
during World War II to gather information about the US nuclear work due to mistrust 
existing between two sides. The aforementioned historians attribute Soviet nuclear 
weapons acquisition to Stalin’s rational security calculations, but also to various 
beliefs and emotions: first, to the Soviet leaders’ fears that the US would be ahead of 
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them militarily and thus would overpower the USSR in the post-war world order; 
second, to the Soviet historical quest to become a world superpower; and third, to 
Stalin’s belief that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US were an attack 
not against Japan, but against the Soviet Union.  
 
Another group of historians focuses on the sequence of Soviet policy making during 
the arms race stage with Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘blustery’ personality on the one side 
(see e.g. Craig and Radchenko, 2018; Fursenko and Naftali, 2006; Holloway, 1984 
Zagoria, 1961; Zubok and Harrison, 1999; Zubok, 2009) and Brezhnev’s pragmatic 
detente on the other (see e.g. Holloway, 1975; Zaloga, 2002; Zubok, 2009). These 
authors ascribe Soviet ‘irrational’ arming and dangerous moves such as placing of the 
Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 to first, Khrushchev’s political style of nuclear 
brinkmanship and ideological messianism; second, to the growing hostility of the US; 
and third, to the Soviet continuous striving for military superiority and superpower 
status. The important contribution here is that the US-Soviet arms race cannot just be 
understood as the action-reaction phenomenon, which puts neorealist logic of rational 
deterrence into question. Khrushchev’s era was characterised by the development of 
the MAD doctrine. However, there was a notable belief among top Soviet officials that 
the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war (Craig and Radchenko, 2018; Zubok, 2009). 
Despite Khrushchev’s aggression, his nuclear policy was largely driven by the desire of 
recognition as an equal to the US and an achievement of peaceful coexistence (Craig 
and Radchenko, 2018; Zubok, 2009). His beliefs, however, led to the most serious 
near miss in nuclear history – the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. After the crisis both 
the US and the Soviet Union fully accepted the logic of MAD, which offered a relative 
stability to the next three decades of the Cold War (Craig, 2013). This exemplifies the 
role that individual beliefs and identities played in the vertical nuclear proliferation.  
 
The third sequence of Soviet nuclear policy-making is related to the politics of arms 
control and disarmament under leaderships of Brezhnev and Gorbachev. The 
disarmament period in the late 1980s coincided with the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, it is only natural that it is captured in all general 
accounts on Soviet leadership and the Cold War. Some sources provide a more 
specific focus on Gorbachev (see e.g. Calingaert, 1991; Holloway, 1988, 1989/90, 
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2011, Zubok, 2000, 2009). These authors commonly explain Soviet disarmament 
policy being a result of the struggling Soviet economy and the key component of 
Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ characterised by the politics of openness, restructuring, 
liberal ideas of peace and cooperation as well as Gorbachev’s personal fears of a 
nuclear war and scepticism about military force. Furthermore, during Gorbachev’s 
rule the USSR and the whole world were shaken by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on 
April 26, 1986. Gorbachev’s active pursuit of disarmament, as argued by some 
historians, emerged as a response to the catastrophe (see e.g. Rhodes, 2007; Zubok, 
2000; Zubok, 2009).  
 
This section provided a brief overview of existing historical perspectives on the Soviet 
nuclear behaviour during the Cold War. This literature presents a range of factors that 
determined a course of Soviet nuclear policy from the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
to the rapid arms reduction. Undoubtedly, security, power, and deterrence 
calculations significantly shaped Soviet nuclear decisions. However, what historians 
emphasise is that Soviet behaviour was not always rational, and it is important to take 
into account the powerful ideas and beliefs the Soviets had about themselves and 
where they wanted to be. These ideas were often a product of individual leaders’ 
worldview and the messianic character of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. Their 
prominence could not allow the Soviets to lag behind the capitalist West and drove 
their quest for superpower status. Zubok (2009: xxiv) stated that it is not possible to 
explain Soviet motives during the Cold War “without at least trying to understand how 




This chapter established that IR literatures that look at states’ motivations for acquiring, 
maintaining, or forgoing nuclear weapons present a complex theoretical debate with 
numerous strengths, but also contradictions and weaknesses. Drawing from near 
enough every existing IR paradigm, these approaches provide a dynamic picture of 
nuclear proliferation emphasising that it is never complete and there is always a need 
to explore states’ nuclear motivations further, because nuclear proliferation remains as 
one of the major security issues in the world. This chapter demonstrated that, although 
there is a plethora of authors focusing on the nuclear behaviour of the USSR during the 
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Cold War, their explanations remain rooted in materialist rationalist frameworks that 
treat Soviet nuclear policy as a measured response to the external security environment 
and as a result of an internal bureaucratic struggle. Such approaches, although 
valuable, proved insufficient to fully understand Soviet nuclear motives due to an 
increased over-reliance on rationalist assumptions and their inability to explain vertical 
nuclear proliferation.  
Ideational scholarship on nuclear proliferation emerged predominantly after the end of 
the Cold War and expanded our understanding of nuclear proliferation seeing the 
international system as a social construction and arguing that non-rationalist factors 
such as ideas, beliefs, and identities to a large extent influence nuclear behaviour of 
states. This gave rise to a large body of empirically and theoretically rich scholarly 
work that shed light on many previously unexplored cases of nuclear proliferation and 
restraint as well as augmented existing knowledge provided by neorealist and domestic 
politics approaches. Identity-focused literature offers an invaluable insight into how a 
state’s identity constructions are very much interlinked with the direction of its nuclear 
policy. Within this literature, constructivist, feminist, and poststructuralist approaches 
offer in-depth understandings of the connection between identity and nuclear 
proliferation by taking the connection beyond linear causal links and moving on from 
the assumption that all states exist and operate in an objective universal reality. 
However, scholars utilising these approaches to nuclear proliferation largely neglect 
the case of the Soviet Union revealing a gap in our understanding of this case beyond 
conventional materialist factors.  
This chapter also showed that Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War has been a 
subject of numerous works of historians. These literatures demonstrate that Soviet 
policy-making was not always rational and had a lot to do with the ideological and 
totalitarian nature of the Soviet state and, most importantly, historians highlight how 
the way Soviets viewed the world and themselves played a crucial role in shaping the 
USSR’s nuclear policy. Therefore, there is no doubt that there were deeper non-rational 
motives to Soviet nuclear behaviour, which IR literature on nuclear proliferation fails to 
capture. By asking ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons 
policy?’ this thesis seeks to fulfil this gap. Its fundamental rationale is that no volume in 
IR literature has satisfactorily explored the significance of identity constructions to the 
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course of Soviet nuclear policy.  
Finally, this chapter established that among ideational identity-focused approaches to 
nuclear proliferation, poststructuralism offers the most in-depth understanding of 
connections between nuclear policy and articulations of state identity, yet it is only 
utilised in a handful of studies. Feminist contributions to the field are also often 
overlooked, although these studies enrich our understanding of masculinised nature of 
state identities and the consequences this has for nuclear weapons policy. It thus 
follows that the second gap that this thesis seeks to fill is to expand our application of 
poststructuralism to nuclear weapons proliferation and to highlight the necessity of 
incorporating a feminist dimension into this approach. To conclude, while this thesis 
shares the basic assumption of constructivism that identity matters, it seeks to take the 
identity logic a step further by focusing on the discursive constructions of a nuclear 
identity and seeing how these constructions permeate the practices of nuclear policy. 
The next chapter outlines the details of this approach and presents the theoretical 













Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: A Poststructuralist Approach to Identity 




So far, it has been established that the intention of this thesis is to examine the extent 
to which identity construction and articulation was at the heart of the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons policy and how these concerns manifested themselves from the rule 
of Joseph Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev during the periods of nuclear weapons 
acquisition, the arms race, and disarmament. Chapter 2 articulated the core rationale 
for the analysis via comprehensive review of the existing relevant literature. It was 
demonstrated that in the case of the USSR’s nuclear decisions, material forces have 
been traditionally privileged over ideational in IR scholarship. However, this picture 
remains incomplete. As discussed, neorealist and domestic politics explanations do 
not always provide an accurate account of events and have multiple shortcomings due 
to their assumption that states are self-interested rational actors and due to their 
conceptualisation of security purely in terms of state military power and material gains 
(see e.g. Evangelista, 1988; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979; 1981).  
Ideational approaches offer an invaluable alternative insight into other cases of 
nuclear proliferation and restraint through their emphasis on the socially constructed 
nature of security and the role of ideas, beliefs, and identity in nuclear policy-making 
(see e.g. Hymans, 2006b; Ritchie, 2008: 2010; Rublee, 2009). However, these 
literatures commonly adopt causal epistemologies and treat identities as pre-given, 
which, as argued in Chapter 2, does not always capture the complexities of 
identity/policy nexus. Furthermore, they overlook the case of the Soviet nuclear 
policy. The previous chapter also established that in comparison to constructivism, a 
poststructuralist approach moves away from the assumption of pre-given identities 
taking into consideration their discursive nature and the performative-constitutive 
relationship to foreign policy (Ballbach, 2016: 392). This provides for a deeper 
understanding of the link between a state’s identity and nuclear policy.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework through 
which this thesis seeks to explore the connection between identity and Soviet nuclear 
policy. Drawing on the works of poststructuralist and feminist IR scholars, it discusses 
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the value of focusing on the articulations of a state’s nuclear identity in order to gain 
an in-depth understanding of how nuclear policies are enacted and legitimised.  
Although this thesis claims that identities are important in nuclear policy decision-
making, it is imperative to highlight that they are not singular drivers of policy. As 
explained by Wendt (1999: 135):  
the claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or 
that they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are 
just as important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power 
and interest have the affects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them 
up. 
 
The intention of this thesis is to provide a poststructuralist account of Soviet nuclear 
policy during the Cold War.  It argues that understanding the co-constitutive 
relationship between nuclear identity constructions and articulations of nuclear policy 
provides for a more nuanced insight into states’ decisions regarding nuclear weapons.  
 
This chapter thus proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the key premises and 
assumptions of poststructuralist theory and poststructuralist-informed understanding of 
a state identity as principally articulated through foreign policy discourses and 
constituted in relation to one or multiple Others. It then proceeds to discuss the 
relevance of feminist IR conceptualisations of gender within international security 
studies, noting that both rationalist and ideational nuclear proliferation scholars have 
largely neglected gender in their analyses. The prime purpose of this discussion is to 
show how incorporating a gender lens into a poststructuralist analysis of 
identity/policy nexus helps to flesh out the discursive constructions of identity in 
hierarchical difference. Second, building upon Ballbach’s concept of ‘a nuclear state 
identity’, this chapter defines ‘nuclear identity’ in poststructuralist terms emphasising 
its centrality and value for this research. The discussion then proceeds with the 
reiteration of the research questions established in Chapter 1 and in line with the 
poststructuralist approach. Finally, the last section of this chapter examines what 
Soviet nuclear identity is understood to be in terms of its relation to difference and key 




Poststructuralism in IR: Key Assumptions 
 
Chapter 2 has already gone some way in outlining the shortcomings of various 
mainstream IR approaches that have dominated the analyses of nuclear policy in the 
Soviet Union. Emerging in the 1980s, poststructuralist works sought to criticise the 
universalising, objectivist, and positivist stance of rationalist theories drawing attention 
to the power of language and discourse (see e.g. Ashley, 1984; 1987; 1988; 1989; 
Campbell, 1992; Der Derian, 1989; Hansen, 2006; 2012; Neumann, 1999; Walker, 
1987; 1995). Inspired by poststructuralist philosophers such as Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida, these scholars discard what is taken for granted as assumed 
knowledge, arguing that knowledge is ultimately historically contingent. The key task 
of poststructuralist critique is:  
 
to expose the historicity – the arbitrariness, the political content, and the 
dependence upon practice – of the limits that are imposed in history and 
inscribed in paradigms of the sovereignty of man […] the task is to come to 
terms with the knowledgeable practices by which limits are imposed and 
paradigmatically inscribed (Ashley, 1989: 284). 
 
As such, poststructuralism seeks to deconstruct realist claims to objectivity and 
structural determinism and to bring out the political and historical contexts upon 
which our knowledge about international politics is contingent (Hansen, 2012: 99).  
The theoretical starting point of this thesis is the poststructuralist conceptualisation of 
security as constructed rather than given – security is constituted in language as a 
discursive practice (Hansen, 1997: 381). This allows us to move away from linking 
security solely to the military and strategic means. Understanding security as a 
discursive practice implies that threats, insecurities, and identities come into being 
through the practice of security. However, security is not just discursive but also 
political, both are integral to each other: 
By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a 
ship). By uttering ‘security’, a state – representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use 




This highlights an intimate connection between material and ideational domains that 
poststructuralism advocates – material as in making a concrete policy decision.  
Furthermore, poststructuralism rejects the assumption that the state is an essentialised 
presence. Poststructuralists argue that the state is never finished as an entity but is 
constantly in the process of being produced through a set of practices that establish 
identity and fix difference (Ballbach, 2015: 141; Campbell, 1992: 9-13). The state 
(here: the Soviet Union) is not treated as a pre-given subject that comes before policy 
decisions – it is a particular mode of subjectivity that is reproduced through the 
practice of foreign policy, which in its turn can be understood “as a political practice 
central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of [American] political 
identity” (Campbell, 1992: 8). This demonstrates how foreign and security policies of 
states act as important practices through which states construct and reinforce their 
identities. Constructivists also emphasise identity as central to states’ foreign policies 
and argue against the always-rational nature of states’ decisions (Wendt, 1999). Some 
conventional constructivists even allow more scope for non-causal theory (see e.g. 
Katzenstein, 1996). However, they still broadly attempt to ‘test’ theoretical validity and 
privilege causal epistemological research (Hansen, 2006: 9; Wendt, 1999: 87). In 
comparison to most constructivist approaches, poststructuralism rejects causal 
epistemology arguing instead that “representations of identity are simultaneously the 
precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of policy” (Hansen, 2006: 10). 
This point will be discussed in greater detail throughout this chapter.  
Another imperative aspect to highlight when adopting a poststructuralist theoretical 
framework is the shift from the positivist logic of explanation to the logic of 
interpretation. The latter, as explained by Campbell (1992: 4), does not concern itself 
with identifying the ‘real causes’ of for example nuclear proliferation, but with 
investigating the political consequences of different historical modes of representation. 
This emphasises the necessity of the transference from why to how questions, which 
has been largely neglected by nuclear proliferation scholars preoccupied with 
causality, as seen in Chapter 2.  Doty (1993: 298-299) posits that how questions are 
concerned with explaining how meanings are constructed and attached to various 
subjects/objects, which make certain practices possible. In contrast to why questions, 
how questions present a more critical approach to the studied issue and explore the 
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kind of power that produces meanings, identities, and their interrelationships (Doty, 
1993: 299). Posing how questions can help to “inquire into practices that enable 
social actors to act, to frame policy as they do, and to wield the capabilities they do” 
(Doty, 1993: 299). Thus, when interrogating the connection between Soviet nuclear 
policy and identity, this thesis asks not why the Soviets chose to acquire a nuclear 
bomb or to dramatically reduce their nuclear arsenal, but how these decisions were 
made possible. I will discuss the established research questions later on in this 
chapter, when introducing the concept of ‘a nuclear identity’. 
 
Poststructuralists see language as constitutive of reality, texts mirror a world ‘out there’ 
(Agger, 1991: 120). Language carries ontological significance for poststructuralists. As 
Hansen (2006: 18) puts it: “it is only through the construction in language that ‘things’ 
– objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material structures – are given meaning 
and endowed with a particular identity”. The concept of ‘discourse’ is key to 
poststructuralist analyses of the relationship between identity and policy. Foucault 
(1972: 80) postulated that discourse can be treated either as the general realm of all 
statements, as a group of individual statements, or as a regulated practice that 
accounts for certain statements. It is through discourses that the material and the 
ideational are represented. Discourses play a central role in the conduct of 
international politics. As emphasised by Doty (1996: 5):  
 
International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices 
that put into circulation representations that are taken as “truth”. The goal 
of analysing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been 
obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the 
production of knowledge and identities and how these representations 
make various courses of action possible. 
 
In essence, poststructuralist scholars do not take objects and subjects of international 
relations as pre-given entities. Instead, through the analysis of international relations 
discourses, they seek to examine how these objects and subjects acquired their 
meaning in the first place, and what kind of possibilities for policy action these 
meanings enabled. For poststructuralism, discourses function as the primary sites for 
the exercise of power, and foreign policy acts as a discursive practice through which 
states construct and reproduce their own and others’ identities.  Therefore, a 
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poststructuralist critique of mainstream approaches to nuclear weapons proliferation 
would postulate that through acquiring or not acquiring nuclear weapons, a state first, 
continuously reproduces and affirms its identity, and second, a state’s identity takes a 
form of representational practice that enables or precludes articulations of policy. This 
represents a significant departure from the key claims of nuclear proliferation literature 
discussed in Chapter 2, because this approach helps to understand nuclear policy as a 
dynamic process that is not fixed or universal but is constitutively linked to identity 
and is historically contingent.  
 
It is imperative to note that the kinds of approaches that promote textual interpretation 
and abstain from the analysis of the material ‘real’ world attract a great deal of 
criticism in the field of IR. The poststructuralist shift away from the mainstream 
conceptions of security in military terms prompted some to argue that the field has 
been ‘seduced’ by poststructuralism. In the widely cited article that represents the 
views of a number of others, Walt (1991: 223) argues: “issues of war and peace are 
too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that 
is divorced from the real world”. However, this chapter and Chapter 2 have already 
gone some way in showing how preoccupation with causality and focusing solely on 
the objectivist, power-related, and material aspects of nuclear proliferation provide an 
incomplete picture of Soviet nuclear policy. Furthermore, in the direct response to 
Walt’s criticisms, Hansen (1997: 369) argues that poststructuralism is not a case for 
seduction and security studies would benefit from engaging with it more closely: 
 
Poststructuralism advocates a position different from both the traditional 
realist and idealist perspectives in IR and offers important insights on the 
construction of national-international dichotomy, the relationship between 
national identity and security politics, the discursive character of the 
concept of security. 
 
So far, this chapter has established that this thesis adopts a poststructuralist theoretical 
framework and problematises strictly positivistic and objectivist search for a singular 
definitive ‘truth’ about states’ decisions regarding nuclear weapons. While fully 
acknowledging the value of realist and constructivist accounts for understanding 
nuclear proliferation, it emphasises that preoccupation with universalist truths, 
causality, and pre-given identities, provides a somewhat limited picture. Instead, this 
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thesis treats identity as constructed through Soviet nuclear weapons discourse, 
meaning that it cannot exist outside of the discourse and cannot be used as a variable 
against which the behaviour of states can be measured (Hansen, 2006: 6). 
Furthermore, consistent with poststructuralist ontological emphasis on language, this 
thesis conceptualises identity as both a precondition for and as constituted through 
nuclear policy. Hence, the analytical epistemological focus is on how identity and 
policy are articulated within discourse. The implications of focusing on discourse and 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological considerations that it entails will be 
discussed in greater depth in the next chapter. At this stage, the chapter turns to the 
poststructuralist emphasis on difference. It introduces the conceptualisation of identity 
as relational and highlights the significance of difference and Otherness to the 
articulations of foreign policy.  
 
Identity, Difference, Otherness 
 
Despite numerous debates regarding the role of identity in security studies, there is a 
general consensus that identity presumes multiplicity and is defined in relation to a 
series of differences (Fierke, 2015: 82). Difference is a central component of 
poststructuralist understanding of how meaning is constituted through discourse. 
Essentially, this means that language only establishes meanings through a series of 
differential signs or juxtapositions, and in so doing produces binary oppositions and 
hierarchies where one element is valued over the other (Agger, 1991: 113; Hansen, 
2006: 19). These systems of signs are inherently unstable and are in need of support; it 
is through the articulation of difference that the meaning becomes temporarily 
stabilised.  
 
To illustrate, a poststructuralist understanding of sovereignty implies separation and 
differentiation between domestic ‘inside’ and international ‘outside’; “the principle of 
state sovereignty affirms a specific account of who we are […] and denies the 
possibility of any other alternative” (Walker, 1990: 12). The inside only becomes 
meaningful when it is juxtaposed to the outside. In this sense, the outside or the Other 
often takes on a form of not just being radically different, but also being constructed as 
evil and dangerous, as neatly epitomised by Walker (1990: 13): 
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"We" are rational, enlightened, and developed; We would be happy to 
cooperate with other peoples on the basis of rational and enlightened 
standards of civilized behaviour; but unfortunately "They" are uncivilized 
and irrational; consequently, We must resort to force in order to protect the 
standards We have striven so hard to maintain. Aspirations for peace are all 
very well, it might be said, but what about the ----- (fill in the name of your 
favourite enemy of the moment)? 
This presents poststructuralist understandings of foreign policy as playing a central role 
in producing the boundary between inside and outside as well as producing the ‘we’ 
who enact this policy and the threatening ‘they’ who render security necessary 
(Hansen, 2012: 99). For the Soviet leaders, to speak of the capitalist, warmongering, 
the American, means to construct another identity as communist, peaceful or non-
American, as will be illustrated in the empirical chapters of this thesis. These 
constructions are reproduced through foreign policy discourses and invoked as the 
precondition for policy action, which implies that identities are repeatedly executed 
rather than merely possessed. This sets out poststructuralist understanding of identity 
and policy as performative, meaning “constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are 
said to be its results” (Butler, 1990: 25). As such, identities only become meaningful 
when they are performatively enacted through the formulation of policy. 
In his seminal work Identity/Difference, William Connolly (1991: 64) stated that an 
identity could only exist when established in relation to difference: “Identity requires 
difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its 
own self-certainty”. Inspired by the Derridean notion of différance, poststructuralist 
scholars propose several dimensions of the identity/difference nexus: first, the role of 
identity and difference in constituting ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of states; second, the role 
of identity and difference in reproducing hierarchies where one element is privileged 
over the other; and third, its role in constructing ethics, morality, and responsibility.   
 
To build on the first point, Campbell (1992: 68), for example, explains that Otherness 
and the production of danger about the evil external Others are crucial for successful 
formation of a state’s identity. Looking at how the US historically constructed its 
identity, he claims that while identity need not require something radically different in 
this case there was a “temptation to treat difference as otherness” (Campbell, 1992: 
56). These processes contribute to what Campbell calls a “well-established discursive 
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economy of identity/difference”, which in its turn triggers exclusionary practices of 
boundary-making (policies) and additionally reinforces the representation of fear and 
danger in society (Campbell, 1992: 145). As such, political leaders have historically 
legitimised their security policies by constructing spatial Others as threatening to the 
security of the national Self (Hansen, 2006: 38).  
 
The ideological antagonism of the Cold War is an exemplary case of extreme othering, 
because the national Self (whether Soviet or American) was constituted vis-à-vis the 
evil radically different Other.  However, as argued by Hansen (2006: 41), defining 
radical forms of identity construction as the only forms of identity construction results 
in a static view of foreign policy discourse as incapable to change. Identities are not 
always constructed in relation to evil or radically different external Others. Difference 
can take on more ambiguous and complex shapes and the degree of Otherness may 
also vary (Hansen, 2006: 39). In a similar manner, Guillaume (2011: 29) posits that if 
alternative mechanisms of constructing difference are possible, then othering 
represents only one mechanism in the process of “identity formation, performance and 
transformation, even though it might predominate in certain historical-intellectual 
contexts”.  
 
Second, identities are constructed within foreign policy discourse not only though the 
articulation of spatial (outside) Others, but also in relation to temporal Others. 
Temporal themes may include development, transformation, change, or continuity 
(Hansen, 2006: 48). In this sense, articulations of difference may construct certain 
hierarchies and binary oppositions where the Other is inferior to the Self, one identity 
is valued over the other. Doty (1996: 2) refers to representations in the context of state 
interventions as “the ways in which the South has been discursively represented by 
policy makers, scholars, journalists, and others in the North”. Hierarchical 
representations and the construction of the Other as temporarily progressing towards, 
for example, the (Western) Self is a central component of discourses on 
democratisation, human rights, and legitimisation of interventions (Fierke, 2015: 82; 
Hansen, 2006: 40). For instance, Doty (1996: 2) argues that practices of representation 
of the Global South by the Global North contain certain representations that constitute 
the ‘imperial encounters’. As such, the relationship between the US and the 
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Philippines in the early 1950s was constructed in such a hierarchical manner that the 
US government was enabled to judge the internal situation in the Philippines and to 
embark on an interventionist course with little respect to Philippine sovereignty (Doty, 
1993: 297-298). And this encounter constitutes the very meaning of ‘the American’ 
and ‘the Philippine’. This is relevant because, the Soviet leaders constructed the Self 
that was sometimes superior and sometimes inferior to the Other (the US), which 
served as both a precondition for and a product of rapidly increasing nuclear arsenals, 
as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
According to Doty (1996: 3-4), identities are established through representational 
practices and binary oppositions act as legitimate ways to categorise certain parts of 
the world and to enable certain courses of foreign policy where the Self acts as a priori 
more superior and more developed than the Other. To illustrate, the binary 
oppositions found in, for example, intervention discourses may include 
rational/irrational, developed/underdeveloped, core/periphery, modern/traditional, to 
name but a few. However, temporal identity constructions need not always involve an 
external Other but can be based on the temporal construction of Self, becoming a 
better version of Self (Wæver, 1996, cited in Hansen, 2006: 49). This shows how 
Selves as well as Others are in a continuous process of exploration and refinement. 
 
Finally, aside from spatial and temporal dimensions of identity constructions, foreign 
policy discourses also articulate ethical identities. According to Hansen (2006: 50), 
political leaders legitimise foreign and security policies through the discursive 
constructions of responsibility, ethics, and morality. For instance, the emergence of 
development and human security discourses in the post-Cold War era point to the 
explicit exploration of ethical identities by states. Moving issues such as the violation 
of human rights or humanitarian disasters from the strategic self-concerned national 
realm invokes “a particular moral force, a call for action that in response constitutes 
the spatial and temporal identities of those involved” (Hansen, 2006: 50). 
 
As this thesis is concerned with nuclear weapons discourses, it is crucial to consider 
spatial, temporal, and ethical identities that these discourses articulate.  Similarly to 
discourses on development and interventions, nuclear weapons discourses establish 
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hierarchies. The discursive construction of a nuclear threat both highlights and 
represses its inherent dangers and demonstrates that various representations are 
present, often simultaneously. Despite the heterogeneous dangers of nuclear 
proliferation, the collective discourse often focuses on some dangers while ignoring 
the others. For instance, Gusterson (1999: 111) argues that there is a common 
perception in the Global North that nuclear weapons somehow become more 
dangerous in the hands of the Global South leaders.  Thus, “while we can live with the 
nuclear weapons of the five official nuclear nations (China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States) for the indefinite future, the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, 
would be enormously dangerous” (Gusterson, 1999: 112). Gusterson (1999) refers to 
this double standard on nuclear weapons as ‘nuclear Orientalism’, which can be 
conceptualised as a specific discourse that puts certain representations into circulation 
and in which, through the production of danger, the Self speaks of the Other 
reinforcing hierarchies and constructing identities. The analogous pattern can also be 
found in the Soviet nuclear weapons discourse, as Chapters 5 and 6 will articulate. 
Furthermore, the non-proliferation discourse also reproduces hierarchies. For example, 
Paul (2003: 146) and Price (2007: 242) argue that unequal rights and obligations 
constitute a major shortcoming of the NPT regime, suggesting that it legitimises 
nuclear weapons of major superpowers while emphasising others’ weapons as a 
threat.  Price (2007: 232) claims that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is suffering a 
chronic legitimacy deficit worldwide, which is caused by continuous possession of 
nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states. He suggests that this legitimacy crisis 
has been deepened further by the US under the Bush administration recognising India 
as a responsible nuclear power and normalising its nuclear arsenal in 2005 (Price, 
2007: 243). This change in perception constructs a notion within nuclear weapons 
discourse that nuclear weapons are not a problem if possessed by responsible, not 
rogue, states. The threat is posed by potential possessors and users, not by nuclear 
weapons themselves, which “amounts to a rejection of the bedrock premise of the 
NPT regime: namely, that nuclear weapons themselves are an international bad no 
matter who possesses them” (Price, 2007: 244).  
The matters of responsibility have already been discussed in Chapter 2. Using similar 
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theoretical frameworks, Ritchie (2010) and Duncanson and Eschle (2008) claim that 
nuclear superpowers establish a Self that is morally good and responsible. This shows 
how nuclear weapons discourses articulate ethical identities. The essentialist premise 
of the Western discourse constructs leaders of countries in the Global South as 
somewhat lacking responsibility and both technological and political maturity to 
handle nuclear weapons (Gusterson, 1999: 114). This invokes the representations of 
the Western Self not only as more responsible, but also as a morally superior 
policeman of disarmament, enacting policy to halt nuclear proliferation in the Global 
South, while maintaining its own ‘safe’ nuclear weapons (Gusterson, 1999: 114). This 
is relevant, because a similar dynamic is seen between the Soviet Union and the US 
during the Cold War as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. 
To sum up, poststructuralist identity is always relational and is discursively constructed 
in juxtaposition to difference. This difference takes on varying degree of Otherness and 
through the production of threat and danger necessarily invoked by the Other, it 
stabilises constructions of the Self and acts as both a precondition for and a 
constitutive of foreign policy. As argued by Doty (1996: 3-4), identities of people or 
states are created through representational practices (e.g. political statements) that 
position subjects vis-à-vis one another. Thus, oppositions often act as legitimate ways 
of categorising certain regions or peoples of the world and are crucial for successful 
formation and functioning of a state’s identity.  
 
Although identity always requires difference in order to be, the difference need not 
always be extreme. Seeing identity as only existing through radical difference 
produces a weaker reading of foreign policy discourse and prevents the engagement 
with the processes through which discourses become stable or change over time. 
Finally, in addition to the analytical concern with the varying degree of Otherness, it is 
imperative to locate difference in the three dimensions of identity construction: spatial, 
temporal, and ethical. Nuclear weapons discourses are known to articulate Selves and 
Others along all three of these dimensions, as noted above. Through the conception of 
space, time, and responsibility political communities argue and think about their 
boundaries, their internal constitution, and relations with the outside (Hansen, 2006: 
46). This is important, because this thesis captures the time frame where significant 
shifts in the direction of nuclear policy have occurred meaning that articulated 
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identities have also transformed over time. Building on this, the next section of this 
chapter argues that gender intersects with the dimensions along which states construct 
their identities and foreign policies and thus, it is essential to include gender to the 
analyses of nuclear identity/policy nexus. 
 
The Relevance of Gender for Understanding Identity Constructions and Nuclear 
Weapons Policy  
 
Chapter 2 briefly outlined the invaluable contribution of feminist IR approaches to 
identity-focused nuclear weapons proliferation literature. Gender is seen to function as 
a symbolic system that reveals existing dichotomous structures within international 
relations, because the very meaning of masculinity and femininity is defined through 
its relation to the Other (Cohn at al., 2005: 1).  Feminist scholars emphasise that ideas 
about gender are woven through policy discourses and shape all aspects of how 
nuclear weapons are perceived and addressed by states. As Duncanson and Eschle 
(2008: 546) posit, “discourses about nuclear weapons, amongst other things, are 
infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which flow from and underpin the 
primary signifiers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy 
favoured over the feminine”. This section unpacks the significance of gender to 
understanding how identity and difference are discursively constituted and reproduced 
through practices of foreign policy, and how the status of a nuclear power is 
constructed as a particularly masculine status. 
 
In a similar vein to poststructuralists, feminist IR scholars problematise the objectivist 
and positivist nature of conventional IR approaches widely arguing that they are 
gender-blind and thus provide a limited picture of global politics (see e.g. Cohn, 
1987a; 1987b; Hooper, 2001; Enloe, 2007; 2014; Runyan and Peterson, 1991; 
Tickner, 1992; 1995). According to Enloe (2014: 352), “explanations of international 
politics that are devoid of feminist questioning are too-simple explanations. Such 
nonfeminist explanations shy away from complexity. They underestimate power.” 
Feminist IR critiques of realism hold that realists assume the world is divided into 
series of dualisms – men-women, peace-war, strong-weak, rich-poor – that inform 
concepts such as security and power, are patriarchal by nature, and privilege 
masculinity (Runyan and Peterson, 1991: 70; Tickner, 1995: 56). The notions of 
	 59	
morality and rationality prevalent in realist thought are built upon idealised traits of 
masculinity and international politics is ultimately seen as “a man’s world, a world of 
power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity” (Tickner, 1995: 53). 
Broadly, feminist IR scholars seek to deconstruct realist claims that are based on 
gendered assumptions, and similarly to poststructuralists, they emphasise the historic 
and cultural contingency of knowledge. 
 
As a response to the objectivism, essentialism, and gender-blindness of mainstream 
approaches to IR, feminist IR theory seeks to introduce gender as a category of analysis 
in IR and to conceptualise gender as socially constructed rather than given. As 
explained by Sylvester (1994: 4): “By “socially constructed”, I mean that men and 
women are the stories that have been told about “men” and “women” and the 
constraints and opportunities that have thereby arisen as we take to our proper 
places.“ Understanding gender as a social construct allows us to move beyond 
inherent and static notions of, for instance, women as more peaceful and men as more 
aggressive and warlike, and instead investigate how masculine and feminine traits are 
ascribed to subjects and objects in international politics such as nuclear weapons.  
 
Another important aspect of understanding gender is its performativity. Judith Butler 
(1990; 2011) famously claimed that gender has no ontological status and is produced 
and reproduced through various discursive practices rather than through the 
inscription of meaning on a pre-given sex. Consequently, masculine and feminine 
identities are not located in the body, but constructed and sustained through 
performative acts (Butler, 1990: 136). This process is discursive, meaning that 
discourse is central to the constitution of gender: “Performativity must be understood 
not as a singular or deliberate “act”, but, rather, as the reiterative and citational 
practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (Butler 2011, xii). As 
such, gender is not a stable identity and only becomes meaningful as long as it is 
continuously performed. In line with Butler’s claims, this thesis theorises identity as 
performative meaning that articulations of identity within nuclear weapons discourse 




Ideas about gender are not understood here as ideas about women and men, their 
bodies, or their perspectives on nuclear weapons. Rather, ideas about gender 
represent the discursive constructions of masculinity and femininity as a differential 
system of signs that reinforces particular identities and enables political action. 
Feminist IR scholars point specifically to the gendered nature of these constructions 
claiming that gender operates as a site where identities are constituted in hierarchical 
difference. In the West dichotomies such as rational vs. irrational, objectivity vs. 
subjectivity, reason vs. emotion have typically been used to describe male/female 
bodies (Tickner, 1995: 57). In international relations discourses, characteristics 
associated with masculinity are predominantly valued higher than those associated 
with femininity. It is, however, important to avoid treating ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
as monolithic categories; international relations discourses produce different forms of 
masculinity and femininity that depend on circumstances and are subject to change 
and struggle (Hooper, 2001: 4). As such, the meaning of masculinity and femininity is 
not fixed or ahistorical and is open for a potential change. It is, therefore, important to 
be aware that Soviet nuclear weapons discourse may articulate different forms of 
masculinity, enabling varying courses of nuclear policy.  
 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is Carol Cohn’s pioneering research on the 
gendered nature of nuclear weapons discourse. Cohn (1987b: 715) posits that nuclear 
discourse is an “emphatically male discourse” rife with images of competitive male 
sexuality and built on language that is abstract, sanitised, and full of euphemisms. In 
her detailed study of the language of nuclear deterrence employed by the American 
defence intellectuals, which she refers to as “technostrategic”, she concludes that 
beneath the abstraction and technical jargon lie “strong currents of homoerotic 
excitement, heterosexual domination, the drive towards competence and mastery, the 
pleasures of membership in an elite and privileged group” (Cohn, 1987a: 24). Cohn 
(1987a: 18) argues that incorporating sexual metaphors in the representations of 
nuclear weapons mobilises the association of these weapons with masculine traits 
such as strength, competitiveness, manliness, sexual potency, rationality, and power, 
which thereby supports their development and possession. As a result, “regardless of 
their military utility nuclear weapons are turned into the ultimate arbiter of 
political/masculine power” (Cohn et al., 2005: 4). This creates context for, first, 
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nuclear weapons being perceived as the preeminent symbol of state security and, 
second, for nuclear superpowers to ensure this symbol is secure by subordinating and 
emasculating other nations (Cohn et al., 2005: 4). In contrast, nuclear disarmament 
and those who oppose nuclear weapons are portrayed as irrational, unrealistic, 
emotional, idealistic, and “wimpish” (Cohn, 1987a: 24; 1993: 231).  
 
Arms races are, to put simply, competitions. According to Wilson and Daly, 1985: 60), 
intense competitiveness is a predominantly masculine characteristic. Indeed, Cohn 
(1987b: 715; 1993: 236) argues that sexualised competition and obsessive concern 
with manliness constitutes the very nature of the elite nuclear weapons discourse. In 
addition, she posits: “within the defence community discourse, manliness is equated 
not only with the ability to win war; it is also equated with the willingness to threaten 
and use force” (Cohn, 1993: 236). This is connected to another defining feature of 
masculinity, which is bravado – the denial of fear and vulnerability. As defined by 
Trickett (2011: 287-288), bravado is a highly masculine attribute that ties in with the 
idea of being ‘tough’ and ‘fearless’. As shown above, possessing nuclear weapons is 
also associated with being ‘tough’ and ‘fearless’, among other aspects. These points 
are important, because the Cold War was the period of an intense nuclear competition 
between the Soviet Union and the US, where both sides often threatened to use force 
against each other. Naturally, identities constructed in and expressed through a set of 
Cold War foreign policy discourses were masculine. The persistent and pervasive 
representations of masculine attributes within nuclear policy discourses did not create 
a suitable space for effective disarmament policy, which is why perhaps very little was 
achieved to halt the Cold War arms race, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
To further illustrate the relationship between the construction of masculine identity 
and policy, Jutta Weldes (1999) provides an engaging gender-mindful account of 
nuclear identity/policy nexus. She focuses on the reading of the official US discourse 
during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, claiming that the narrative of the Cuban 
missile crisis was constructed around US state identity, which both rendered the crisis 
obvious and marginalised alternative accounts. More specifically, the deployment of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba made the “emphatically masculinist” US Cold War identity 
precarious. Constructing the events as crisis created possibility for the US to take 
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action (to manifest a forceful policy response) and thus to reassert and performatively 
reproduce this identity. Weldes (1999: 46) describes it not just as masculine, but also 
as “aggressively macho”, “The fear of appearing weak – whether of arms or of will – 
loomed large because such a feminine characteristic would excite not the desired 
respect, but only contempt”. Recalling the discussion of othering in the previous 
section, the production of crisis can be described as one of the mechanisms that 
enables state leaders to secure the Self vis-à-vis the external Other through the 
discursive production of threat and danger. This shows how in nuclear policy 
discourse the Other becomes radical and threatening, when masculinity of the Self is 
threatened and is in need of reassurance. This is important, because such dynamic 
enables particularly forceful policy action, which was prevalent during the Cold War. 
 
Weldes (1999: 42-47) describes American masculinist identity as being discursively 
constructed within the Cold War discourse and built around: first, claims to leadership 
and credibility, particularly in the Western hemisphere; second, around being the 
defender of freedom and democracy; third, around reinforcing the overtly masculine 
elements such as strength, toughness, and will; and finally, this identity was built 
around the US taking on the ‘burden of responsibility’ due to its uniqueness and, to 
quote the US president John Kennedy, “the right to the moral leadership of the planet” 
(Kennedy, 1961, cited in Weldes, 1999: 42). While being aware of the presence of 
gendered hierarchies in the US discourse, the analysis of Weldes also neatly captures 
all three dimensions along which identities are constructed: spatial, temporal, ethical. 
The Soviet nuclear missile deployment in Cuba challenged and threatened all 
elements of US identity. Hence, these events have been constructed as a crisis. As a 
result, US interest in the crisis became maintaining and showcasing its credibility to 
the allies through the marginalisation of alternative narratives.  
 
Furthermore, the US leaders construct Soviet missiles differently from their own. The 
Soviet missiles are (necessarily) offensive and by definition aggressive and illegitimate, 
whereas “because the United States had ‘commitments’ in which it engaged openly 
and without deceit, the extraterritorial missile deployments of the United States were 
(necessarily) defensive” (Weldes, 1999: 53). Overall, such practices enable the 
reassurance of state identity; “crises allow for the (re)articulation of relations of 
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identity/difference as a means of both constituting and securing state identity” 
(Weldes, 1999: 58). The research of Weldes demonstrates that masculine identities are 
always potentially precarious and are in need of constant reinforcement and 
stabilisation. Otherness both constitutes identity and threatens it. Therefore, when 
reading Soviet nuclear discourse, it is imperative to be mindful of practices through 
which states stabilise their identities such as the production of danger and crises, or 
the transformation of difference into otherness and vice versa. The last point is crucial, 
because, as will be shown in Chapter 7, constructing the Other as not so radical or 
even different enables significant shifts in the direction of nuclear policy. 
 
This section demonstrated that “gendered discourse constructs a masculine identity 
around nuclear weapons that places firm parameters on what is considered 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviour” (Ritchie, 2008: 11). Gender shapes the way 
nuclear weapons are talked about and thought of, which reveals a distorted 
hierarchical nature of nuclear weapons discourse and policy. Thus, gender plays an 
important role in the construction of international politics, and a poststructuralist 
account of nuclear weapons policy must be gender-mindful, because powerful ideas 
of masculinity underpin nuclear discourses and identities and policies that it 
reproduces.  
 
So far, this chapter has established that both poststructuralist and feminist IR scholars 
have sought to critique the objectivist, state and military centric views of security and 
nuclear proliferation. Conversely, these scholars emphasise the role discourse, 
identity, and gender play in constructing international politics. Security and gender are 
understood here as socially constructed and performatively reproduced, rather than 
pre-given. It has also been established that this thesis adopts a poststructuralist 
approach that is gender-mindful, arguing that identities are constituted through 
nuclear weapons discourse and established in relation to difference that takes on 
varying degree of Otherness.  Identities serve as both a precondition for and a product 
of nuclear policy, meaning that the two are mutually constitutive and reinforcing. 
Furthermore, nuclear weapons discourses articulate identities along the three 
dimensions: spatial temporal, and ethical. Gender intersects with all three dimensions, 
and gender hierarchies reproduced through nuclear discourse shape nuclear 
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behaviour of states.  A status of a nuclear power is constituted as a particularly 
masculine status due to state officials’ historical preoccupation with manliness, 
strength, and demonstration of power. The existence of such constructions makes 
nuclear proliferation possible and desirable, while simultaneously subordinating 
disarmament efforts, which are seen as a demeaning sign of weakness.  
 
These are the primary theoretical roots of this thesis, which emphasises the centrality 
of identity and discourse to the course of Soviet nuclear weapons policy during the 
Cold War. This chapter now turns to the conceptualisation of ‘a nuclear state identity’ 
and describes how it enables the main research question restated at the beginning of 
this chapter to be answered.  
 
The Discursive Construction of a Nuclear Identity 
 
Chapter 1 already established that in order to explore the connection between identity 
and Soviet nuclear policy, this thesis specifically looks at how Soviet leaders 
constructed their nuclear identity across the span of the Cold War events, and how 
these constructions made Soviet nuclear decisions possible. Subsequently, drawing 
from Ballbach’s study of North Korea’s nuclear policy, Chapter 2 emphasised the 
utility of using a more precise formulation of ‘a nuclear state identity’ rather than just 
state/national identity when examining states’ nuclear policies. Ballbach (2016: 393) 
conceptualises nuclear identity as a particular trait of the broader state identity that is 
performatively constituted through foreign policy discourses and is imbricated with the 
reframing of the Self in terms of a nuclear weapons state.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed how states have historically grounded their identity in the 
possession of powerful weaponry. The enormous destructive force of nuclear weapons 
carries a number of political, economic, and cultural consequences for their 
possessors, which reshapes state identity. All states that acquire nuclear weapons 
construct nuclear identities. While Ballbach (2016) offers a useful clarification of what 
it means to establish and reinforce Self as a nuclear weapons state, I will elaborate on 
the concept of ‘a nuclear identity’ and expand its meaning based upon the theoretical 
underpinnings of this analysis.  
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In the context of the subject matter of this thesis, the conceptualisation of 
poststructuralist identity/policy nexus and the socially constructed nature of 
international politics stimulates the asking of several interrelated research questions. 
First, ‘how did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity?’ Second, ‘how did 
Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time?’ Third, ‘how did nuclear identity 
constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible?’ To reiterate, the main objective 
of posing how questions is to explore a complex interplay of facets that constitute 
nuclear identities (e.g. beliefs, gendered hierarchies, representations of Self and Other) 
and to investigate how these facets enabled nuclear policy in the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War. 
 
Nuclear identity encompasses political elites’ (general secretaries, ministers, top 
Communist Party officials etc.) beliefs in the historical connection between power, 
recognition, and nuclear weapons. It represents how elites perceive their state as a 
power in light of possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear identity can 
be understood in a poststructuralist sense as discursive and relational. It is discursive, 
because it is constructed and articulated through words and narratives that political 
elites use to talk about nuclear weapons, and to justify and legitimise decisions and 
practices regarding nuclear proliferation, arms control, or disarmament. Nuclear 
identities exist only as long as they are continuously rearticulated in discourse and 
enacted through policy decisions. As such, Soviet nuclear weapons discourse is 
broadly envisioned here as the articulation of ideas about nuclear weapons (both 
Soviet and others’), their value to the Soviet Self, and enunciation of Soviet intent and 
practice regarding nuclear proliferation and/or disarmament through the formulation 
of official foreign and security policy doctrines.  
Statements have varying impact depending on who makes them. Foucault (1972: 50) 
claimed that in order to understand how certain discourses acquire meaning, we must 
first ask who is speaking: 
Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it [the language] his own 
special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if 
not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What 
is the status of the individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned by 
law or tradition, juridicially defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer 
such a discourse? 
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Political elites play a key role in constructing and reinforcing nuclear identities, as 
they are principal decision makers when it comes to foreign and security policy.  
Thus, nuclear identities reflect political elites’ vision or understanding of how being 
nuclear relates to their state being a recognised power. The status of political elite puts 
this group in the position of speaking and deciding for the state or the collective. For 
poststructuralists, knowledge can be accepted due to power and prominence of such 
actors. Given the totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union, political elite discourses 
can be considered hegemonic. In a Foucauldian sense, these discourses are the 
expression of Soviet totalitarian power conditions, in which the alternatives are 
silenced, freedoms restricted, and opportunities for action are blocked (Foucault, 
1977). 
Nuclear identity is relational, because it is defined in relation to what it is not, through 
relations of difference. The premises for self-definition are rooted in an ongoing 
process of self-comparison with key Others. As Hymans (2006b: 21) puts it, “It is the 
identification of similarities and differences (real or imagined) between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
that clarifies the sense of who we are”. In line with the theoretical discussion in the 
previous sections of this chapter, difference here is assumed to take on varying degree 
of Otherness. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that in order to flesh out the 
important political substance of identity construction, it is essential to consider three 
dimensions: spatial, temporal, ethical. Identities and difference are articulated in 
nuclear weapons discourses along all three of these dimensions. Hence, the 
examination of Soviet nuclear identity in this thesis employs spatiality, temporality, 
and ethicality as three analytical lenses. 
 
Taking each of the three lenses in turn, first, nuclear identity constructions always 
involve the articulation of borders. For the Soviet leaders, the key spatial Other during 
the Cold War was the United States, but also anything that embodied capitalism 
whether it was other capitalist states or merely their beliefs that did not adhere to the 
Soviet socialist ideology. As noted by Hansen (2006: 47), spatial identities may be 
constructed as a combination of the geographically bounded and the abstract political. 
The fierce Soviet-American nuclear rivalry presents a particularly enduring 
occurrence, because it enables the most powerful constructions of spatial nuclear 
identity. Poststructuralist accounts are interested in how states construct identities for 
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themselves based on the Other. This is why looking at how the Soviet officials 
constructed their superpower rival and its ideology and nuclear arsenals in order to 
articulate Soviet nuclear identity, is an essential component of the empirical chapters 
to follow.  
 
Second, nuclear identities are constructed in relation to temporal Others, whether 
external or internal. Progress, change, and transformation constituted an integral part 
of the Soviet post-revolution mindset. Hansen (2006: 49) posits that narratives of past 
struggles and defeats are essential for the establishment and refinement of the 
contemporary Self. Therefore, this analysis is mindful of the temporal articulations of 
the Soviet Self, because Bolshevik rule was undoubtedly the period of significant 
change and transition. Stalin, for example, frequently compared the Soviet Union to 
the Tsarist Russian Empire, whereas Khrushchev compared the Soviet Union of his 
present to Stalin’s rule, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. It is also important to 
pay attention to temporal constructions of external Others. The nuclear arms race was 
a competition where each side continuously tried to gain advantage and superiority 
over the other, meaning that there was a need for constant progression towards the 
Other. More specifically, one should ask whether the Self was articulated in a time 
different from the one of the Other. Or is the Other constituted as temporally superior 
to the Self thus enabling the search for progress and superiority?  
 
Finally, in nuclear weapons discourse, difference can be located in ethical 
constructions of identity, because, as mentioned previously, states naturally articulate 
the Self that is a responsible nuclear state. Chapter 2 established that among other 
factors, national security concerns enabled nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union. 
“For governments to legitimise their foreign policies as in the ‘national interest’ is to 
articulate a responsibility toward the national body politics”, which consequently 
signals (non)responsibility towards the Other (Hansen, 2006: 50). Moving beyond state 
responsibility towards the national community, nuclear weapons discourses also 
articulate explicit international responsibility whether to accentuate the importance of 
disarmament or the importance of protecting the world from the Other’s nuclear 
weapons. This establishes the Self within the higher moral ground and invokes a 
particular moral force on state actions.  As such, it is important to pay attention to the 
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discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility in the Soviet nuclear 
weapons’ discourse.  
 
Nuclear identity is masculine, because it is underpinned by powerful ideas of 
masculinity that state leaders attach to nuclear weapons. These ideas are woven 
through nuclear weapons discourse of superpowers such as the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Gender as a symbolic system intersects with all three dimensions along 
which states construct identity and difference. It reproduces particular hierarchies 
where the side associated with traditionally masculine characteristics such as strength, 
power, and sexual potency, is valued over the other side. As such, nuclear identities 
that enable nuclear weapons proliferation and arms races are a priori masculine.  
 
However, the previous section stated that both masculinity and femininity are fluid 
and should not be treated as static or monolithic. As emphasised by Hooper (2001: 
67), masculinities are constantly in flux, and dominant forms of masculinities “are 
constantly being challenged, reconstituted, and reinvented in different sections of 
society, in adaptation to changing economic, political, and social circumstances”. It is 
therefore important to pay attention to how the masculine nature of Soviet nuclear 
identity altered throughout the Cold War and the kind of political change that this 
enabled or precluded.  As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis captures three different time 
periods of nuclear weapons proliferation during the Cold War, from the rapid arms 
build-up to disarmament and strict arms control measures between 1941 and 1991. 
Changes in the direction of policy are made possible due to the changing nature of 
identity that enables them. Masculinity, as one of the primary characteristics of a 
nuclear identity, is also susceptible to change. Conducting a gender-mindful analysis 
of Soviet nuclear weapons policy allows us to examine discursive changes that 
facilitate policy adjustments. To quote Enloe (1993: 18-19), the Cold War itself is:  
 
best understood as involving not simply a contest between two 
superpowers, each trying to absorb as many countries as possible into its 
own orbit, but also a series of contests within each of those societies over 
the definitions of masculinity and femininity that would sustain or dilute 
that rivalry. 
 
Applying the insights of poststructuralism and feminism, discussed earlier in this 
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chapter, Soviet nuclear identity is understood here to have always been the product of 
Soviet political elites’ nuclear weapons discourse. As such, nuclear identity is 
discursive, and it is articulated through words, narratives, and official policy 
statements and doctrines concerning nuclear weapons acquisition, nuclear build up, 
arms control, and disarmament. Soviet nuclear identity is relational, meaning that it 
only exists in relation to difference constructed by the Soviet officials. This difference 
is located in spatial, temporal, and/or ethical constructions of identity that exist in 
nuclear weapons discourse. The key external Other of the Soviet Self is the capitalist 
US. The way Soviet officials construct the Other establishes and reinforces Soviet 
nuclear identity thus enabling nuclear policy. However, this thesis takes into account 
that identity constructions involve multiple Others and varying degree of difference.  
Soviet nuclear identity is also masculine, because of the symbolic link between ideas 
about masculinity and nuclear weapons. This link was particularly prominent during 
the Cold War arms race and as noted in the previous section, nuclear weapons 
discourse is oversaturated with masculine traits that render nuclear proliferation 
desirable and necessary. Masculinity, however, is in flux and is susceptible to change, 
which potentially enables a differing course of policy. This nuclear identity-focused 
poststructuralist approach arguably enables the analysis of the relationship between 
identity and Soviet nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, which this thesis 
seeks to examine. Therefore, it makes an important contribution to our understanding 
of nuclear politics by first, fleshing out the identity construction of a lesser known in 
critical IR literature case; and second, by showing how the Soviet identity 
constructions fuelled nuclear weapons acquisition, the arms crisis and confrontational 





This chapter outlined the essential elements of the theoretical framework through 
which this thesis seeks to examine the relationship between nuclear identity 
constructions and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. Theoretical roots of the 
analysis adhere to the works of poststructuralist and feminist IR authors. In IR terms, 
this is a poststructuralist critical security studies situated thesis. Rather than to replace, 
it seeks to problematise the objectivist, positivist, and materialist approaches to 
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nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union prevalent in IR literature. This chapter has 
argued that a discursive gender-mindful approach that seeks to deconstruct the 
hierarchical representations upon which nuclear weapons policy is based is the most 
appropriate approach for this thesis.  
Drawing from poststructuralist and feminist critiques of mainstream IR approaches, it 
has introduced international security as a discursive arena, where states establish and 
reinforce their discursively constructed and relational nuclear identities. These 
identities are both constitutive of and a product of states’ nuclear policies, meaning 
that the two are mutually reinforcing. Identities are not fixed or pre-given but are 
performatively executed through practices of foreign and security policy. This thesis 
problematises the causal relationship between identity and policy maintained by some 
constructivist approaches to nuclear proliferation, arguing that it leads to an 
incomplete and static understanding of identity/policy nexus. Instead, this thesis asks 
how the construction of Soviet nuclear identity made nuclear policy decisions 
possible.  
Understanding nuclear identity as relational postulates that it is always constituted in 
relation to difference. However, in comparison to some poststructuralist scholars who 
generally focus on instances of extreme Otherness (see e.g. Campbell, 1992; 
Connolly, 1991), this chapter argued that difference does not always need to be 
radical, and it is imperative to take into account varying degree of Otherness along 
with the three dimensions of identity construction: spatial, temporal, and ethical. In 
Hansen’s terms such approach to identity/difference nexus provides a “theoretical 
double grip”. According to Hansen (2006: 51), this double grip: 
not only provides substantial knowledge of the identity construction taking 
place within foreign policy discourse, it also provides a lens through which 
discursive differences, similarities, and changes can be studied, thus 
ultimately furthering theoretical understanding of the links between identity 
and policy. 
 
Further to this, this chapter emphasised that gender intersects with all three 
dimensions of identity construction. Nuclear identities are necessarily constructed as 
masculine, and feminist approach that foregrounds gender is required in order to flesh 
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out the hierarchical structure of nuclear weapons discourse that makes nuclear 
weapons desirable for states. 
Both poststructuralist and feminist scholars build on the Foucauldian idea that 
discourses produce modes of power and exclusion and their purpose is to critique and 
deconstruct the binary oppositions that underpin the processes of power and 
exclusion. Integrating gender into a poststructuralist account of Soviet nuclear policy 
during the Cold War is imperative in order to uncover the dichotomous structures that 
are present in the Soviet nuclear discourse and to interrogate the ways, in which 
nuclear identities are constructed and articulated through relations of difference and 
the kind of policies this enables. Before continuing to this analysis, I first must outline 
the methodological considerations and methods employed in this thesis. While it has 
been intimated to some extent in this chapter, the conceptualisation of ‘discourse’ 

































Chapter 3 established that this thesis adopts a poststructuralist gender-mindful 
theoretical approach to explore the connection between Soviet nuclear identity 
constructions and Soviet nuclear policy across the span of the Cold War events. It 
emphasised the centrality of language and discourse to poststructuralist studies and 
introduced the concept of ‘nuclear identity’ as an entity that is continuously 
rearticulated in nuclear discourse and enacted or ‘performed’ through nuclear policy 
decisions. I argued that identity does not cause nuclear weapons policy or vice versa; 
rather, they exist in a mutually constitutive relationship and continuously reinforce 
each other. Before delving into the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity and policy, it is 
important to discuss the methods used to translate this theoretical perspective into 
empirical research.  
 
This chapter presents the methodological choices made, and methods utilised to 
achieve the objectives of this thesis. First, it clarifies what is meant by ‘discourse’ in 
the context of this thesis and introduces a poststructuralist approach to discourse. 
Second, drawing principally on Hansen’s poststructuralist discourse theory and 
methodology, it elaborates upon the ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
premises of poststructuralist-informed understanding of identity as both constitutive of 
and a product of policy. Third, this chapter discusses the interpretive strategy and 
practicalities of poststructuralist discourse analysis focusing on text selection, the 
application of discourse analysis to texts, and issues of validity, reliability, and 
generalisability.  
 
A Poststructuralist Approach to Discourse 
 
Chapter 3 has already gone some way towards outlining the centrality of language and 
discourse to poststructuralist research. It has theorised nuclear identity and policy as 
discursive by nature with linguistic practices centrally involved in structuring 
international politics. To recap Doty’s formulation, “International relations are 
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inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation 
representations that are taken as ‘truth’” (Doty, 1996: 5). As such, a discursive 
approach is particularly suitable for the investigation of the mutually constitutive 
relationship between identity constructions and nuclear weapons policy. It allows us 
to uncover how subjects and objects acquire their meaning and the kind of 
possibilities for action these meanings enable. The starting point of a discursive 
approach is that language and discourse constitute reality and not the other way 
around. “Our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social 
relations but, rather, play an active role in creating or changing them” (Jørgensen and 
Phillips, 2002: 1).  
 
On this basis, broadly speaking, a discourse(s) can be understood as “a particular way 
of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002: 1). More specifically, discourses are “practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49), where meaning is 
constantly negotiated and established by the way language is structured into a socially 
constructed system of rules and significant differences (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
2000: 4). As Howarth (2000: 102) exemplifies in a frequently cited passage: 
 
Consider, for instance, a forest standing in the path of a proposed 
motorway. It may simply represent an inconvenient obstacle impeding the 
rapid implementation of a new road system, or it might be viewed as a site 
of special interest for scientists and naturalists, or a symbol of the nation’s 
threatened natural heritage. In short, the meaning or ‘being’ of the forest – 
what it literally is for us – depends on the particular systems of difference 
or discourses that constitute its identity. 
 
Studying these “systems of difference” forms the basis of a discursive approach. In the 
context of the subject matter of this thesis, similar to the forest above, Soviet nuclear 
identity comes into being through multiple contradictory dimensions that are 
historically contingent. For example, Soviet nuclear identity may appear very 
differently to different audiences. It may appear as aggressively competitive and 
irrational or as reasonable and peace-loving. Contradictory elements can combine to 
constitute identity, which will be elaborated upon throughout the empirical chapters.  
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According to Milliken (1999: 229), seeing discourse as structures of signification 
which construct social realities is the first theoretical commitment of discourse 
theorists. The meaning is seen as established in structure and not in substance. 
Discourses are expected to be structured as a sign system where one object is 
distinguished from the other (Milliken, 1999: 229). Poststructuralists often draw on 
Derrida, who emphasised the oppositional nature of this relationship between signs 
exposing established relations of power where one element is valued over the other. 
This is important for poststructuralist conceptualisation of identity as relational. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that foreign policy discourses establish identities in relation to 
radical difference in a hierarchical order through the juxtaposition of the national Self 
to the foreign Other (see e.g. Campbell, 1992; Connolly, 1991; Doty, 1993; Walker, 
1990). This is particularly relevant to the classical discourse of national security. 
However, some discourses construct a more ambiguous form of difference that does 
not necessarily involve radical othering, power, or hierarchy (see e.g. Guillaume, 
2011; Hansen, 2006). Furthermore, this difference is constructed along three 
dimensions – spatial, temporal, ethical – that intersect with gender. This provides a 
more substantial knowledge of identity constructions, going beyond the simple 
identifying of two signs as ‘different’. 
 
As some discourses draw on more ambiguous constructions of difference, 
understanding identity cannot be solely accomplished through looking at 
juxtapositions and dichotomies, but through the location of signs within a more 
complex structure of linking and differentiation (Hansen, 2006: 41-42). As such, 
“meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each 
other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation to another 
series of juxtaposed signs” (Hansen, 2006: 42). Hansen (2006: 21) exemplifies this 
process by showing how in the 19th century discourse through a positive process of 
linking the term ‘woman’ was defined as emotional, motherly, reliant, but these 
female series of links were at the same time juxtaposed to the male series of links, 
such as rational, intellectual, independent, through a negative process of 
differentiation. The key methodological point to establish here is that discourses 
construct identities within a web of signs that do not necessarily have to be explicit or 
to exist in the form of binary oppositions. The links between signs might become 
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unstable, whereby the negatively valued term of one discourse may become a positive 
sign within another. Therefore, to flesh out Soviet nuclear identity constructions, this 
relationship between signs in discourse needs to be carefully studied.  
 
When talking about how discourses stabilise and fix meaning within a web of signs, 
different discourse theorists use different terms. For example, Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985: 142) emphasise the significance of “nodal points”. To put simply, a nodal point 
is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 26). This often gives way to the construction of dominating or hegemonic 
discourses. However, an important aspect of poststructuralist understanding of how 
discourse operates is the assertion that discourses are fluid, whereby the meaning can 
never be fixed permanently and is inherently unstable (Doty, 1996: 6; Hansen, 2006: 
21; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 111). Such conceptualisation reinforces the notion of 
discourse and identity as changeable and historically contingent. As explained by 
Doty (1996: 6): “Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it 
can only be partial in nature. It is the overflowing and incomplete nature of discourses 
that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation”. For example, 
understanding discourses as fluid allows us to see how the constructed meaning 
attached to nuclear proliferation in Soviet nuclear discourse might shift and destabilise 
over time. In this sense, the ‘positive signs’ linked to nuclear build-up might become 
unstable; or a negatively valued term previously attached to disarmament might be 
constructed as positive. This has implications for the discursive articulations of policies 
that these varying constructions enable, as will be exemplified by the analysis of 
Soviet nuclear identity constructions under the rule of Gorbachev in Chapter 7. 
 
Ontological and Epistemological Premises of Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 
 
One of the criticisms often levelled at poststructuralism is its denial of materiality, the 
‘real world’ out there. This stems from poststructuralism’s explicit critique of 
universalism and objectivist search for a singular definitive ‘truth’, as discussed earlier 
in Chapter 3. For example, some critics describe the poststructuralist stance as “a 
radical idealist position, increasingly emptied of any intelligible meaning” (Guzzini, 
2000: 148). However, it would be imprecise to claim that poststructuralism rejects 
materiality. Rather, as Hansen (2006: 22) argues, “the point is not to disregard material 
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facts, but to study how these are produced and prioritised”. Laclau and Mouffe (1995: 
108) concur that the point is not to deny materiality of objects, but to affirm that these 
objects only acquire meaning through discourse. They explain: 
 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an 
event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is 
constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of 
God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is 
not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different 
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any 
discursive condition of emergence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1995: 108). 
 
Nuclear identity exists in a mutually constitutive relationship with policy. It only exists 
in nuclear weapons discourse, but it is enacted and reproduced through a set of 
material structures such as nuclear testing, the signing of a treaty or arms reduction, 
and so on. Therefore, identity and policy are ontologically intertwined, which leads to 
the conceptualisation of nuclear policy as a discursive practice. In line with Hansen’s 
and Butler’s formulations, identities come into being through the discursive enactment 
or ‘performance’ of policy, but at the same time these identities are constructed as 
legitimising the proposed policy (Butler, 1990: 25; Hansen, 2006: 26). The key task of 
discourse analysis is thus to show how policies acquire meaning within discourse 
drawing on a set of identity constructions.  
 
An epistemological premise of poststructuralist understanding of identity and policy as 
mutually constitutive lies in the rejection of causality. This sets poststructuralism apart 
from rationalism and constructivism. Hansen (2006: 26) explains that in order to 
investigate a causal relationship, a dependent and an independent variable need to be 
identified, separated, and observed independently. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, neorealist approaches to nuclear proliferation may trace states’ nuclear 
decisions to a particular security threat or lack of thereof; the domestic politics 
approaches would look at the domestic structures and changes within states; and 
some constructivist approaches would look at the establishment of certain norms, 
codified or not, and hypothesise their causal effect on nuclear proliferation and 
restraint. In contrast, for poststructuralists, the two variables are ontologically 
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inseparable and enacted through discourse. As such, there is no identity existing 
independently or prior to policy (Hansen, 2006: 26).  
 
Poststructuralist adoption of discursive epistemology is not a flaw, but a choice. It 
allows us to move from the positivist logic of explanation to the logic of interpretation. 
Rather than questioning why a certain policy decision was made, poststructuralists ask 
how it was made possible. Chapter 3 established the significance of posing how 
questions. As argued by Doty (1993: 298), how questions allow us to examine “how 
meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus 
constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and 
preclude others”.  Posing why questions takes as unproblematic the possibility that a 
particular action could happen and instead relies on probability (Doty, 1993: 298). 
The review of the literature in Chapter 2 demonstrated that approaches utilising such 
explanations only provide a partial understanding of Soviet nuclear policy. Therefore, 
to recap the primary research questions outlined in the Introduction, this thesis asks, 
first, ‘how did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity?’ Second, ‘how did 
Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time?’ Third, ‘how did nuclear identity 
constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible?’ Posing these questions allows 
for an in-depth exploration of the connection between identity constructions and 
Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War.   
 
So, how does one go about answering these research questions? What are the 
methodological implications of adopting a discursive ontology and a discursive 
epistemology? The relationship between poststructuralists and questions of 
methodology and methods is not straightforward, because traditionally, 
poststructuralist research has not engaged with explicit methodological discussions, 
drawing on Derrida’s widely cited claim that methodology is bound with positivism 
and his own deconstruction is “not a method and cannot be transformed into one” 
(Derrida, 1991, cited in Peters and Biesta, 2009: 22). However, Hansen (2006: xix) 
argues that all writing must make methodological choices and no poststructuralist 
account can find a “space free of strategies, inclusions, and exclusions”. At the very 
least poststructuralist focus on discourse calls for attention to the methodology of text 
selection and methodology of reading. Indeed, her poststructuralist analysis of the 
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Western debate on the Bosnian war demonstrates that a poststructuralist theoretical 
position can be translated into a rigorous methodological approach that produces an 
empirically rich study. This thesis bases its interpretive approach on Hansen’s 
systematic examination of the political construction of identity, which will be 
discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Prior to discussing the interpretive strategy of this poststructuralist discourse analysis, it 
is worth reflecting that poststructuralist premise that objects only acquire meaning 
through discourse precludes the use of other forms of discourse analysis, such as 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). As emphasised by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 7), 
in contrast to poststructuralist discourse theory, CDA scholars treat discourse as just 
one among many social practices and insist that there are other dimensions beyond 
discourse. Because poststructuralism assumes that all knowledge is discursively 
situated, the purpose of discourse analysis is “to examine how certain representations 
underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations 
make various courses of action possible” (Doty, 1996: 5). To put simply, the purpose 




According to Fierke (2007: 82), discourse analysis is useful for “seeing the relational 
aspects of identity, or how identities have meaning vis-à-vis one another”. It serves the 
purpose of constructing a map of a particular world and allows the researcher to look 
at how power relationships and hierarchies hold this world together (Fierke, 2007: 82). 
Discourse analysis is an analytical tool for studying representations and constructions 
of particular ‘worlds’ through the emerging patterns across texts (Fierke, 2007: 84-85). 
However, I am cautious to refer to discourse analysis as a ‘tool’. For poststructuralists, 
there is a theoretical and methodological ‘whole’, meaning that theory and method 
are intertwined and based on philosophical premises regarding the role of language in 
the social construction of the world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 4).  
 
Poststructuralist discourse analysis looks for structures and patterns in texts through 
which identities and policies are articulated.  As noted above, discourses never reach 
absolute fixity and stability. However, Hansen (2006: 29) posits that the analysis of 
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larger number of signs in processes of linking and differentiation allows us to analyse 
“the relative ability of a discourse to present a construction of identity which is not 
(seen as) highly internally unstable”. This internal stability of identity-policy 
construction can only be determined when situated in a broader historical and 
political context and is dependent on agency and competing discourses (Hansen, 
2006: 31). As such, mapping the key events that took place during the identified 
period of study is a useful methodological technique for tracing the stability of official 
discourse and for the selection of texts, which will be discussed in the next section of 
this chapter 
 
The interpretive strategy that I adopt reflects the main characteristics of a nuclear 
identity outlined in Chapter 3. To reiterate, a nuclear identity encompasses political 
elites’ construction of Self as a power in light of possessing or not possessing nuclear 
weapons; it is discursive, relational, and masculine. This chapter has already gone 
some way in elaborating on the poststructuralist understanding of identity as 
discursive. The other two aspects of nuclear identity need a little unpacking with 
regards to my research reading strategy.  
 
Nuclear identity is relational and only established in relation to difference. Thus, 
locating the difference by focusing on the processes of linking and differentiation 
provides a starting point for my interpretive strategy. According to Hansen (2006: 44):  
 
The processes of linking and differentiation provide theoretical concepts 
and methodological tools for conducting empirical analysis and they allow 
for a structured and systematic analysis of how discourses seek to construct 
stability, where they become unstable, how can they be deconstructed, 
and the processes through which they change. 
 
 
Methodologically, I began the analysis of selected texts by identifying clear 
constructions of the Other – to the Soviets during the Cold War it was obviously the 
United States or capitalist states more generally or capitalism as an ideology – and 
clear constructions of the Self. This is done by highlighting the terms in texts that 
characterise the Other, such as ‘evil’, ‘aggressive’, ‘enemy’, ‘war-mongering’, ‘blood-
thirsty’, and the terms that describe the Self, such as ‘civilised’, ‘rational’, ‘peaceful’, 
‘invincible’. I also integrate the insights of Doty’s (1993) and Milliken’s (1999) 
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predicate analysis to compliment and deepen Hansen’s approach. This method 
involves focusing on language practices of predication, which refers to the attaching of 
verbs, adjectives, and adverbs to nouns. As Milliken (1999: 231) explains, 
“predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with 
particular features and capacities”. As such, I look for the ways in which the key 
subjects/objects with which I am concerned – for example, nuclear 
weapons/proliferation, the Soviet Union, the United States, disarmament, arms control 
– are predicated upon particular signifiers, which attach certain attributes to them. At 
the same time, I note the manner, in which these subjects/objects are positioned in 
relation to each other (linking and differentiation).  
 
It does not, however, mean that articulations of Self and Other are always explicit and 
synchronously present in all texts. For example, to construct the Americans as ‘evil’ 
does not mean that the Soviets always explicitly constructed themselves as ‘not evil’. 
When discourses are articulated through foreign policy decisions and debates, 
particular discourses may become so well-established that they are assumed to be 
obvious (Hansen, 2006: 44). It is also essential to be aware of discursive 
disappearance. Because identities are historically contingent, some may lose their 
importance over time or vice versa, previously non-existent identities may become 
important. Hansen exemplifies this with the case of monarchy-republic distinction 
prominent in the constructions of European identity in the 18th and 19th century, but 
ceasing to exist at present, because ‘monarchy’ ceased to carry significance for states 
to differentiate themselves from one another (Hansen, 2006: 44).  
 
The next step of the interpretive strategy is to evaluate the degree of Otherness. In 
security discourses, the Other is often constructed as not just different, but as 
dangerous and threatening to the national Self, thereby capitalising on “a fund of 
generalised resentment from those whose identity is jeopardised by the play of 
difference, contingency, and danger” (Connolly, 1991: 209-210). Historically, states 
have legitimised their security policies through such constructions. On the basis of 
this, I search for the articulations of threats and dangers in Soviet nuclear discourse 
and clear constructions of the Other as an ‘enemy’. This, however, is not done to 
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establish the link between a security threat and nuclear policy, but to look at the kind 
of possibility for policy action that these constructions enable and preclude.  
 
Chapter 3 argued that the difference between Self and Other need not always be 
radical. This foregrounds the importance of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities for 
the construction of identity and difference. Hansen (2006: 46) provides a useful 
explanation of this and it is worth reproducing at length: 
 
Even abstract discourses constitute subjects by situating them within 
particular boundaries, by investing them with possibilities for change or 
repetition, and by constructing ethical relations. Turning to foreign and 
security policies, national security discourse can be seen as a particular 
spatial, temporal, and ethical instantiation: the space of the national 
community is sharply differentiated from the anarchic international realm; 
within this national space progress can unfold while it is deferred on the 
outside; and responsibility is situated between governments and citizens 
while ‘international responsibility’ is absent, perhaps even dangerous. 
 
 
Methodologically, the constructions of space, time, and ethics are investigated through 
the analysis of the processes of linking and differentiation. But it is important to bear in 
mind that spatiality, temporality, and ethicality are analytical lenses, not explicitly 
articulated signs (Hansen, 2006: 46). Furthermore, not all texts will explicitly articulate 
all three elements simultaneously. In terms of applying this to the reading of the texts, 
I, first, look for spatial identities, which are immediately identifiable in the 
constructions of other states or regions: the USSR, the United States, Europe, America 
etc. However, as Hansen (2006: 47) argues, spatial identities always involve a 
combination of territorially bounded and abstract political constructions. Thus, I also 
search for the signs such as ‘capitalists’, ‘communists’, ‘the peoples’, ‘humanity’, 
‘barbarians’. These identities articulate geographical connections, but also constitute 
political subjects in their own right. 
 
Second, I investigate how the temporality of the Other is constructed in relation to the 
temporality of Self. The key task is to establish whether the Self is constituted as an 
object in a time that differs from the one of the Other. This involves looking for 
articulations of development, transformation, change, progress etc. It is important to 
bear in mind that the Self may be constructed as less temporally developed than the 
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Other, which may be indicated by the use of terms such as ‘backwardness’, 
‘underdeveloped’. Furthermore, because identities are always in the process of 
refinement, identity constructions need not always involve a spatial Other, but may be 
based on the temporal constructions of the Self. As such, I look at how the Soviets 
articulated their own past and future and whether they constructed themselves as 
inferior, superior, or identical to the United States.  
 
Third, I search for the discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility in 
Soviet nuclear discourse. These include articulations of responsibility toward the 
Soviet state, ideology, or citizens as well as an international responsibility toward the 
humanity. It is thus important to pay attention to the way the Soviets framed their 
nuclear policies, whether it was constructed as serving a noble purpose beyond the 
borders of the USSR, and whether they constituted a Self that was responsible and 
ethical in relation to the Other. This also involves looking at how the Soviets 
constructed their nuclear weapons in relation to others. 
 
Nuclear identities are also masculine due to a historical link between ideas about 
masculinity and nuclear weapons. Feminist IR scholars demonstrated that nuclear 
discourses are oversaturated with masculine traits that construct nuclear proliferation 
as particularly desirable and even necessary (see e.g. Cohn, 1987; 1993; Cohn et al. 
2005; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008). It is thus essential to adopt an interpretive 
strategy that allows for an examination of masculinising and feminising practices. On 
this basis, I search for sexual metaphors and expressions of competitive male sexuality 
in texts. I also look at how constructions of Self, Other, and nuclear policies - for 
example, arms control, building more missiles, acquiring the bomb - are linked to 
terms that are traditionally understood as masculine or feminine. For instance, a 
practice of testing a new powerful bomb becomes a particularly masculine practice 
when it is linked to attributes such as invincibility, power, strength. Conversely, when 
disarmament is linked to terms such as weakness, emotion, or compromise, it 
becomes a more feminine practice, as the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 will exemplify. 
Furthermore, based on the feminist IR arguments discussed at length in Chapter 3, in 
nuclear discourse practices associated with masculinity are privileged over those that 
are associated with femininity. Thus, there is a need to pay attention to the way the 
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linkage of certain subjects/objects/practices to, for instance, power and superiority 
might be a way of masculinising them, or vice versa, the way of making something 
inferior might be a way of feminising it.  Here, it is important not to conflate 
everything that is privileged and powerful with masculinity and the lack of power with 
femininity. These are not monolithic categories and they are subject to change and 
struggle (Hooper, 2001: 4). It is, therefore, essential to be mindful of different forms of 
masculinity and femininity that may be present in Soviet nuclear discourse and the 
varying courses of nuclear policy that they may enable. 
 
So far, this chapter has justified the suitability of poststructuralist discourse analysis to 
achieve the main objectives of this thesis and to answer its main research questions. It 
has outlined the theoretical purpose and ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological premises of poststructuralist understanding of identity and policy. 
Drawing principally on Hansen, this section of the chapter has established the 
interpretive strategy used to translate this understanding into a viable empirical 
research. This chapter now turns to the discussion of the practicalities of 
poststructuralist discourse analysis relevant to this research focusing on the selection 
of texts, the actual application of the interpretive strategy to the texts, and issues or 
reliability, validity, and generalisability. 
 
The Practicalities of Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis of Soviet Nuclear Identity 
Constructions 
 
In order to investigate the constructions of Soviet nuclear identity and the enactment 
of nuclear policy, I applied the interpretive strategy outlined above to a broad 
spectrum of texts. Prior to discussing the selection of texts in detail, it is important to 
clarify the time periods that this thesis focuses on, or to use Hansen’s formulation to 
“map the key events”. ‘Key events’ refers to “those situations where ‘important facts’ 
manifest themselves on the political and/or the media agenda and influence the 
official policy-identity constellation” (Hansen, 2006: 32). I selected the time periods 
for this study on the basis that they were the periods when Soviet leaders were doing 
something relatively new and/or different with regards to nuclear weapons policy, 
such as deciding to develop these new weapons of unprecedented power; deciding to 
scale up the production to develop massive arsenals (vertical nuclear proliferation); 
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and deciding to disarm.  
Considering the limitations of time and resources, these seemed the most important 
times of Soviet policy development to study and they capture various courses of 
nuclear policy. The three empirical chapters that follow cover one of these periods 
each and are structured chronologically: first, the period of nuclear weapons 
acquisition (Joseph Stalin), 1941-1949; second, the period of the arms race (Nikita 
Khrushchev), 1953-1964; and third, the period of détente (Leonid Brezhnev) and 
disarmament (Mikhail Gorbachev), 1964-1991. Throughout the thesis, I also refer to 
the time periods as ‘stages’. Next, through the careful reading of Cold War histories, I 
mapped the key events that took place within selected time periods, which included, 
for example, the signing of various arms control agreements, the testing of newest 
types of nuclear weapons, moratoria on nuclear testing. Each empirical chapter begins 
with a brief historical overview of the key events that occurred during each time 
period. The mapping of key events also informed my text selection process, because I 
looked for texts produced shortly before, during, and after each event.  
Selection of Texts 
Perhaps the main difficulty encountered when conducting research on nuclear 
proliferation is the lack of materials available to the public and secrecy surrounding 
this subject. In the case of this study, however, Soviet nuclear policy decisions that are 
of interest are now in the past and a broad range of source materials that were crucial 
for my discourse analysis have now been declassified and are accessible through state 
archives and numerous databases online. As noted by Hanhimäki and Westad (2003: 
xiii), there has been a revolution in access to Cold War historical sources in recent 
decades, which allows for re-evaluation and new interpretations of key documents on 
foreign affairs. This applies not just to the US and the UK where declassification has 
been mandatory for a while, but also to Russia and many other states around the 
world. Due to a number of personal constraints, it was not possible to visit the 
archives in person.5 Therefore, in addition to scanning all official online sources and 
through a lengthy and persistent search, I made sure to identify key authors who 
visited the state archives and I got hold of their work, because they often present 
	
5 This did not have a large impact on the final result, as much material is now digitalised, 
which also makes archival research more time-efficient. 
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excerpts from or full transcripts of speeches and scans of policy documents. I will 
elaborate on this in the sub-section below.   
 
Poststructuralist discourse analysis does not rely on a fixed number of texts. It cannot 
turn to statistical significance as a measure for how many texts should be used 
(Hansen, 2006: 86). The main aim of text selection was to use the variety of sources to 
identify dominant discourses in order to explore Soviet nuclear identity constructions. 
The final selection of texts that I used in the empirical chapters were generally chosen, 
because they met three of the important criteria highlighted by Hansen (2006: 85): 
they had clear articulations of identities and/or policies; they were widely read; and 
they had a formal authority signalling the importance of status and power. However, 
some of the texts scored higher in, for example, clear identity articulations and formal 
authority, but were not widely read or known at the time due to the secretive nature of 
the Soviet government. In terms of identity constructions, texts were selected on the 
basis of their quality and diversity of articulations of Self and Other(s), the varying 
degree of Otherness, and expressions of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities. 
Particular care was taken to ensure that selected texts referred to the Soviet 
motivations and reflections on nuclear weapons proliferation, arms control, and 
disarmament. In order to capture relational aspects of nuclear identity, it was 
important to search for texts that referred to the American nuclear program, as the US 
was the Soviet key external Other. Additionally, at relevant moments I also looked at 
how the US constructed a nuclear identity to demonstrate that this process was not 
unique to the Soviet Union. I selected a few texts from the US official discourse to 
show the differences and similarities in their nuclear identity constructions. This 
section now turns to the discussion of the sources in more detail.  
 
i. Official policy discourse 
Official foreign policy discourse legitimises state action. It centres on political leaders 
who have the authority to sanction policies and those with central roles to execute 
them, such as high-ranked military staff and ministers (Hansen, 2006: 60). Due to the 
totalitarian structure of the USSR, policy decisions were generally in the hands of the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party, especially when it came to nuclear 
weapons. Thus, in the first instance, I searched for texts produced by general 
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secretaries themselves, including public statements, speeches (both domestic and 
international), transcripts of radio broadcasts, and official policy documents.  
 
Then, I expanded the search to speeches of other Soviet officials who held highly 
ranked posts at that time. I was interested in general secretaries’ and their key 
ministers/policy advisors’ statements with regards to nuclear proliferation and how 
they used their position on nuclear weapons to construct and reproduce their state’s 
nuclear identity and policy. The key search criteria were statements related to nuclear 
weapons and made during the time period in question. It is important to note that the 
number of official statements used in each empirical chapter differs. Stalin, for 
example, rarely made official policy statements regarding nuclear weapons in public, 
whereas Gorbachev made so many that there can be no certainty that I found them 
all.  
 
In order to locate texts, I searched for key words (e.g. Gorbachev nuclear weapons 
speech or Khrushchev American nuclear bomb) in several electronic archives, which 
were mainly US-based, but they contained large collections of Soviet documents 
translated into English. Russia also has a range of digitally accessible archives, which 
were all carefully searched. The list of electronic archival collections consulted 
included: The Cold War International History Project; The Marxist Archive; Atomic 
Archive; The Harvard Project on Cold War Studies; The National Security Archive; US 
Department of Energy, Office of History and Heritage Resources; Selected Documents 
on the Topic of the Atomic Bomb, 1935-1976: Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Library & Museum; US Atomic Archive; Truman Library; Los Alamos Science; Joseph 
Vissarionovich Stalin, Complete Collection of Writings; The USSR Atomic Project 
Online Archive; Documents of the Soviet Epoch Online; and The Cold War: A History 
in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. Additionally, I conducted a general search 
through a web search engine using the same key words as above. Some speeches 
were located in newspapers. For instance, the majority of Gorbachev’s speeches was 
available through The New York Times website. I also searched through the digitalised 
archive of the Soviet newspaper Pravda, because it often published full transcripts of 
Soviet officials’ statements.  
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To collect texts from the US official discourse, I searched for relevant American 
Presidential statements in some of the above archival collections and in the large 
online database Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Additionally, I 
consulted some published official archival document series located at the Edinburgh 
University main library. These included: The American Atom; The Cold War: A 
History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts; and Containment: Documents on 
American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950.  
 
ii. Non-official texts 
Non-official texts, such as routine correspondence between politicians, personal 
notes/remarks, letters, memoirs, diaries, provide a wealth of detail regarding how the 
leaders felt, thought, and acted in relation to nuclear weapons. These texts offer a 
‘behind closed doors’ insight (and a wide range of Soviet decisions took place behind 
closed doors) and uncover identity constructions that may not be evident from the 
reading of official policy discourse. For instance, the articulations of Otherness may 
take on a different form without the presence of the wider audience. These texts were 
still produced by key Soviet decision makers at the time of the studied events and they 
were selected based on the diversity of identity articulations. Again, the number of 
texts selected for each time period differed. For example, very few were used for 
Gorbachev’s period, while a large number was included into the empirical chapter 
about Stalin’s nuclear policy, because he made fewer public statements on this 
subject. 
 
Some of these texts, such as letters and diaries, I found in the aforementioned 
electronic archives using the same key word search. Generally routine 
correspondence between Soviet state officials, meeting notes, and records of private 
conversations are only available in print at the Russian state archive. However, as 
mentioned previously, there are numerous published historical accounts of the Cold 
War that reproduce these texts at length, because the authors visited the state archives 
in person. Here it was important not to be susceptible to historians’ interpretation of 
this primary evidence and to only use the original text that they reproduce. With the 
issue of reliability in mind, I only included texts that appeared either in the most 
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widely cited historical accounts or those that appeared in numerous sources. I will 
discuss these historical sources in more detail in the next sub-section.  
 
One final note is with regards to memoirs. In this analysis I used three memoirs written 
by general secretaries: Socialism, Peace and Democracy: Writings, Speeches and 
Reports (Gorbachev, 1987); Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World 
(Gorbachev, 1988); and Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Khrushchev, 
1974). I also used two personal accounts of people involved in Soviet nuclear 
projects: Vospominaniya. [Memories] (Sakharov, 1990), Sakharov was a nuclear 
physicist in charge of the design and development of the first hydrogen bomb; G. K. 
Zhukov: Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya. [G.K Zhukov: Memories and Thoughts] 
(Zhukov, 1985) Zhukov was a Soviet general and Marshal of the Soviet Union, who 
also served as Minister of Defence. Hansen (2006: 61- 68) notes that memoirs are 
well-suited for constructing legacies, for fleshing out the writing of the Self, and they 
are also important historical accounts of people directly involved in foreign policy 
decision-making. However, caution needs to be taken, because some memories may 
fade, some may be even fabricated, and memoirs often position the author in a 
favourable light (Fass, 2006: 121). Thus, only a very small number of texts was 
included in the empirical analysis of this thesis, but these sources provided, to use 
Hansen’s formulation, “a ‘raw and fruitful’ account of what war is really like ‘in the 
field’” (Hansen, 2006: 69). 
 
As a native Russian speaker, I was able to select and study the relevant texts in their 
original form and language. At first, I made an attempt to only search for original texts 
and to translate them myself. However, due to time constraints and the amount of 
documents, I ended up using mainly the texts that have already been translated into 
English by others. Where it was possible, I checked the translations against the original 
and all of them accurately reproduced the key points the speakers were making 
including metaphors and idioms. 
 
iii. Secondary sources 
According to Hansen (2006: 83): the writing of good discourse analysis “requires 
knowledge of the case in question, and knowledge comes, in part, from reading 
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standard works on the history, processes, events, and debates constituting a foreign 
policy phenomenon”. In order to situate primary data sources within their historical 
context, I relied on secondary scholarship. Specifically, I selected a number of widely 
cited and well-known historical accounts of the Cold War and in particular major 
historians’ work on the nuclear project in the Soviet Union.6 These sources were used 
to look at the precise time periods chosen for this study and for the reading around 
these time periods to establish key events, key actors, and the chronology of Soviet 
nuclear policy-making. Historical accounts consult a range of official and non-official 
statements made by Soviet and American leaders. They focus on nuclear weapons 
decisions and give a wealth of detail with regards to how these decisions were made. 
This type of literature was particularly useful for this research, because first, it helped 
to situate Soviet nuclear identity constructions in relevant historical and social 
contexts; second, it provided a large number of primary texts that I could not access 
through digital archival collections, particularly those that were not a part of the 
official foreign policy discourse; and third, in some instances it pointed me in the 
direction of original texts.  
 
In order to make sure that I obtained reliable historical information, I read through 
more than one historical account for each time period, generally 4 or 5. I only 
included the information that appeared in at least 3 of those. Historical accounts 
chosen for this study were written by most prominent and widely cited Cold War 
historians and historians specialising specifically on the history of the Soviet Union or 
on the history of nuclear weapons. These sources were predominantly in the form of 
published books, but also included articles published in peer-reviewed journals. All 
books were collected at the Edinburgh University main library.  
 
Applying Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 
The first stage of the analysis constituted an extensive reviewing of secondary sources 
in order to understand the historical context within which key documents were 
produced. This was essential, because discourses have no inherent meaning within 
themselves and need to be located historically and socially (Hardy et al., 2004: 20). 
	
6 The sources I used, and their specific contributions are presented in detail in the last section 
of Chapter 2.  
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This meant trying to understand the periods before Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition 
and the entire Cold War period, not just periods selected for focused study, as noted 
by Herrera and Braumoeller (2004: 18), discourse analysis requires investigating 
where ideas and beliefs came from and how they changed. I began reading 
chronologically starting from the initial nuclear developments in the Soviet Union in 
the early 1940s until the end of Gorbachev’s rule in 1991 and noting the primary 
sources that the authors used.  
 
Second, I applied the interpretive strategy outlined earlier in this chapter to the 
selected primary texts that were previously downloaded and, in some cases, printed. 
All texts were subjected to multiple readings. I investigated them for linkages and 
differentiations, various degrees of Otherness, spatial, temporal, and ethical 
constructions, strategies of feminisation and masculinisation. Patterns by which Soviet 
nuclear identity was constructed were identified through shared language that 
occurred across a range of texts. After several readings, I noted the re-occurring 
themes or dimensions of identity constructions. These formed the sub-sections of the 
first empirical chapter. The evolution of Soviet nuclear identity was analysed by 
examining whether these dimensions changed across different time periods and how 
these changes enabled varying courses of policy. 
 
Issues of Reliability, Validity, and Generalisability 
This thesis adopted an inherently interpretive approach, which raises questions 
regarding the issues of reliability, validity, and generalisability. As this is a 
poststructuralism- informed research, it is opposed to ‘scientific’ methods of positivist 
tradition and, in terms of reliability, postpositivist approaches do not seek to provide 
objective and replicable findings. The aim is to offer an interpretation of events. 
However, this does not mean that ‘anything goes’. Hansen (2006: 45) responds to the 
critique frequently levelled at poststructuralism regarding its lack of methodological 
rigour: 
 
But this [the critique] is misleading insofar as the methodology of discourse 
analysis insists on reading based on explicit discursive articulations of signs 
and identities and that one has to pay careful analytical attention to how 
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signs are linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and 
how they legitimise particular policies. 
 
 
As such, what matters is that the analysis does not overlook important signs, does not 
downplay the degree of Otherness, and does not misinterpret the connection between 
identity constructions and policy. In this chapter, it was my duty as a researcher to 
clearly state ontological and epistemological premises that informed my interpretive 
strategy, to outline the processes involved at each stage of the interpretation including 
the commentary on the reliability of used sources. It was also my duty to present the 
quotes from selected texts as fully as possible in the empirical chapters. This opens up 
the analysis to scrutiny by the reader, who can either confirm or question the 
interpretation. 
 
In terms of validity, the aim of this research is to explore discursive constructions of 
nuclear identity and policy, not to tell the story of what actually happened or to search 
for quantifiable ‘objective truths’. If validity is concerned with the appropriateness of 
methodology and methods, I made sure to present these as clearly as possible. This 
chapter demonstrated how the chosen strategy and methods enabled me to investigate 
the diversity of Soviet nuclear identity constructions in an effective way. 
 
Finally, in terms of generalisability, conventional IR approaches to nuclear 
proliferation take on a positivist ontological position and assume an objectivist 
universal truth, which, as argued in Chapter 2, can be counterproductive in the 
nuclear proliferation context. This thesis does not seek to provide generalisable 
findings. Rather, it determines “motives, meanings, reasons, and other subjective 
experiences that are time- and context-bound” (Anderson Hudson and Ozanne, 1988: 
511). Nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation is case specific and often models 
developed for analysing some cases do not provide the same results when applied to a 
different case (Sagan, 2011: 235). This does not indicate that these models are useless: 
they do contribute to our understanding of specific regional and national cases by 
developing new theoretical constructs (Sagan, 2011: 233). However, to get a full 
picture, there is a need for uncovering specific processes that have occurred in 
particular time and place and to hold off the assumption that truth and reality are 
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universal. It would not be possible, for example, to generalise the key findings of this 
thesis beyond the Soviet Union. Furthermore, when looking at discursive nuclear 
identity constructions, it is doubtful that there can ever be generalisability. 
Poststructuralism emphasises identities as complex, contradictory, historically 
contingent, and only existing in discourse. “There are no objective identities located in 
some extra-discursive realm, hence identity cannot be used as a variable against 




This chapter established the ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
premises of this thesis and introduced methods involved. It has argued that 
poststructuralist discourse theory based on discursive ontology and epistemology 
represents a viable approach to the analysis of the mutually constitutive relationship 
between Soviet nuclear identity and policy. The insights of Hansen’s research to a 
large extent informed the interpretive strategy and methodology of this thesis through 
its emphasis on the utility of analysing the processes of linking and differentiation, the 
varying degree of Otherness, spatial, temporal, and ethical identities. As 
poststructuralist research often faces criticisms due to its traditional lack of 
engagement with questions of methodology and methods, this chapter sought to 
present all the steps and thought processes that were involved in the selection and 
interpretation of texts as clearly and transparently as possible. The following three 
chapters present the results of the application of this interpretative strategy to selected 
texts. The next chapter will turn to the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions 












Chapter 5. Nuclear Weapons Acquisition – Joseph Stalin (1941-1949) 
 





To reconfirm, the aim of this thesis is to explore the constructions of Soviet nuclear 
identity across the span of the Cold War events, and to demonstrate the significance of 
this identity to the enactment and justification of Soviet nuclear policy. Chapter 2 
emphasised that much has been written about the need to go beyond rationalist 
conventional explanations for the development of nuclear weapons.  Possessing and 
threatening to use nuclear weapons can be as much about ideas, beliefs, and identity 
as it is about security and self-defence. This chapter begins the empirical analysis of 
nuclear identity constructed by the Soviet political elites during the stage of 
acquisition of nuclear weapons in the USSR.7 It focuses on the emergence of this 
nuclear identity and establishes the main characteristics of its discursive construction.  
 
The following analysis is mainly derived from the chronology of the Soviet decisions 
regarding the development and testing of USSR’s first nuclear weapons, secondary 
sources, and key speeches, notes, and discussions between highly ranked Soviet 
officials – mainly, but not limited to the three key decision-makers at that time, the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Joseph Stalin, 
chief of the Soviet security and secret police (NKVD) Lavrentiy Beria, and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. The chapter consults a range of texts stretching 
from the early 1940s until the first Soviet nuclear test on 29 August 1949. However, in 
order to flesh out the emergence and dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity, texts from 
the early 1930s and just immediately after the first test are also briefly consulted.  
 
This chapter looks to uncover discourses that enabled the emergence and 
reproduction of Soviet nuclear identity and made weapons’ acquisition possible, 
desirable, and legitimate. Chapter 3 established that in line with poststructuralist and 
	
7 At this stage during the 1940s, ‘nuclear weapons’ encapsulated atomic or fission bombs.	
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feminist approaches to IR, this thesis conceptualises nuclear identity as discursive, 
relational and masculine. In this sense, Soviet nuclear identity is understood as 
reproduced through elite discourses and constructed vis-à-vis one or multiple Others. 
This chapter also looks at a number of key documents and speeches from the US side 
in order to apprehend the inherently co-constitutive relationship between Self and 
Other and to show how states can be made foreign from one another through 
discourses of danger and difference.  
 
This chapter argues that when a nuclear identity emerges as competitive, hyper-
masculine, threatened by the radical spatial other, and acting in order to achieve 
admirable moral goals such as peacekeeping, it enables and legitimises nuclear 
weapons acquisition, simultaneously excluding the possibility of reaching an 
agreement on nuclear arms control policy. At a first glance, Stalin’s choice of post-war 
nuclear proliferation policy was one of realpolitik. It made sense to build the bomb in 
order to provide security for the Soviet Union and to balance power against the US. 
However, closer consideration of the motivations, justifications, and articulations of 
Soviet policy in this era, using poststructuralist discourse analysis, reveals there is 
more to the story than self-defence considerations. There are deeper underlying 
meanings behind Soviet political elites’ perceptions of the bomb and its future uses.  
 
This chapter emphasises that apart from the obvious security/deterrence factor, Soviet 
nuclear policy decisions were additionally reliant upon particular ideas about leaders’ 
subjective understandings of Self and Other and their constructions of threat and 
danger. Soviet nuclear identity thus presents itself as a complex interplay of 
representations. This chapter is organised around three core dimensions of Soviet 
nuclear identity that emerged from the analysis of the Soviet officials’ discourse during 
the period of nuclear weapons acquisition. These are: competition with the US or 
‘catch up and overtake’, hyper-masculinity, and peacekeeping. This chapter also 
discusses paranoia as a defining element of Soviet policy-making under Stalin’s rule, 
which constitutes a form of a discursive construction of threat and danger and defines 
boundaries between inside and outside. This practice was essential in order to 
establish a particular discursively constructed Soviet reality where nuclear weapons’ 
acquisition was desirable and necessary.  
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Historical Overview, 1941-1949 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis of Soviet nuclear discourse, this chapter provides 
a brief historical overview of the Soviet atomic project at its initial stages. Soviet 
physicists were advanced in their research and knowledge of atomic fission and some 
work on uranium had already been carried out before and during World War II. 
Following the Nazi invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, the established Uranium 
Commission ceased to function, and most nuclear scientists abandoned their research 
for the war effort (Holloway, 1994: 75). Beria was first informed about the Anglo-
American nuclear project in 1941 (Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 44-45). The 
information was passed on to him from NKVD residents in Britain and the US 
(Artyomov, 2013: 63). After gathering more intelligence and realising the 
advancement of uranium work in Germany, Britain and the US, Stalin instructed the 
State Defence Committee to revive the old uranium project (Craig and Radchenko, 
2008: 49). Igor’ Kurchatov was chosen as a scientific director for the project. On the 
government’s side, Molotov and later Beria oversaw it. After the US dropped two 
atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the work 
on the Soviet atomic project was rapidly accelerated and generously sponsored by the 
Soviet state. Hiroshima and Nagasaki put a strain on the US-USSR wartime alliance 
and had a powerful impact on the Soviet officials, raising questions of whether the US 
could be trusted not to start another war against the Soviet Union (Zubok, 2009: 27-
28).  
 
The Soviet atomic project was kept under a veil of strict secrecy. It is worth noting that 
it was initiated during a particularly dark period in Soviet history characterised by the 
bloody war against Nazi Germany, the brutality and repressiveness of Stalin’s regime, 
and the devastated post-war economy. At the same time, the Soviet victory against the 
Germans raised not only Stalin’s status among the Soviet people and political elites, 
but also contributed to the belief that the Soviet Union was becoming a military 
superpower and a key actor in the international arena. Zubok (2009: 6-8) points out 
that it was during the war that the Russian term derzhava (‘great power’) entered the 
official Soviet lexicon. As a result, the Soviets expected to be treated like one in the 
post-war world and proceeded with the socialist expansionism into Eastern Europe.  
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The first Soviet atomic bomb was built in four years, contrary to Western predictions 
that a Soviet bomb would take ten, and successfully tested on 29 August 1949 
(Holloway, 1994: 265).  Prior to that, both the Soviets and the Americans attempted to 
put forward anti-nuclear and disarmament plans, but they never reached consensus. 
Notably, the Baruch plan of June 1946 was a failed US attempt to prevent the Soviet 
Union from developing nuclear weapons. The Baruch plan proposed a creation of a 
powerful international agency that would establish effective safeguards through 
inspections of nuclear facilities and eliminate nuclear weapons (Holloway, 1994: 
162). Only after all states would agree to this plan, the US would get rid of all its 
nuclear weapons. Baruch also suggested removing the right of veto from the Soviet 
Union, which meant that if the US suspected that the Soviets had the bomb, they 
would take action (Holloway, 1994: 163). This plan clearly disadvantaged the Soviets 
putting them in a precarious position in the face of the American atomic monopoly 
without any viable defence. The Soviets did present the US with alternatives also 
emphasising the need to create an international control commission but leaving the 
development of atomic production in national hands rather than under international 
ownership (Holloway, 1994.: 165). The Americans rejected these proposals. During 
this period the relations between the USSR and the US significantly deteriorated 
marking the beginning of the Cold War in 1947.  
 
Threatened Derzhava and ‘Catch up and Overtake’ 
 
While the history of the Soviet atomic project dates back to the late 1930s, Soviet 
nuclear identity emerged when Soviet post-war self-conception as derzhava was 
threatened by the existence of the American atomic monopoly. This identity of 
threatened derzhava is crucial for us to understand when exploring Soviet nuclear 
identity and policy during the Cold War era. Much of Stalin’s policy making was 
about competing with the capitalists and establishing the Soviet Union as a global 
socialist superpower. ‘Catch up and overtake’ emerged as one of the dominant 
political discourses during Stalin’s rule, which continuously legitimised and 
maintained a large scale of Soviet industrial/military build-up and territorial expansion. 
This process contributed to the continuous reinforcement and re-imagination of Soviet 
state identity. This identity largely reflected and augmented Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
constructing a Self that was unique, morally sound, superior to capitalism, and en 
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route to its rightful superpower status and the achievement of the global communist 
regime. Below is an excerpt from Stalin’s speech outlining the results of the 
implementation of the Five-Year plan of 1928, which, as was repeatedly emphasised 
by Stalin throughout the speech, were attained in only four years: 
 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with 
its backward, and in part medieval, technology, on to the lines of new, 
modern technology. The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to 
convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, dependent upon 
the caprices of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful 
country, fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world 
capitalism (Stalin, 1933). 
 
This quote captures the re-imagination of Soviet identity and its transformation under 
the rule of Bolsheviks in line with their ideological ideas and beliefs. This identity was 
constructed in relation to external difference – the capitalist countries, particularly the 
United States; but also, in relation to earlier ‘weaker’ Tsarist Russia that Stalin set out 
to transform into a military superpower. Competing with and overtaking the capitalists 
became a necessity in order for this Bolshevik identity to flourish. More evidence of 
the significance of this competition can be found in Stalin’s speeches in the early 
1930s during the rapid acceleration of industrialisation in the USSR: 
 
you need in the shortest period of time to liquidate its [our socialist 
homeland’s] backwardness and to develop true Bolshevik tempo and build 
up its socialist might. There are no other ways. This is why prior to October 
Lenin said: “It’s either death, or to catch up and overtake the advanced 
capitalist countries (Stalin, 1931). 
 
This quote demonstrates the vital significance of winning the competition against 
capitalism. Constructing the Self as a mighty socialist state that would catch up with 
and overtake the West made Stalin’s policy possible, which in its turn reproduced and 
strengthened Soviet state identity. It can be seen from the quote above how Stalin 
constructed the Soviet identity vis-à-vis the USSR’s own pre-Bolshevik past. The 
simultaneous othering of capitalist states shows how temporal and spatial others can 
co-exist in the process of self-constitution. As we can see, Stalin frequently referred to 
pre-existing Soviet weakness and emphasised the transformation and progression of 
the Soviet Union from an old agrarian state to a mighty technologically developed 
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new one. In the same speech, he listed old Russia’s enemies and repeatedly made a 
point about its lost battles and the former backwardness of its industries.  To illustrate: 
 
The history of old Russia, by the way, consisted of being constantly beaten. 
Beaten by Mongol khans. Beaten by the Turks. Beaten by Swedish feudals.  
Beaten by Polish and Lithuanian landlords. Beaten by Anglo-French 
capitalists. Beaten by Japanese barons. Beaten by everyone for 
backwardness - for military backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for 
state backwardness, for agricultural backwardness (Stalin, 1931). 
 
Frequent use of the terms ‘beaten’ and ‘backwardness’ emphasises the difference 
between the Russian Empire then and the Soviet Union at that moment. Stalin was 
constructing an identity of a powerful state that transformed and would not be beaten 
or fall behind again. As a result, the Soviet Union was becoming: “a country prepared 
for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern 
means of defence and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from 
abroad” (Stalin, 1931).  
 
The new Russia being discursively constructed as different from the old ‘beaten’ Russia 
made the strengthening of Soviet industries and defence not only desirable, but 
necessary. There is an assumption in Stalin’s speeches that the Soviet Union should be 
ahead of everyone; its rightful place is above everyone else and particularly the 
capitalists. The ‘new’ Soviet state identity was built on the idea of Russian rebirth and 
future greatness as the world’s centre of Marxism-Leninism and socialism:  
 
In course of further development of international revolution there will 
emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to 
itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, 
drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism (Stalin, 1927, 
cited in Kennan, 1946). 
 
 
The construction of such identity enabled the course of Soviet policy of 
industrial/military build-up and post-war expansion into Eastern Europe. Everything was 
aimed at increasing Soviet strength and influence and the weakening of the capitalist 
camp. The Soviet victory against Nazi Germany had a profound impact on Soviet 
construction of Self as a triumphant superpower with strengthened international 
authority. For example, Molotov (1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 153) stated: 
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“Important problems of international relations cannot nowadays be settled without the 
participation of the Soviet Union or without heeding the voice of the country”. In his 
speech at the Bolshoi theatre in February 1946, Stalin criticised the nature of capitalism 
pointing out that its development “proceeds not in a smooth and balanced forward 
movement, but through crises and military catastrophes” (Stalin, 1946, cited in 
Holloway, 1994: 150).  In the similar manner, the head of the State Planning 
Committee (Gosplan), Nikolai Voznesenskii (1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 151), 
stated: 
 
monopoly capitalism is capable of giving rise to new aggressors […] The 
Soviet people wishes to see its armed forces even stronger and more 
powerful, in order to guarantee the country against all contingencies and 
stand on guard over peace. 
 
A close reading of the Soviet ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse suggests that it became 
a source of pride for the Soviet officials to stress the rapid pace of industrial 
accomplishments; the USSR’s new role as an important powerful actor in the 
international arena; and its ideological superiority and the inevitable victory of 
Marxism-Leninism over capitalism. These factors point to the exceptional character of 
identity that the Soviets were constructing. There was a belief that the USSR is a state 
like no other, although constructing a Self that is exceptional is embedded in discursive 
practices of most states. Oskanian (2018: 30) argues that Russian and Soviet 
exceptionalism took on a hybrid from, by being rooted in messianic civilising missions 
and in Russia’s distinct geographical position between Europe and Asia. Oskanian 
(2018) traces the evolution of Russian exceptionalism from Tsarist to contemporary 
Russia claiming that Soviet exceptionalism borrowed its imperial ambitions from the 
Romanov Empire. “Marxism-Leninism was an ideological peculiarity that enabled the 
imposition of a civilising project on often unwilling subjects in both West and East” 
(Oskanian, 2018: 35). This Soviet civilising project had two key directions: against 
capitalism and against the “backwardness of the traditional East” (Oskanian, 2018: 35).  
 
Carleton (2017) claims that the triumph over Nazi Germany became a pillar of Russian 
identity due to the long-standing “belief [among Russians] in their special role in saving 
civilization from history’s villains”. In addition, this identity rested on the belief that no 
other state had been such a frequent target of attacks and aggression (Carleton, 2017). 
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This is echoed in Stalin’s speech about Russia being constantly beaten in the past. The 
victory against Germany and catastrophic losses that the USSR suffered during the war 
greatly intensified both beliefs. The quotes from Soviet officials discussed earlier 
referring to the future greatness, the new post-war role, and the USSR becoming the 
socialist centre of world significance show how the narrative of exceptionalism was 
embedded in identity that the Soviets were constructing.  
 
It is worth noting that the US had of course also constructed exceptional conceptions 
of Self. What is particularly interesting is the different ways in which the two states 
carved out their exceptional identities. The US built an exceptional identity from its 
unique foundations of modern liberal and democratic principles, its claim to the world 
leadership, and the burden of responsibility for freedom and peace (Walt, 2011; 
Weldes, 1999). This is seen, for instance, in US president Harry Truman’s radio address 
to the nation after the bombings of Hiroshima: 
 
It was a victory of one way of life over another. It was a victory of an ideal 
founded on the rights of the common man, on the dignity of the human 
being, on the conception of the State as the servant - and not the master- of 
its people (Truman, 1945a). 
 
Discourses of exceptionalism in the US did not include the notion of it being 
previously beaten or backward, which makes it almost the reverse of the Soviet 
exceptionalism. The development, testing, and the use of the first US atomic bombs in 
1945 destabilised Soviet exceptional superpower identity enabling the diversion of all 
efforts from post-war reparation to the acceleration of the Soviet atomic project.  
 
So far, this chapter has established that Soviet state identity went through 
transformation under the Bolshevik rule. Soviet state identity was constructed in 
relation to the key spatial Other – the US – and in relation to the Russian pre-
revolutionary Self that according to Stalin was technologically backward and beaten 
by multiple enemies. As a result of these constructions, catching up with and 
overtaking capitalist countries became one of the pillars of Soviet state identity, which 
enabled increasing efforts to develop all of its industries. After the victory in the Great 
Patriotic War against Germany in 1945 and the strengthening of the international 
status of the USSR, the Soviet state identity evolved into an exceptional superpower 
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identity. American success in developing first nuclear weapons had a profound 
influence on this identity. A nuclear bomb became an embodiment of the advances in 
Western military science and the hegemonic status of the US. In the eyes of Soviet 
officials, the US bomb made their earlier industrial/military accomplishments and the 
war victory look less significant. As recalled by the British correspondent Alexander 
Werth: 
 
the news [of Hiroshima] had an acutely depressing effect on everybody. It 
was clearly realized that this was a New Fact in the world’s power politics, 
that the bomb constituted a threat to Russia, and some Russian pessimists I 
talked to that day dismally remarked that Russia’s desperately hard victory 
over Germany was now ‘as good as wasted’(Werth, 1964: 925). 
 
As already noted, acquiring a modern means of defence played an important role in 
the re-invention of the Soviet Self as the global socialist derzhava. Thus, nuclear 
weapons were something that the Soviets desperately needed to possess in order to 
keep this superpower identity strong. The bomb was an essential tool that served a far 
greater purpose than defence: to not repeat the mistakes of the past and fall behind the 
capitalists again as well as to reaffirm the Soviet post-war greatness. Therefore, not 
rushing to acquire the bomb was a priori not an option for the Soviet government.  
Chapter 3 established that nuclear identity comes into being through the discursive 
construction of Self as a power in light of nuclear decisions. It can be seen from the 
Soviet officials’ public reaction to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 
commentary on the American atomic monopoly that the Soviet leadership began to 
comprehensively explore its identity in terms of becoming a nuclear weapon state. 
 
‘Catch up and overtake’ became one of the key elements of nuclear identity that the 
Soviets were constructing. This is reflected, for instance, in Molotov’s statement made 
in November 1945: “we will make up for everything, as necessary, and we will 
achieve the prosperity of our country. We will have atomic energy too, and much else” 
(Molotov, 1945, cited in Holloway, 1994: 144), or in Stalin’s speech in February 1945: 
“if we render the proper help to our scientists they will be able not only to catch up, 
but also to overtake in the near future the achievements of science beyond the borders 
of our country” (Stalin, 1945, cited in Holloway, 1994: 149). From this we can see that 
acquiring the bomb for the USSR was as much about the competition with the US as it 
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was about defending itself. More evidence of this can be found in the statement made 
by professor Simon Alexandrov, who was sent as a Soviet representative to observe the 
US atomic tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946: “I do not know whether we have an atomic 
bomb right now. Perhaps we have; perhaps we have not. But I believe that very soon, 
we will have everything that you have in the United States” (Alexandrov, 1946, cited in 
Streifer and Sabitov, 2013: 55). 
 
The following quote represents the significance of catching up with the US in nuclear 
developments to the Soviet leadership. It featured in the article by Kurchatov’s 
assistant Igor’ Golovin, where he recalled Beria’s behaviour after witnessing the first 
Soviet nuclear test: “Did it look like the American one? Very much alike? We didn’t 
screw it up? Kurchatov isn’t pulling our leg, is he? Everything the same? Good!” (Beria, 
1949, cited in Golovin, 1991: 21). Beria immediately informed Stalin about the test: 
“Josef, it has burst, like the American one!” (Beria, 1949, cited in Streifer and Sabitov, 
2013: 54). To Soviets the atomic bomb was the symbol of advanced Western military 
science and Stalin’s government placed a lot of emphasis on military build-up and 
acquiring modern weaponry. Successfully building and testing the bomb that looked 
and burst “like the American one” meant that the Soviets started catching up with the 
US thus reaffirming their superpower identity.  
 
This identity-construction process was to some degree different from that which was 
taking place in the US, because the American leaders had already constructed the 
identity of a state that was ahead and above everyone due to a belief in American 
moral superiority. The Americans did not refer to temporal constructions of the earlier 
Self that were weak or somewhat inferior. Rather, they constructed this exceptional 
identity around their unique history and a historic understanding of Self being an 
exceptional credible leader of the Western Hemisphere and a freedom’s defender as 
well as around qualities such as strength, rationality, and toughness (Weldes, 1999: 
46-47). The atomic monopoly reinforced these qualities and American leadership and, 
additionally, placed an imaginary burden of protecting the free world on the US 
shoulders. For instance, Truman (1945a) noted: “We must constitute ourselves trustees 
of this new force - to prevent its misuse and to turn it into the channels of service to 
mankind”. However, Soviet and American exceptionalisms are also very similar in a 
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sense that both states construct their Selves as responsible nuclear superpowers that 
can (obviously) be trusted with nuclear weapons and can even use it to service the 
mankind. This eventually enabled the expansion of both nuclear projects, which were 
presented as serving noble purposes. I will come back to this point several times 
throughout the empirical chapters, as it represents the important ethical dimension of 
Soviet nuclear identity.  
 
To the Soviets, catching up did not just mean successfully testing one atomic bomb. 
That would not be overtaking. In 1949 the US was already in possession of around 
170 atomic bombs (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 81). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the Soviets kept their first nuclear test in August 1949 quiet until it was detected by the 
US three and a half weeks later (Holloway, 1994: 265). The Soviets needed to narrow 
a nuclear gap with the US before they could use the bomb as a tool to showcase their 
military might:  “And if we trumpet it everywhere, the USA will so speed up its work 
that we will not be able to catch up with it” (Kurchatov, cited in Holloway, 1994: 
267). There is certainly rationalist deterrence logic at work here, which cannot be 
overlooked. After the attack on Hiroshima, Stalin said to his government: 
 
A single demand of you comrades … Provide us with atomic weapons in 
the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole 
world. The equilibrium has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will 
remove a great danger from us (Stalin, 1945, cited in Holloway, 1981: 
183). 
 
Despite the element of deterrence, there was an obsession with catching up and 
overtaking among the Soviet officials that seemed to override the need to “remove a 
great danger”. 
 
In his speech at the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 
1947, Molotov stated: 
 
A sort of new religion has become widespread among expansionist circles 
in the USA: having no faith in their own internal forces, they put their faith 
in the secret of the atomic bomb, although this secret has long ceased to be 
a secret [Emphasis added] (Molotov, 1947, cited in Holloway, 1994: 258). 
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This statement is important, because it came some two years before the Soviets tested 
the bomb, yet they were already constructing a nuclear identity, re-imagining the USSR 
as a nuclear weapons state. This shows how powerful some discourses can be; 
admitting that the Soviet Union was behind the US was unimaginable, because Soviet 
superpower identity needed to be stabilised and reinforced. As a result, Soviet officials 
started claiming that “the imperialist camp has lost thereby one of its most powerful 
means for blackmailing people” (The secret bulletin of the Central Committee’s 
information bureau, 1947, cited in Holloway, 1994: 258). The Soviet government kept 
the first Soviet nuclear tests under strict secrecy. However, after the US detected the 
test, the Soviet news agency TASS issued an announcement referring back to Molotov’s 
statement of November 6, 1947: 
 
This statement signified the Soviet Union already had discovered the secret 
of the atomic weapon and that it had this weapon at its disposal. […] 
Scientific circles of the United States of America took this statement by 
V.M. Molotov for bluff, considering that the Russians could not possess the 
atomic weapon earlier than the year 1952. They were mistaken, however, 
since the Soviet Union possessed the secret of the atomic weapon in 1947 
(TASS, 1949, cited in Holloway, 1994: 258). 
 
This statement exhibits how the discursive construction of Soviet nuclear identity 
preceded the construction of the bomb itself. The emergence of this nuclear identity 
was innately linked to the struggles of the post-war era, when the Soviet self-
conception as a global socialist superpower was challenged by the existence of 
American atomic monopoly and had to be asserted. Stating that the Soviets possessed 
the atomic weapon earlier than predicted in the US reinforces the significance of ‘catch 
up and overtake’ and affirms the identity of a state that does not lag behind the 
capitalist US. Without a doubt, successfully testing a nuclear bomb provided certain 
security guarantees to the Soviet government and minimised the chances of a surprise 
attack by the US. However, the decision to build the bomb as quickly as possible was 
enabled by two prevalent ideas: ideas about the Soviet exceptionalism, and about 
catching up with and overtaking the West. These ideas were already deeply embedded 
into the Soviet construction of Self and enabled the emergence of Soviet nuclear 
identity. In this sense, nuclear weapons were not just security tools, but tools of 
superpower reassurance.  
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Hyper-masculinity in Soviet Nuclear Identity Constructions 
 
Chapter 3 formulated the significance of gendered hierarchies to the construction of 
nuclear identity. To reiterate, ideas about masculinity and power shape political 
discourses about nuclear weapons, which creates context where these weapons are a 
necessity (Cohn et al., 2006: 4). What one sees as ‘feminising’ or ‘masculinising’ 
comes from the culturally embedded beliefs in what typically constitutes male and 
female bodies (Cohn et al., 2006: 2). Society traditionally associates traits such as 
strength, rationality, prudency, responsibility etc. with male bodies in opposition to 
weakness, emotions, irrationality, passivity, need of protection etc., which are 
believed to be female body characteristics. As seen in the previous section, Soviet 
leaders were constructing an identity of a tough and powerful state that would not be 
beaten or intimidated placing a lot of emphasis on military strength. This makes Soviet 
nuclear identity hyper-masculine by nature. Nuclear weapons were essential in order 
to maintain this type of aggressive masculinity, because American nuclear monopoly 
threatened it and made the Soviets look weak and emasculated. This ties in with the 
previously discussed theme of catching up with and overtaking the US; Soviet officials 
perceived falling behind in areas such as defence as backwardness and weakness. 
Chapter 3 emphasised intense competitiveness as a highly masculine trait. This can be 
seen throughout Stalin’s statements: 
 
You fall behind, you are weak – so you are wrong, and you can be beaten 
and enslaved. You are mighty – so you are right, so we need to be wary of 
you. This is why we cannot fall behind anymore (Stalin, 1931). 
 
Such rhetoric openly invites and encourages competition. In the context of Stalin’s 
speech, ‘might’ was linked to not falling behind the West in defence matters. This is 
interesting, because the nuclear identity constructed by the Other – the US – was also 
very masculine: 
 
The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be 
swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, only the 
industrious, only the determined, only the courageous, only the visionary 
who determine the real nature of our struggle can possibly survive 
(Kennedy, 1962, cited in Weldes, 1999: 46).  
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Although Kennedy made this statement in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was 
a clear representation of the masculine character of US identity. As outlined in 
Chapter 3, Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 546) state that security discourses “are 
infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which flow from and underpin the 
primary signifiers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy 
favoured over the feminine”. For example, the following dichotomies feature in 
Stalin’s speeches: weak/mighty, weak/powerful and self-reliant, unstable/has no fear of 
crises etc.  To illustrate, I go back to Stalin’s speech discussed earlier that captures the 
results of the Five-year-plan implemented in 1928, which reflects masculine character 
of Soviet Bolshevik state identity: 
 
Finally, as a result of all this the Soviet Union has been converted from a 
weak country, unprepared for defence, into a country mighty in defence. 
[…] The results of the five-year plan have shown that the capitalist system 
of economy is bankrupt and unstable; that it has outlived its day and must 
give way to another, a higher, Soviet, socialist system of economy; that the 
only system of economy that has no fear of crises and is able to overcome 
the difficulties which capitalism cannot solve, is the Soviet system of 
economy (Stalin, 1933). 
 
The constructed Self was linked to traditional traits of masculinity such as pride, 
strength, and stability. In addition, the use of word combinations such as ‘a higher 
system’ or ‘the only system’ also illustrates the exceptional character of Soviet identity 
that Stalin was reinforcing. The Other – the US – was constructed through the process 
if differentiation as sensitive and emotional, the traits that are traditionally associated 
with femininity. The below quote equates being emotional with the danger of being 
dominated: “They, bourgeois politicians, are very sensitive and revengeful. You should 
keep your feelings under control. If your emotions rule you – you will lose” (Stalin, 
cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 58). In contrast, a ‘victorious’ Self was 
constructed as an encompassment of traditionally masculine qualities - determined, 
independent, impenetrable, and invincible: “Finally, the results of the five-year plan 
have shown that the Communist Party is invincible, if it knows its goal, and if it is not 
afraid of difficulties” (Stalin, 1933). 
 
Both the US and the USSR constructed masculine nuclear identities in opposition to 
the external Other and they reinforced these identities in very similar ways by 
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constructing the Other as unstable, emotional, irresponsible, and so on. For example, 
the head of the Soviet Committee on Standards Vasiliy Emel’yanov noted when 
recalling the post-Hiroshima period: “The only possibility of restraining these new 
claimants to world domination [the Americans] and of cooling their ardour was to 
create our own atomic bomb very quickly” (Emel’yanov, 1975, cited in Holloway, 
1981: 187). The need to restrain and to “cool the ardour” is the language that portrays 
the Other as emotional.  
 
The US leaders also engaged in antagonising the Other as seen from Truman’s 
memoirs: “Force is the only thing the Russians understand” (Truman, 1955: 412) and 
in his diary entry that reflected the decision not to use the atomic bomb in Tokyo and 
Kyoto: 
 
We as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this 
terrible bomb on the old Capitol or the new […] It is certainly a good thing 
for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic 
bomb (Truman, 1945b). 
 
The above quote reinforces the US ethical identity of a responsible nuclear state and a 
trustee of nuclear force implying that the USSR leaders would not be as ‘merciful’.  In 
the similar manner, the US Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s reflected: 
 
We must remember that she [Russia] has not learned the amenities of 
diplomatic intercourse and we must expect bad language from her […] 
There has been growing quite a strain of irritating feeling between our 
government and the Russians and it seems to me that it is a time for me to 
use all the restraint I can on these other people who have been apparently 
getting a little more irritated (Stimson, 1945a). 
 
American officials constructed the Soviets as almost child-like differentiated from the 
paternal US, suggesting that they would not understand the diplomatic US language, 
but they would understand violence and force. Specifically, the Americans were 
infantilising the Soviets, simultaneously depicting themselves as more responsible and 
legitimately authoritative. Here, the language works to construct certain hierarchies 
and to boost the so-called ‘American manhood’. Doty (1996:31) argues that American 
manhood was linked to first, the competence to colonize and govern, and second, to 
democracy. The atomic monopoly also clearly reaffirmed this manhood as seen from 
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the US leaders’ assumed responsibility and leadership due to developing the bomb 
first:  
this was a place where we really held all the cards. I called it [an atomic 
bomb] a royal straight flush and we mustn't be a fool about the way we 
play it. They [the Soviets] can't get along without our help and industries 
and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique (Stimson, 
1945b). 
The war with Japan was still continuing when Stimson wrote this in his diary, yet he 
was thinking about how to “play” with the US’ ally, the Soviet Union. In a way, the 
Americans were also indulging in competition, more specifically in being the leader 
of this competition. 
The Soviet manhood as a consequence of the US atomic monopoly was somewhat 
crushed, which the Soviets actively hid.  As a result, another factor indicating the 
hyper-masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity was bravado. Despite openly 
acknowledging the weakness of the USSR at earlier stages of his rule, Stalin and other 
Soviet officials did not refer to weakness so much after the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki even though they were behind the US again on the means of defence. 
Instead, they continued to construct the identity of a fearless mighty state and even 
attempted bluffing. The Soviets had to reinforce and stabilise their post-war global 
superpower identity. To illustrate, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 
October 29, 1946, Molotov declared: 
 
It must not be forgotten that in response to the atomic bombs of one side 
atomic bombs, and perhaps something else as well, may be found on the 
other side, and then the final collapse of the calculations of certain self-
satisfied but limited people will become more than obvious (Molotov, 
1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 164). 
 
 
More evidence of Soviet bravado can be found in Stalin’s interview with the Sunday 
Times correspondent Alexander Werth on the 25th of September 1946 published on 
the front page of Pravda: 
 
Atomic bombs are intended to frighten faint-hearted people, but they 
cannot decide the outcomes of wars, and would under no circumstances 
suffice for this purpose. Certainly, the monopoly on the secrets of the atom 
bomb poses a threat, but against that there are at least two things: The 
monopoly on the possession of the atom bomb cannot last long; The use of 
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the atom bomb will be forbidden (Stalin, 1946b). 
 
Again, Stalin was constructing an identity that was very masculine, reinforcing 
fearlessness and rationality. This made the bomb’s acquisition possible and necessary. 
To reiterate the argument of Cohn et al. (2006: 3) regarding political leaders’ “anxious 
preoccupation with affirming manhood”, not acquiring the bomb in Stalin’s eyes 
would be a ‘wimpish’ or a ‘soft’ move, and the Soviet Union needed to realise its 
discursively constructed identity of an invincible superpower, because the American 
bomb made this established masculine identity precarious and raised questions about 
Soviet strength and toughness. Soviet bravado and the public diminishing of the 
bomb’s significance was a part of this ideational project. To illustrate, a year after the 
nuclear bombings of Japan Stalin stated: 
The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare 
people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course, the atom bomb is a 
weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of war is decided by the 
people, not by one or two new types of weapon (Stalin, 1946, cited in 
Holloway, 1994: 282). 
 
Such discourse disguises the vulnerability of Soviet nuclear identity and seeks to 
maintain and reinforce its masculine attributes. In order to stabilise this identity, the 
Soviets needed to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. This shows how the 
gendered nature of nuclear discourse and competitive hyper-masculine identity 
constructed within it enabled nuclear weapons acquisition in the USSR. 
 
Soviet Nuclear Identity as Peace-loving 
 
As with any identity construction, Soviet nuclear identity was highly complex and 
contradictory. Previous sections established that nuclear weapons were necessary in 
order to reproduce and affirm Soviet masculine and exceptional superpower identity. 
Acquiring modern means of defence and catching up with and overtaking the US was 
integral to the stability of this identity. A third element of nuclear identity that the 
Soviets constructed was that of the USSR as rational, responsible, and peace loving in 
opposition to the aggressive, imperialist, and warmongering US. These constructions 
particularly intensified after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the 
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Soviets became fully aware of the bomb’s military and political significance. It was 
during the period between the end of World War II and the first Soviet nuclear test 
(1945-1949) that both the USSR and the US put ahead various plans to halt nuclear 
proliferation, as mentioned in the historical overview that this chapter begins with. 
Constructing a clear boundary between the ‘cooperative’ Self and the ‘aggressive’ 
Other made the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons legitimate and necessary, 
because if no agreement can be achieved then there was a need to defend oneself 
from “the instigators of war”. There is thus a contradiction at the heart of the Soviet 
nuclear identity construction – alongside the narratives of masculine military strength 
and superpower status discussed so far, the Soviets also constructed their identity 
through narratives of cooperation and peacekeeping. To illustrate, in one of his 
interviews to Pravda in 1948 Stalin stated:  
 
[T]hose in the United States and Great Britain who inspire an aggressive 
policy do not consider themselves interested in an agreement and in co-
operation with the U.S.S.R […] What the war instigators who are striving to 
unleash a new war fear most of all is the reaching of agreements and co-
operation with the U.S.S.R. because a policy of concord with the U.S.S.R. 
undermines the position of the instigators of war and deprives the 
aggressive policy of these gentlemen of any purpose (Stalin, 1948). 
 
This constructed the USSR as peaceful, cooperative and seeking agreement with 
“aggressive” capitalists. The above passage also portrays Soviet policy as more rational 
and superior to that of the US and Britain, because the Soviets were the ones seeking a 
diplomatic route. In the similar manner, in another interview to Pravda in 1946 Stalin 
commented on Winston Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech: 
 
Mr. Churchill now takes the stand of the warmongers, and in this Mr. 
Churchill is not alone.  He has friends not only in Britain but in the United 
States of America as well […] in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends 
bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends (Stalin, 1946a). 
 
Constructing the Americans as “warmongers”, and above all, comparing British and 
US leaders to Hitler a year after World War II ended, reinforced the oppositional 
identity of the USSR as peaceful and co-operative. This kind of representational 
practice presented Soviet leaders’ actions as reasonable, and their strategy of bomb’s 
acquisition as legitimate. Othering and the production of danger reaffirmed and 
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stabilised Soviet nuclear identity constructing the Soviet position as distinct from the 
US and morally sound. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fuelled these 
constructions. As noted by the Soviet marshal Georgy Zhukov in his memoirs: 
 
It was clear already then that the US Government intended to use the 
atomic weapon for the purpose of achieving its imperialist goals from a 
position of strength in “the cold war.” This was amply corroborated on 
August 6 and 8. Without any military need whatsoever, the Americans 
dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful and densely-populated 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Zhukov, 1971: 674-675). 
 
 
Accentuating the lack of military need for the bomb’s use portrays the US as violent 
and irrational in opposition to peaceful Soviets. “The greater the frenzy in the camp of 
the warmongers, the greater should be the calm and restraint in our camp of peace” 
(Malenkov, 1949, cited in Holloway, 1994: 269). A Soviet politician and the future 
short-term replacement for Stalin Georgy Malenkov actually made this statement after 
the Soviets tested the bomb revealing discursive structures that both highlight and 
repress the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons and demonstrating that various 
constructions can be present in the discourse, often simultaneously. In this sense, the 
Soviet bomb supposedly did not present any danger to the world, but the American 
bomb did. Additionally, the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Washington Nikolay Novikov 
described American efforts to discuss international control of atomic energy as means 
to “somewhat ameliorate the aggressive character of the Anglo-Saxon alliance of 
‘atomic powers’” (Novikov, 1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 158). Soviet efforts on this 
matter were talked about differently: 
 
Personages in the United States cannot but know that the Soviet Union is 
not only opposed to the employment of the atomic weapon, but that it also 
stands for its prohibition and for the termination of its production. It is 
known that the Soviet Union has several times demanded the prohibition of 
the atomic weapon, but each time this has been refused by the Atlantic 
bloc powers (Stalin, 1951). 
 
Here Stalin projects an ethical identity of the USSR not only as a responsible and 
peaceful state, but moreover as opposing nuclear weapons proliferation. The 
narratives of American irrationality and aggressiveness legitimised and necessitated 
the Soviet nuclear project, to an extent constructing the Soviets as burdened by the 
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acquisition of nuclear weapons but acting in pursuit of peaceful policy goals such as 
the prohibition of nuclear weapons and defending themselves from the US threat. 
 
Despite using their nuclear weapons against Japan, the US also constructed a Self that 
was ‘peaceful’ by juxtaposing it to the ‘irrational’ autocratic Other. For example, Table 
5.1 displays attributes extracted from the Stimson’s (1945c) memorandum that were 
linked to the US and the USSR: 
 
      United States           Soviet Union 
a nation of free 
thought, free speech, 
free elections, in fact, 
a really free people;  
 






our system of freedom.  
autocratically controlled 
system; 
a nation that is not 
basically free; 
systematically controlled 
from above by Secret 
Police; 
free speech is not 
permitted;  
policy cannot be 
permanent;  
tied up with the life of 
one man; 
forever resting upon 
every citizen, the stifling 
hand of autocracy; 
Russia's Secret Police 
State;  
a nation whose people 
are not possessed of free 
speech;  
governmental action is 
controlled by the 
autocratic machinery of a 
secret political police; 
cannot give effective 
control of this new 
agency [atomic bomb]. 
 
Table 5.1 Attributes linked to the US and the USSR quoted from Stimson’s memorandum, July 
19, 1945 
 
Language in the table above is representative of what Chomsky (1982, cited in Dalby, 
1990: 176) refers to as “the language of US moral exceptionalism”. This language 
manifests the idea present in US officials’ minds that the US was an exceptional state, 
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the pinnacle of democracy destined to show moral leadership in the world, whereas 
the USSR was autocratic and thus inferior and could not be trusted with nuclear 
weapons. These constructions legitimise one side’s weapons over the other and help 
to flesh out the superior peaceful identity that is being reinforced. The US officials 
even went as far as claiming that they used “the most terrible bomb in the history of 
the world” for peace and common good (Truman, 1945b). Truman portrayed the 
bombings as a tragic and inevitable burden that fell on American shoulders and 
continued to reinforce the identity of a peace-loving, democratic and civilised nation: 
 
We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the 
lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans […] I shall ask the 
Congress to cooperate to the end that its production and use be controlled, 
and that its power be made an overwhelming influence towards world 
peace […] Now let us use that force and all our resources and all our skills 
in the great cause of a just and lasting peace! (Truman, 1945a) 
 
This shows that essentially the US and the USSR were occupying different ideational 
nuclear worlds. Their constructions of reality were completely opposed, yet at the 
same time similar in a number of ways. Each portrayed the Other as danger to 
international peace and stability, but they were going through identical motions of 
constructing the Self that was peaceful. Such constructions enabled armament on both 
sides. To illustrate, the below quote from Stalin reflects how the Soviets did not 
approve of the American “just and lasting peace”: 
 
By what right do the interests of preserving peace require such monopoly? 
Would it not be more correct to say that matters are directly the opposite, 
that it is the interests of preserving peace that require first of all the 
liquidation of such a monopoly and then the unconditional prohibition of 
the atomic weapon too? I think that the proponents of the atom bomb may 
agree to the prohibition of the atomic weapon only if they see that they are 
no longer monopolists (Stalin, 1951). 
 
Similarly to Truman, Stalin attempted to construct a peace-loving nuclear identity thus 
enabling the acquisition of nuclear weapons and making it legitimate and necessary. 
Moreover, this quote implies that disarmament could paradoxically be achieved 
through armament. While this has evidence of thinking along the lines of rational 
deterrence, the previous two sections of this chapter established that Soviet efforts to 
build the bomb as quickly as possible were enabled by the need to assert Soviet 
	 114	
superpower identity that was hyper-masculine, competitive, and exceptional by 
nature. The attempt to construct an identity as peace-loving was an attempt to 
legitimise Soviet nuclear weapons and to reinforce the USSR as a moral leader (just as 
the US did).  
 
Paranoia and Discursive Constructions of Threat and Danger 
 
Previous sections of this chapter showed how Soviet nuclear identity was established 
and articulated in relation to spatial, temporal, and ethical Others. Nuclear discourse 
served to distinguish the Self from the Other. Another integral characteristic of the 
articulation of Soviet nuclear identity was the discursive construction of threat and 
danger. The statements of Soviet officials related to the US nuclear weapons often 
exemplified a sense of paranoia. ‘Paranoia’ here is not understood in a clinical sense 
but is loosely based on what Hofstadter (1964: 77) called “the paranoid style” as a 
force in politics meaning “the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and 
conspiratorial fantasy”. He notes that this style “has more to do with the way in which 
ideas are believed than with the truth or falsity of their content” (Hofstadter, 1964: 77). 
Paranoia is a particular dynamic of identity construction that characterised US-USSR 
relations during the Cold War: it is not just Self-Othering; it is a distinctly paranoid fear 
of the Other that enables policies and identities of the Self. It manifested itself through 
the suspicion and lack of trust not in the realpolitik sense, but the lack of trust and also 
fear of those who represent something different from Self. Naturally, the Soviets could 
never trust their allies. This stems from their historical understanding of the capitalist 
world as a radically different Other and persistent fears of falling behind, as seen 
earlier in the chapter.   
 
Paranoia, as defined above, is evident from the expanded USSR spy networks. 
Intelligence gathering, particularly regarding new military technologies, was integral to 
the Stalinist state (Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 43). However, it is the resources that 
the Soviets invested into spying on their allies that raise additional questions. The 
Soviet officials were just as concerned about the secret work on the atomic bomb 
carried out by their allies in the US and Britain as by the work of their enemy – Nazi 
Germany. The Soviets were spying on both projects, but invested more funds in the 
former (Lota, 2002) and it was the Anglo-American project that enabled the speeding 
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up of the Soviet work on the bomb. Some officials such as Beria went as far as 
believing that intelligence information was purposeful disinformation. As reflected by 
the KGB officer Iatskov: “From the very beginning Beria suspected disinformation in 
these [intelligence] reports, thinking that the enemy was trying to draw us in this way 
into huge expenditures of resources and effort on work which had no future” (Iatskov, 
cited in Holloway, 1994: 115). 
 
Soviet enhanced suspiciousness was hardly surprising. There was not much room for 
trust in the Soviet-American alliance due to their ideological rivalry. Representations 
of fear and danger were an essential instrument of the Soviet state that legitimised 
practices such as espionage. In the US, when it came to the bomb’s development, it 
became clear that not all allies could be trusted with nuclear secrets, as evident from 
the existence of an Anglo-American agreement about complete secrecy particularly 
against the Soviet Union.  As pointed out by Hixson (2008: 135-136), American 
foreign policy before World War II was fuelled by enemy-othering of Bolshevism, 
which was described as “the negation of everything American”.  American identity 
was reaffirmed through the construction of the USSR as “Godless Communism” and 
“pariah regime” (Hixson, 2008: 136). Despite US-USSR alliance against Nazi 
Germany, the prior existence of these constructions did not allow for trust and 
transparency.   
 
Both the US and the USSR actively engaged in the production of danger against each 
other. Chapter 3 established that when an identity is threatened or insecure, as 
explained by Connolly (1991: 64), “the maintenance of one identity (or field of 
identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or into 
one of its numerous surrogates”. Campbell (1992: 145) refers to this process as “well-
established discursive economy of identity/difference”, which triggers exclusionary 
practices of boundary-making and contributes to the representation of fear and danger 
about the other.  
 
Of course, the US had its own paranoia about the Soviet Other also known as the ‘Red 
Scare’, which came in two waves. The first wave occurred immediately after the 
Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and was conceptualized by Levin (1971: 29) as a 
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“nation-wide anti-radical hysteria provoked by a mounting fear and anxiety that a 
Bolshevik revolution in America was imminent”. The second wave, popularly known 
as ‘McCarthyism’, after Senator Joseph McCarthy, began after World War II and was to 
an extent caused by the US discovering the true size of the Soviet spy network and by 
the general fear and hatred of American Communist Party (Storrs, 2015).  The main 
difference between American and Soviet discourse of paranoia is that Soviets had a 
clear definition of danger coming from the outside – the US. In contrast, the 
Americans were also fearful of the ‘enemy within’ (Storrs, 2015).   
 
After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet exceptional superpower state 
identity was threatened and destabilised, which intensified the discursive practices of 
representing the US as a threatening and dangerous Other. Moreover, Soviets 
considered the bombings to be an attack against them, which exhibited the deeply felt 
emotions that the Soviets had with regards to the American bomb. To illustrate, as 
recalled by Molotov in his memoirs: 
 
[The bombs dropped on Japan] were, of course, not against Japan, but 
against the Soviet Union: see, remember what we have. You don’t have the 
atomic bomb, but we do – and these are what consequences will be if you 
stir (Molotov, cited in Holloway, 1994: 164). 
 
Here Molotov described the Soviet existence as being essentially threatened by the 
American hostile practices. These representations are important to the construction of 
Soviet nuclear identity, because representing the Other as threatening is necessary to 
understand the Self as peaceful. Such discourses inform and legitimise practices that 
are aimed at countering the threat. To illustrate further, the member of Politburo 
Zhdanov noted: 
 
On the heels of Churchill, the most venomous imperialist politicians who 
had lost their sense of balance, began to propose plans for the quest 
realization of a preventative war against the USSR, and openly called for 
the utilization of the temporary American monopoly of the atomic bomb 
against Soviet people (Zhdanov, 1947, cited in Gullion, 1947). 
 
Production of danger about the US allowed for the (re)articulation of relations of 
identity/difference and helped to secure Soviet nuclear identity in the post-war period. 
It was a part of reality constituted by the Soviets. The radical difference between the 
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Soviet Self and the American Other reinforced this discourse of insecurity and enabled 
nuclear weapons acquisition and political practices such as active intelligence 
gathering before and during the wartime alliance with the US. Reinforcing the idea 
that the US leaders were plotting a nuclear attack against the USSR contributed to the 




This chapter established that constructions of Soviet nuclear identity emerged as part 
of the reassurance project for the Soviet post-World War II state identity. The Soviets 
constructed the Self as an exceptional superpower and a future global centre of 
Marxism-Leninism. Stalin’s rapid industrialisation policy in the early 1930s and later 
nuclear weapons project were enabled and co-constituted by the construction of this 
superpower state identity. Nuclear weapons were instruments for the affirmation of 
Soviet greatness and masculinity. US nuclear advances and the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 threatened and destabilised Soviet state identity 
making it appear child-like and weak compared to the masculine US. The Soviet 
officials saw the bombings of Japan as an attack against the USSR, which required 
them to build the bomb as soon as possible in order to stabilise not only their 
threatened material security, but also their constructed superpower identity.  
 
This chapter argued that early-Cold War Soviet nuclear development policy was 
determined by the nature of nuclear identity the Soviet leaders were constructing. 
During the stage of nuclear weapons acquisition, Soviet nuclear identity emerged as 
competitive and fundamentally reliant on catching up with and overtaking the 
capitalist United States, which was an integral element of Soviet domestic and foreign 
policy. Stalin constructed the ‘old’ Tsarist Russia as weak, anachronistic, and beaten. 
The ‘new’ Soviet Union could not afford to be backward again. Hence, in Stalin’s eyes 
the USSR needed to match and surpass the capitalists, first to defend themselves from 
the “warmongering” and distrustful US, and second to showcase Soviet superiority, 
invincibility, and its exceptional character. This enabled the rapid acceleration of the 
Soviet atomic project. In comparison, the US did not need to compete with the Soviets 
or anyone else due to their atomic monopoly. But similar to the Soviets, the Americans 
constructed an exceptional identity based on its uniquely moral, democratic, and 
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enlightened foundations and its duty to lead the world to a more civilised condition. 
The bomb in this case was a vehicle for the reinforcement of their identity as the 
“leader of the world for the common welfare” (Truman, 1945a).  
 
Soviet nuclear identity emerged as hyper-masculine. It was constructed around 
attributes traditionally associated with masculinity such as strength, toughness, 
invincibility, and bravado. A state that constructs a highly masculine identity is a priori 
in favour of nuclear weapons’ acquisition, because “political masculinity is linked 
with preparedness to use military action and to wield weapons” (Cohn et al., 2006: 3). 
In this case, abstaining from nuclear weapons acquisition was not possible for the 
Soviets, because falling behind was constructed as a weakness or wimping out. The 
American atomic monopoly threatened Soviet manhood. Thus, the Soviets asserted 
their masculine nuclear identity by feminising the US and constructing it as emotional, 
immoral, and irrational. Threatened manhood made bomb’s acquisition desirable and 
necessary. US nuclear identity was also hyper-masculine and they reinforced it by 
constructing the Soviets as irrational, soft, and child-like, which made the Self appear 
as strong and rational. This shows how two very different states can be essentially 
quite similar when it comes to affirming their manhood by means of acquiring arms. 
 
Soviet nuclear identity was also constructed as peace-loving vis-à-vis the “aggressive” 
and “warmongering” US. These constructions made Soviet nuclear weapons 
acquisition legitimate, because the Soviets were acting in order to accomplish ethical 
goals such as preserving peace and saving the world from the evil imperialists who, in 
contrast to the USSR, did not understand the diplomatic language and would unleash 
war if their atomic monopoly remained unchallenged. As a consequence, Soviet 
nuclear weapons were constructed as peaceful, while the American weapons posed the 
real danger to the world. The US also constructed a peace-loving nuclear identity 
proclaiming Self as “a trustee of this new force” and the use of atomic bombs in the war 
against Japan was seen as necessary, because it was done to achieve the common good 
and peace for humanity. US officials constructed the Soviets as irrational and 
untrustworthy particularly when it came to nuclear weapons. The nature of nuclear 
identities that both states were constructing vis-à-vis their radically different Other 
made nuclear acquisition and build up necessary and undisputable, while agreeing on 
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arms control measures or disarmament proposals such as the Baruch plan was neither 
possible, not desirable. 
 
Finally, the Soviet nuclear project came into effect as an appropriate and necessary 
measure for defending the threatened Soviet Self from the evil and dangerous Other – 
the US. The discursive construction of threat and danger was essential to the 
construction of Soviet nuclear identity, because it helped to establish the boundaries 
between Self and Other and legitimised political practices that are said to counter this 
threat – nuclear weapons acquisition. This chapter showed how incorporating an 
identity dimension is crucial to fully understand Soviet motives and behaviour, 
because, to the USSR, acquiring nuclear weapons held significance well beyond 
security and self-defence. The next chapter examines how the Soviets continued to 
reinforce and re-imagine their nuclear identity during the stage of Nikita Khrushchev’s 






























Chapter 6. The Arms Race – Nikita Khrushchev (1953 – 1964) 
 
“Why do we need to make ‘cannibalistic’ weapons like this?! Let this device hang over 




Chapter 5 established that Soviet nuclear identity emerged when Soviet post-World 
War II superpower state identity became threatened and destabilised by the American 
atomic monopoly after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The 
decision to build the bomb was made possible by competitive hyper-masculine 
identity, grounded in military strength and ideas about the exceptional character of the 
USSR. This exceptional identity was constructed not just in terms of strength and 
power, but also in moral terms as peace-loving, which made the bomb’s acquisition 
legitimate. The Soviets articulated this identity through juxtaposition to the (very) 
radical external Other - the US. Discursive constructions of the Other as dangerous 
and threatening established Self as peaceful and further enabled the bomb’s 
acquisition, while simultaneously silencing and excluding possibilities of reaching an 
arms control agreement with the US.  
 
This chapter resumes the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity construction and looks at 
how this identity continued to evolve during the stage of the rapid vertical 
proliferation from 1953 to 1964 with consequences for the direction of nuclear policy. 
More specifically, it focuses on the nuclear diplomacy of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, who came to power after 
Stalin’s death and a very brief succession by Georgy Malenkov in 1953, and some of 
the other top CPSU officials. The chapter consults speeches and texts ranging from the 
early 1950s until the forced removal of Khrushchev from office in 1964 as well as 
secondary sources and Khrushchev’s own memoir. Additionally, the chapter consults 
a number of documents and speeches from the US that still acted as the radical spatial 
other to the Soviet Self.   
 
There is no denying that power, deterrence, and security concerns had an impact on 
Soviet nuclear policymaking during the arms race. However, conventional IR 
approaches are insufficient to fully understand events such as the detonation of the 
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militarily useless ‘Tsar’ bomba’; and a rapid increase in nuclear weapons deployment 
and stockpiling beyond retaliatory capability, or dangerous moves such as 
Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum and placing of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. A 
closer look at the motivations and statements made at that time, using discourse 
analysis, deepens our understanding of the key events of the early arms race taking it 
beyond the insights of rational deterrence theory and the domestic politics approach.   
 
This chapter argues that first, Soviet nuclear decisions during the Khrushchev’s stage of 
the arms race were not only enabled by defence concerns, but also by nuclear identity 
that Soviet officials were constructing and showcasing to the ever more divided Cold 
War world. Second, this chapter continues to assert that representations of identity 
matter significantly when it comes to nuclear decisions; an articulation of an 
aggressive, competitive, and hyper-masculine identity that is reinforced in 
juxtaposition to the (very) radical external other is both constitutive and a product of 
aggressive politics of nuclear build up.  
 
The analysis that follows demonstrates that the Soviet leaders continued to re-imagine 
the USSR as a nuclear weapons state. The three overlapping dimensions of Soviet 
nuclear identity identified in Chapter 5 (competition with the US, hyper-masculinity, 
and peace-loving) continued to be present in Soviet nuclear discourse. However, 
certain shifts occurred as the Soviets started to militarily ‘catch up’ with the US.  
 
First, the very meaning of the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude changed due to the 
increasing recognition that the power of nuclear weapons was not in the number of 
missiles, but in their range and in the ability to retaliate. Once this capability was 
acquired, the Soviets began to establish themselves as a superpower no longer 
constructing their greatness in the future tense as seen in the previous chapter. Second, 
the masculine dimension became more prominent and very ‘macho’ meaning 
masculine in an aggressive and assertive way. Third, despite aggressive threatening 
rhetoric, the Soviets continued to project an image of a peace-loving state. The more 
weapons they acquired, the more they constructed the Soviet Self as a protector of 
peace beyond the borders of the USSR (similar to the US identity of the leader of the 
free world, seeing themselves as leaders and protectors of the communist world), 
	 122	
which was not in the foreground during the nuclear weapons acquisition stage. 
Consequently, the reiteration of the Soviet exceptionalism intensified.  Finally, while 
production of danger about the US was still present in the Soviet discourse due to the 
relative instability of nuclear identity, its nature became less paranoid and rather more 
threatening. Ultimately, it is shown in this chapter that the combination of these shifts 
created a discursive space in which some of the most dangerous and aggressive 
nuclear policy decisions became possible.  
 
Similarly to Chapter 5, this chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the key 
nuclear developments and events during Khrushchev’s rule and then it proceeds to 
discuss the three core dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity: competition with the US, 
masculinity, and peacekeeping.  
 
Historical Overview, 1953-1964  
 
In the early 1950s, atomic bombs such as the ones used in the bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki lost their utility. Both the US and the Soviet Union worked on the 
development of hydrogen thermonuclear weapons – 1000 times more powerful than 
the atomic ones (Holloway, 1994: 299).8 The Soviets, who just managed to produce a 
small arsenal of atomic weapons had to invest heavily into this new type of nuclear 
bomb. The thermonuclear project set off rapidly after Stalin’s death in 1953.  
According to statistics provided by Norris and Kristensen (2010: 81) in the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, the number of nuclear warheads in the US increased from 299 
in 1950 to 31,139 (the largest amount they ever had) in 1965; in the USSR – from 5 in 
1950 to 6,129 in 1965. Furthermore, the UK joined the ‘nuclear club’ in 1953 
accumulating a total of 436 nuclear warheads in 1965 followed by the first nuclear 
tests conducted by France and China in 1964 (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 81). This 
created additional security concerns for the Soviet government.  
 
In addition to the rapid armament, Khrushchev’s tenure encompassed some of the 
most notable Soviet accomplishments and absurdities of the nuclear arms race 
	
8 From here onwards the term ‘nuclear weapons’ will refer to thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs 
that rely on nuclear fusion reaction and thus generate more explosive power than atomic 
bombs. 
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between the Soviet Union and the US. These included the development and testing of 
the hydrogen thermonuclear ‘super’ bomb in the early 1950s; the launch of the first 
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the first satellite ‘Sputnik’ by the Soviet 
Union in 1957; the detonation of the ‘Tsar’ bomba’ in 1961 – the most powerful 
thermonuclear bomb ever detonated; and Khrushchev’s infamous nuclear ‘sabre-
rattling’ that led to international crises such as the Berlin crisis of 1961, which 
culminated in the East German erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis 
of 1962. The latter occurred when the Soviets shipped their offensive nuclear missiles 
to Cuba and began construction of sites for medium-range missiles and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (Grogin, 2001: 242). Khrushchev’s demand to the US 
government was the preservation of Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba and the removal of 
American missiles from Turkey. After 13 days of confrontation, US President John 
Kennedy’s careful diplomacy helped to avoid a nuclear catastrophe and the Soviets 
withdrew the missiles (Grogin, 2001: 250).  
 
In comparison to the period of nuclear weapons acquisition, the main source of 
unease for both the Soviets and the Americans during the nuclear arms race was not 
whether the adversary had the bomb or not, but how many, and how powerful. 
Nevertheless, both states attempted to discuss the possibilities of nuclear arms control 
and peaceful coexistence throughout the 1950s (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 214-
215). One of the most notable attempts was US President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
proposal Atoms for Peace presented to the United Nations in December 1953, which 
suggested the joint efforts of the US and the USSR to explore peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. However, as pointed out by Zubok (2009: 125), subsequent American nuclear 
tests made this proposal look like a cover up for the demonstration of nuclear 
superiority. It was only after the most dangerous nuclear ‘near miss’ in history – the 
Cuban Missile Crisis – that the first breakthrough was achieved. On 5 August 1963 the 
US, the USSR, and the UK signed the Limited Test-Ban Treaty banning nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space (Zubok, 2009: 152). 
However, Khrushchev’s power never recovered from the Cuban missile crisis and the 




‘Caught up and Overtook’ and Competition with the US 
 
The desire to catch up with and overtake the US in the nuclear race remained 
prominent in Soviet nuclear discourse as the Cold War tensions escalated in the 
beginning of the 1950s. Similar to the acquisition stage, Soviet leaders and officials in 
charge of the Soviet nuclear project continued to construct a competitive nuclear 
identity emphasising the vital importance of winning the competition against the 
capitalist US. For example, the deputy head of the project Avraami Zaveniagin stated: 
 
The Americans [after the first Soviet atomic test in August 1949] saw that 
their advantages had disappeared, and at Truman’s order began work on 
the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are no slouches. We took 
it up as well and, as far as we can judge, we believe we do not lag behind 
the Americans […] its explosion will mean the liquidation of the second 
monopoly of the Americans (Zaveniagin, 1953, cited in Zubok and 
Harrison, 1999: 143). 
 
 
Zaveniagin did not mention the potential danger that such powerful bomb poses. 
Emphasising that the Soviets are “no slouch” echoes Stalin’s speeches regarding Soviet 
backwardness discussed in Chapter 5. They could not fall behind and be beaten again 
as this carried consequences for both the stability of Soviet superpower identity and 
material security. As a result, the first Soviet hydrogen bomb designed by Andrei 
Sakharov was tested on 12 August 1953, which for a short period of time led Soviet 
officials to believe that they overtook the US (Zubok, 2009: 124). Khrushchev himself 
noted the following: “No one else, neither the Americans nor the British, had such a 
bomb. I was overwhelmed by the idea. We did everything in our power to assure the 
rapid realization of Sakharov’s plans” (Khrushchev, 1953, cited in Zubok, 2009: 124). 
 
 
There is a theme of competitiveness and overtaking in this quote. It captures both the 
extensive effort that the Soviets invested into the bomb production, and that 
competing with the US was emphasised over security concerns. Khrushchev reports 
himself to be “overwhelmed” by the idea of overtaking rather than by security or a 
military advantage guaranteed by having such a bomb.  
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Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the first successful Soviet atomic test in 1949, the US 
nuclear identity was threatened, because they were no longer the nuclear 
monopolists. Discursive constructions of the Other – the USSR – as immoral and 
godless reaffirmed the American Self as being the responsible leader of the free world 
and constructed further American armament as reasonable and necessary. To 
illustrate, US secretary of commerce Lewis Strauss wrote to Truman on 14 November 
1950: “a government of atheists is not likely to be dissuaded from producing the 
weapons on ‘moral’ grounds” (Strauss, 1950, cited in Holloway, 1994: 301). Other 
examples are found in two memoranda circulated among US top officials. First, the 
Joint Chiefs’ memorandum of 23 November 1949 stated: “possession of a 
thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without such possession by the United States 
would be intolerable”. Second, an undated memorandum from December 1949 
elaborated that such possession would have: 
 
a profoundly demoralizing effect on the American people. It would have 
grave psychological and political repercussions which might raise serious 
question concerning the continued unity of spirit, confidence and 
determination among the nations of the Western world (Memorandum, 
FRUS, 1949, Vol.1, Doc. 223). 
 
The end of the American atomic monopoly destabilised US nuclear identity creating 
the need for heavier arming and continuing to construct the Soviet nuclear weapons as 
dangerous in comparison to the American ones. Similarly, after the first Soviet 
thermonuclear test in 1953, following the rhetoric of ‘massive retaliation’, the US 
rapidly launched a new series of hydrogen bomb tests in 1954, exploding a 15-
megaton bomb (Zubok, 2009: 125). Prior to the testing US Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles stated: 
 
The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical 
era," and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of 
manoeuvres, gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by 
overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their 
strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy (Dulles, 1954). 
 
This illustrates the instability of US nuclear identity after the Soviets caught up with the 
Americans again. The discursive construction of the Other as dangerous and 
threatening therefore acts as a stabiliser of this identity and establishes a particularly 
salient form of knowledge, which can be employed in the legitimisation of the course 
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of nuclear policy. This demonstrates that the escalation of the nuclear arms race was 
to a large extent identity-driven on both sides. This is similar to the Soviet 
representations of the US as aggressive and dangerous during the stage of nuclear 
weapons acquisition when Soviet triumphant post-World War II superpower state 
identity became precarious due to the American sole possession of the atomic bomb.  
 
During the 1950s, the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude among Soviet officials went 
through a transformation. They kept going back and forth on their perception of 
nuclear war and deterrence and their thinking was rather contradictory. Holloway 
(1994: 340) described the Soviet attitude: “There appears now to have been a dual – 
even schizophrenic – attitude to nuclear war in the Soviet leadership: a recognition of 
its destructive consequences for the Soviet Union as well as the West, and an official 
position that nuclear war would mean the end of capitalism”. For example, 
Khrushchev stated that in the event of a nuclear war the “imperialists will choke on it” 
and it “will end up in a catastrophe for the imperialist world” (Khrushchev, 1954, cited 
in Catudal, 1988: 49). In the same vein, in his interview to Pravda Molotov asserted 
that in the event of a nuclear war “what will perish will not be world 
civilizations…but the decaying capitalist social system with its imperialist core soaked 
in blood” (Molotov, 1955, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 443). Another example is 
Molotov’s speech at the Communist Party Plenum: 
 
He [Marx] said that things are heading towards the collapse of capitalism 
and towards the victory of Communism… If we are now saying that some 
kind of war can allegedly lead to […] the end of the entire civilization, this 
means that we have something quite opposite from the head on our 
shoulders (Molotov, 1955, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 213). 
 
 
Several Soviet officials attempted to challenge this dominant discourse on nuclear war, 
showing that official discourses do not exist in isolation from discourses of resistance, 
although this was less obvious during Stalin’s rule. For instance, the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers Malenkov claimed that the continuation of the Cold War between 
the US and the USSR would lead to a disaster “which with modern weapons mean the 
end of world civilization” (Malenkov, 1954, cited in Zubok, 2009: 126). In the same 
vein, Major General N. Talensky stressed that nuclear weapons “by their very nature 
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enhance the danger of military adventures” (Talensky, 1955, cited in Zagoria, 1961: 
19). The Soviet atomic scientists who tried to urge the government about the dangers 
of the arms race also shared this view: “Defence against such a weapon 
[thermonuclear bomb] is practically impossible so it is clear that the use of atomic 
weapons on a mass scale will lead to the devastation of the warring countries” 
(Malyshev et al., 1954, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 145). 
 
The report containing the above quote was never published or discussed by the Soviet 
government. Moreover, Molotov and Khrushchev heavily criticised Malenkov for 
ideological heresy and for disputing the inevitable victory of communism over 
capitalism (Zubok, 2009: 126). Khrushchev (1955, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 
147) referred to his statement as “theoretically incorrect and politically harmful”, while 
Molotov (1955, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 147) stated that it made it difficult 
“to prepare and mobilize all forces for the destruction of the bourgeoisie”. This can be 
read as the refusal to accept the idea of any vulnerability, which overpowered the 
concerns for the growing danger of mutual destruction in the case of a nuclear war.  
 
Competing discourses were silenced, because they challenged the hegemonic 
discourse of the invincibility of the Soviet state and destabilised its identity of a state 
that caught up with and overtook the capitalist West in building sophisticated nuclear 
weapons. Without a doubt, catching up with the US in nuclear technology 
development provided certain security guarantees for the Soviet Union. However, it 
also helped to reproduce Soviet nuclear identity, and political elites’ perception of Self 
as a nuclear power was transforming into a superpower with more influence. It seems 
clear that overtaking the US outweighed the concerns for the growing danger of mutual 
destruction in the case of a nuclear war, because, as seen above, the alternative 
discourses were silenced and even scrutinised. 
 
The significant change in Soviet thinking occurred after the Soviets successfully tested a 
1.6-megaton bomb on 22 November 1955. This test demonstrated to the Soviet leaders 
that hydrogen bombs had no limit in their destructive power and according to the 
report on the test provided by Sakharov, the charge power was deliberately reduced by 
half because of the danger of causing too much damage (Sakharov, 1955). The report 
went on to describe the effects of the detonation of this bomb, claiming that the blast 
	 128	
shattered windows in settlements as far as 400 kilometres away. The realisation of the 
tremendous power of nuclear weapons forced Soviet officials to accept a nuclear war 
as an existential threat or as Craig and Radchenko (2018: 214) posit: it caused a shift 
from “the capitalists will die to we’ll all die”.  For example, the head of the Supreme 
Soviet, Kliment Voroshilov stated that war was:  
 
invented by savages. They moved from the bow to the powder, and now 
such a thing has been created, that it goes off once and destroys a whole 
city and destroys the population. We’ll all die in a few generations 
(Voroshilov, 1956, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 214). 
 
In his famous speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev laid out 
his own understanding of the peaceful coexistence between the US and the USSR: 
 
the situation has changed radically, because today there are mighty social 
and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent imperialists 
from unleashing war […] we estimate that the [two] blocs presently possess 




It is the Soviet officials’ belief in mutual assured destruction (MAD) that changed the 
nature of the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude. Having enough weapons to retaliate 
against the US attack convinced Khrushchev that only “insane imperialists” would now 
dare to attack the USSR. “There are only two ways, either peaceful coexistence or the 
most destructive war in history. There is not third way” (Khrushchev, 1956a). In July 
1956 Khrushchev concluded: “The danger of a military conflict is absent” (Khrushchev, 
1956, citied in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 215). This profound shift in understanding 
of the potential grave consequences of a nuclear war for the Soviet Union destabilised 
Soviet nuclear identity, because it meant accepting that Self was also vulnerable and 
rejecting the notion of the Soviet invincibility.  Thus, the Soviets needed to reassert this 
identity and to secure its precarious Self.  
 
Historians often associate Khrushchev’s behaviour with dangerous nuclear bluff, 
boasting, and brinkmanship (see e.g. Zubok, 2009; Zubok and Harrison, 1999; Craig 
and Radchenko, 2018). This behaviour had very little material grounds, because 
economically and militarily the Soviet Union was not even close to overtaking the US 
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during Khrushchev’s tenure. Logically, the acceptance of MAD should have led to the 
moderate vision of nuclear deterrence, but the armament continued at a rapid pace on 
both sides expanding the number of missiles and their explosive power. Rationally, if 
MAD had been accepted, there should be no grounds for further armament. However, 
and with reference to the main argument of this chapter, it is through the reinforcement 
of Soviet competitive nuclear identity that this armament and consequential aggressive 
policy choices became possible. The Soviet leaders continued to reinforce the identity 
of a (now) nuclear superpower through their claims of superiority and invincibility over 
capitalist states. To illustrate: 
 
Prominent leaders of bourgeois countries frankly admit with increasing 
frequency that ‘there will be no victory’ in a war in which atomic weapons 
are used. These leaders still do not venture to state that capitalism will find 
its grave in another world war, should it unleash one, but they are already 
compelled to only admit that the Socialist camp is invincible (Khrushchev, 
1956, cited in Zagoria, 1961:19). 
 
The constructions of Self as superior and more powerful than the Other affirmed Soviet 
nuclear identity. Ultimately, the Soviets asserted the identity of a state that finally 
caught up and overtook the West. “If Lenin would arise, he would have been pleased 
to see his cause become so strong, that the capitalistic world admits being unable to 
win the war against the socialist countries” (Khrushchev, 1956b). Thus, MAD became 
not just the reason for non-use or just something constraining the USSR, but a way for 
the Soviets to construct and reinforce the identity of itself as invincible.  
 
Identity reproduced through such powerful discourse further enabled policy of rapid 
nuclear development, and in 1957 Soviet scientists achieved a technological 
breakthrough. The Soviets successfully tested the world’s first ICBM and launched the 
first satellite ‘Sputnik’ into space. As a result, the reproduction of nuclear superpower 
identity intensified. To illustrate: “Now, that we have the [inter-]continental missile, 
we also hold America by the throat. They thought that America is out of reach. But this 
is not so” (Khrushchev, 1958, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 216). 
 
The effect of this phrasing is to capture the magnitude of Soviet achievements and 
military might, to show the adversary that it is not safe anymore. This could imply that 
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developing ICBMs had more to do with status and identity constructions than with 
security; it was important for the Soviets to reinforce their winning position in the 
competition against the US. In his memoirs Khrushchev stated: 
 
Of course, we tried to derive maximum political advantage from the fact 
that we were the first to launch our rockets into space. We wanted to exert 
pressure on American militarists – and also influence the minds of more 
reasonable politicians – so that the United States would start treating us 
better (Khrushchev, 1974: 53). 
 
 
Overtaking the US brought the Soviet Union to a new place in the international arena. 
It reshaped its nuclear identity into a superpower. Khrushchev also attempted to reject 
Stalinist concept of capitalist encirclement, because it was “no longer clear who 
encircles whom” (Khrushchev, 1958, cited in Zagoria, 1961: 20). Nuclear weapons 
acted as tools of identity construction and reinforcement, because Khrushchev and 
other officials knew very well that in 1958 Soviet missiles were not capable of 
reaching the US. They also knew that the first Soviet ICBM was a highly costly and 
inefficient weapon (Zubok, 2009: 131).  
 
As identified in Chapter 5, the Soviets were beaten by everyone in the past and could 
not afford to be beaten again, because their righteous – even exceptional - place was 
above everyone else, particularly the capitalists. While during the acquisition stage 
nuclear weapons were constructed as a symbol of future greatness of the USSR, during 
the arms race stage this greatness came to the forefront of Soviet nuclear identity 
construction. This can be seen in the following quote from Leonid Ilyichov, a Soviet 
philosopher and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU: 
 
it [the sputniks and the ICBM] is not just a matter of an increase in the 
weight and prestige of one country. It is a question of a change in the 
balance of forces between Socialism and capitalism, of the strengthening 
of the former and the weakening of the latter (Ilyichov, 1958, cited in 
Zagoria, 1961: 21). 
 
Although the Soviets were the first to launch the satellite into space and to develop the 
first ICBM in 1957, they technically did not overtake the US, but Soviet leaders 
erroneously reinforced overtaking on numerous occasions as seen from the above 
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quotes. They could not possibly admit that they were behind again. The ‘true’ figures 
were absent from the Soviet discourse, instead alternative truths were produced, which 
kept nuclear identity stable.  
 
The ‘madness’ of nuclear decisions at this stage of the arms race does not fit within 
traditional, rationalist IR frameworks. It is evident from the Soviet nuclear discourse that 
nuclear weapons were not only serving a military purpose. In fact, their military value 
was not at the forefront: “Let these bombs lie, let them get on the nerves of those who 
would like to unleash war” (Khrushchev, 1955, cited in Holloway, 1994: 343) or “Let 
this device [nuclear bomb] hang over capitalists, like a sword of Damocles” 
(Khrushchev, 1961, cited in Zubok, 2009: 123). The use of Damocles metaphor 
emphasised the precariousness of the American situation in the face of the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal. Khrushchev constructed the Soviet Union as peaceful and powerful in 
juxtaposition to the war-unleashing weaker US. This shows how meaning can be 
established through a system of differential signs where one element is valued over the 
opposite. The discursive construction of Soviet nuclear identity was both a constitutive 
of and a product of successful rapid nuclear development in the USSR: 
now we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and 
hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe out our potential 
enemies off the face of the earth… In one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen 
warheads came off the assembly line in the factory we visited (Khrushchev, 
1959, cited in Fursenko and Naftali, 2006: 248). 
 
Considering the above discussion about Khrushchev’s clear understanding of what 
MAD meant and of the actual disadvantaged strategic position of the USSR, such 
quotes emphasise the need for continuous construction and reinforcement of nuclear 
superpower identity. To illustrate further, after John Kennedy replaced Eisenhower as 
President of the US, Khrushchev continued: 
 
I told him to let Kennedy know...that if he starts a war then he would 
probably become the last president of the United States of America. I know 
he reported it accurately. In America they are showing off vehemently, but 
yet people close to Kennedy are beginning to pour cold water like a fire-
brigade (Khrushchev, 1961). 
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This superpower nuclear identity reproduced through the Soviet nuclear discourse is 
closely interlinked with the dangerous foreign policy decisions that followed in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. One of the most salient examples is the Soviet test of a 
fifty-megaton bomb ‘Tsar bomba’ on 30 October 1961. It was the largest nuclear 
device ever detonated to date. The blast was so powerful that it shattered windows in 
Finland and Norway hundreds of miles away (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 225). The 
whole purpose of this explosion was to demonstrate the Soviet might to the US, 
because as explained by Fursenko and Naftali (2006: 410) ‘Tsar bomba’ was not a 
usable weapon at all. The Soviets did not even have a suitable aircraft to carry this 
bomb to the US if they were to ever use it (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006: 410). 
Historians describe this event as “a dramatic piece of political theatre” (Fursenko and 
Naftali, 2006: 410) or as Khrushchev’s “prestige-saving exercise” after the Berlin 
ultimatum (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 225). Only a couple of weeks before the test 
was conducted, Khrushchev stated: 
We shall probably wind them up by detonating a hydrogen bomb with a 
yield of 50,000,000 tons of TNT. We have said that we have a 100-
megaton bomb. This is true. But we are not going to explode it, because 
even if we did so at the most remote site, we might knock out our own 
windows (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in Adamsky and Smirnov, 1994). 
Catching up with the US was not enough. It is the significance of overtaking that this 
quote re-emphasises. Constructing the identity of a mighty nuclear superpower 
enabled the testing of this very expensive yet militarily useless nuclear device making 
it both reasonable and appropriate. The rapid nuclear armament boosted the Soviet 
construction of itself as a superpower and the Other as an aggressor that was now 
behind. Again, it does not matter how far ahead or behind the USSR really was in 
comparison to the US; that was the Soviet reality and within this reality certain 
dangerous policy practices came about. The superpower nuclear identity made it 
possible for Khrushchev to come up with the Berlin ultimatum in 1958 requesting all 
Western armed forces to be withdrawn from West Berlin. This escalated into a 3-year 
crisis culminating in the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which divided the city for 
the next three decades (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 224-225).  But Khrushchev’s 
most dangerous nuclear policy move was without a doubt the placing of the Soviet 
nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962. This is perhaps the most written-about 
episode of the Cold War. I will proceed to discuss it in the last section of this chapter, 
	 133	
because it represents the peace-loving element of the Soviet nuclear identity rather 
than competition.  
 
Macho-masculinity in Soviet Nuclear Identity Constructions  
 
Chapter 5 established that Soviet nuclear identity was very masculine by nature, 
which reaffirms the argument of feminist IR scholars about the gendered structure of 
security discourses and the dangers that this poses. Chapter 5 argued that acquiring 
nuclear weapons and liquidating the first American atomic monopoly reinforced the 
masculine identity of the USSR as a strong, rational, and impenetrable state. Falling 
behind and not initiating a nuclear weapons programme was constructed as weakness 
due to the “anxious preoccupation with affirming manhood” (Cohn at al., 2006: 2) 
that exists in national and international security debates. The masculine character of 
Soviet nuclear identity took on a new shape during Khrushchev’s tenure. As the 
quantity and quality of missiles increased, the masculine dimension of this identity 
became a more prominent and dominant feature of Soviet nuclear discourse, with 
effects on further direction of nuclear policy. The Soviets reinforced their masculinity 
through nuclear identity construction enacting and legitimising policy of further rapid 
armament.  
 
In the first instance, it is useful to go back to several quotes discussed in the previous 
section. All elements of nuclear identity are interlinked and often reinforced 
simultaneously. Competitiveness itself is traditionally associated with masculinity and 
by placing so much emphasis on ‘catch up and overtake’ and rejecting the idea of 
falling behind in the arms race against the US, the Soviet officials were constructing a 
masculine nuclear identity. This enabled the course of the Soviet rapid armament 
policy and reinforced an even more aggressive macho-like identity through 
Khrushchev’s statements such as: “we hold America by the throat”, “the imperialists 
will choke on it”, “we could wipe out our potential enemies off the face of the earth”, 
and “the capitalist world admits being unable to win the war against the socialist 
countries”. These statements reproduce a self-identity that is dominant, threatening, 
powerful, and militarily superior in relation to the Other evidently being constructed 
as subordinate.  
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The second point to raise in connection with the previous section is to do with the 
nature of the Soviet armament itself and a constant desire to develop even larger more 
powerful missiles. For example, Khrushchev’s genuine excitement about developing 
the bomb that ‘no one else had’ or indeed detonating a militarily useless weapon such 
as ‘Tsar bomba’, demonstrates the symbolic importance of nuclear weapons, which as 
Cohn et al. (2006: 3) highlight, is deeply gendered. “Regardless of their military utility 
nuclear weapons are turned into the ultimate arbiter of political/masculine power” 
(Cohn et al., 2006: 4). Thus, not engaging in the arms race was a priori not an option 
at this stage, because the Soviets already had a small number of nuclear warheads and 
knowing that the US was ahead again would destabilise the masculine identity the 
USSR constructed during the nuclear weapons acquisition stage. The more they 
armed, the more they constructed Self as a nuclear superpower and hence the more 
prominent the masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity became, which in its turn 
led to even more arming and acquitting missiles in quantities that reached beyond 
retaliatory capability.  
 
Soviet nuclear discourse during Khrushchev’s leg of the arms race was largely shaped 
by ideas about gender. The preoccupation with ‘affirming manhood’ is evident in 
numerous statements such as: “We must increase pressure and let our adversary feel 
that our strength is growing” (Khrushchev, 1962, cited in Zubok, 2009: 142) or “you 
won’t get anywhere without taking a risk. We cannot beg for anything from our 
opponents – we can only grab” (Khrushchev, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 
219). Building up nuclear arms helped to reproduce the identity of a strong, aggressive 
state that was willing to take risks and, if needed, to use force. In addition, this can be 
achieved by incorporating sexual metaphors, which creates assent and excitement and 
helps to secure Self as dominant and even more powerful.  
 
For example, when preparing to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev 
stated: “I am going to grab Kennedy by his balls” (Khrushchev, 1962, cited in Zubok, 
2009: 14). The Soviets also asserted their hyper-masculine status by comparing their 
missiles to the American ones, naturally affirming that theirs were better and stronger. 
For example, Khrushchev (1959, cited in Safire, 2009) stated: “You want to threaten us 
indirectly. We have powerful weapons, too, and ours are better than yours if you want 
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to compete.” In another statement in 1961, he pointed out that war between the USSR 
and the US is “hardly possible, because it would be a duel of ballistic intercontinental 
missiles. We are strong on that... Americans would be at a disadvantage to start a war 
with this weapon... They know it and admit it.” (Khrushchev, 1961). The masculine 
character of nuclear identity that the Soviets were constructing made aggressive 
nuclear arms race possible. 
 
The gendered nature of nuclear discourse and the equation of peace with weakness 
carries grave consequences for nuclear policy. Accepting the vulnerability of Self 
would mean accepting one’s weakness. As reflected by Khrushchev (1961): “I 
understand, comrades, and share this state of mind, that our enthusiasm for peaceful 
construction acts as poison, weakens our muscles and our will”. In the similar manner, 
Molotov stated: “but to ask for peace means to show one’s weakness. And to show 
one’s weakness before the strong is politically disadvantageous, inadvisable. It won’t 
do for Bolsheviks” (Molotov, cited in, Holloway 1994: 336). This also shows the 
contradictory nature of identity constructions, because seeing peace as weakness 
seems to contradict the peace-loving strand of Soviet nuclear identity. Nevertheless, 
masculine identity was reproduced even when the idea of disarmament seemed 
accepted:  
 
They [the Americans] are all literally trembling… and suddenly we 
announce that we are prepared to destroy ballistic missiles and all rockets 
… This is a powerful thing, and it will powerfully act on the conscience of 
any reasonable person, especially as our proposal is completely sincere 
(Khrushchev, 1960, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 222). 
 
The idea of Soviet masculine power was grounded in the belief in superiority of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology as seen above, and in military strength. For example, 
Khrushchev (1956b) stated: “We have to do everything to strengthen defence, to 
strengthen the army. Without these things nobody will talk to us.” In the similar 
manner Sakharov reflected on the impossibility of reaching an agreement on 
disarmament with the US: “Any US move toward abandoning or suspending work on 
a thermonuclear weapon would have been perceived either as a cunning, deceitful 
manoeuvre, or as evidence of stupidity or weakness” (Sakharov, 1990, cited in 
Holloway, 1994: 318). 
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Such constructions evoke ‘feminised’ images on the idea of disarmament, silence 
alternative discourses, and as a result, impose particular constraints on the successful 
implementation of relevant arms control policies.  
War is a traditionally masculine concept, because “war making is an activity primarily 
engaged in by men and governed by norms of masculinity” (Cohn and Ruddick, 2004: 
408). But a nuclear war is fundamentally different from a conventional one. Engaging 
in an actual nuclear war in order to boost a masculine superpower status would 
indeed be suicidal and the Soviets understood this very well as evident from the 
discussion of MAD in the previous section. Consequently, safeguarding and reassuring 
a masculine nuclear identity was accomplished via different means. Khrushchev’s 
infamous boasting and nuclear sabre-rattling did exactly that.  
Historians such as Zubok (2009: 130) and Craig and Radchenko (2018: 215) suggest 
that Khrushchev needed to convince the Americans that he was prepared to use 
nuclear weapons so that they would acknowledge the USSR as an equal; he rarely 
missed the opportunity to “frighten the others” (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 215). For 
example, when Khrushchev tried to convince the Iranians to quit the UK-led Baghdad 
pact, he stated: “Would you find it very interesting to catch several hydrogen bombs in 
Iran? Are the Iranian people dreaming about this? I think not. Why, then, did you join 
a pact that aims at exactly this?” (Khrushchev, 1956, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 
2018: 215). Neorealists would also claim that nuclear states engage in this kind of 
bluff, which is what the deterrence theory is based on. Khrushchev with his bravado 
and bragging style did the bluffing in a particular way. This is what indicates that it 
was not just a tactic, it was constitutive of Soviet nuclear identity. By reinforcing the 
preparedness to use nuclear weapons, Khrushchev was reaffirming Soviet manhood 
and strength. On another occasion, in a conversation with China’s Mao Zedong, in a 
bid to impress, Khrushchev exclaimed: “Three-four missiles and there would be no 
Turkey, ten missiles would suffice to destroy the UK” (Khrushchev, 1956, cited in 
Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 216). Considering Khrushchev’s certainty in MAD and 
his actual fear of a nuclear war, such statements were no more than bravado and a 
showcase of masculine identity. The Soviets were reproducing masculine identity even 
whilst admitting in between the lines that they had fewer missiles than the US: 
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I am not complaining – as long as the President [Kennedy] understands that 
even though he may be able to destroy us twice, we’re still capable of 
wiping out the US, even if it’s only once […] We’re satisfied to be able to 
finish off the US the first time around. Once is quite enough (Khrushchev, 
1974: 530). 
This kind of language, along with the previously discussed ‘capitalists will die’ 
attitude, demonstrates the hyper-masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity. If 
nuclear war was not an option, then this identity could only be maintained through 
aggressive threats and readiness to use nuclear weapons, while looking towards 
disarmament would come across as ‘weak’ or ‘wimpish’. If the Soviets were indeed 
acting rationally, these statements would not exist. As Cohn (1993: 231) states: “the 
willingness to use force, is cast as a question of masculinity – not prudence, 
thoughtfulness, efficacy, ‘rational’ cost-benefit calculation, or morality, but 
masculinity”.  
Soviets also attempted to reaffirm their hyper-masculine nuclear identity through 
frequent reiteration that the Other – the US – was fearful of the Soviet missiles. This 
also changed the nature of Soviet discursive production of danger about the US. While 
the Other was still constructed as warmongering and threatening, it was no longer too 
dangerous for the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviets secured their superpower 
masculine identity by emphasising that the Other was afraid, and inflicting fear is also 
an activity traditionally associated with masculinity. For example, in his memoirs 
Khrushchev (1974: 53) stated: “Now it was our enemies who trembled in their boots. 
Thanks to our missiles, we could deliver a nuclear bomb to a target at any place in the 
world”. On another occasion, after the erection of the Berlin wall and Khrushchev’s 
ultimatum failure, he pointed out: “The Americans, two weeks after the Wall went up, 
[wanted] to scare us but they ended up scaring themselves” (Khrushchev, 1962, cited 
in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 225). Furthermore, after the first Soviet ICBM test, 
Khrushchev said: ‘‘main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first 
time in their lives” (Khrushchev, 1957, cited in Zubok, 2009: 131). This enabled the 
construction of Self as fearless and powerful via the subordination of the Other seeing 





Peace-loving and the Soviet Union as a Responsible Nuclear Superpower 
 
Chapter 5 established that in addition to being competitive and masculine, Soviet 
nuclear identity was also constructed as peace-loving. Discourse analysis reveals that 
this dimension remained prominent throughout the stage of Khrushchev’s arms race 
between 1953 and 1964. However, due to the Soviet emerging nuclear superpower 
status, the Soviets constructed themselves as responsible not only for peace in the 
USSR, but also everywhere else in the socialist world. This can be observed in one of 
Khrushchev’s speeches: “In strengthening the defence of the Soviet Union we are 
acting not only in our own interests but in the interests of all peace-loving peoples, of 
all mankind” (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in DeGroot, 2005: 258). More evidence of this 
can be seen from the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to all party 
organizations and all communists of the Soviet Union:  
The peoples want disarmament and believe that the Communists are the 
vanguard and organizers of the struggle to achieve it […] This truth has 
long been known to all genuine Marxists-Leninists, who are aware of their 
responsibility to the peoples and who for several years have been waging -- 
and will go on waging -- a hard and persistent struggle for general and 
complete disarmament, for prohibition of nuclear weapons and their 
testing (CPSU, 1963).   
 
Here the Soviet officials constructed a peaceful ethical identity that was grounded in 
the struggle for disarmament and in the responsibility to liberate the world from the 
dangers of US threats and aggression. The Soviets constructed disarmament as a form 
of class struggle, grounding their responsibility in Marxist-Leninist ideology that is 
somewhat superior, more responsible, and more trustworthy than the capitalist US. 
 
Soviet nuclear identity constructions continued to be contradictory. Despite projecting 
their strength through military/nuclear might and seeing disarmament as ‘wimping out’ 
as seen in the previous section, the Soviets nevertheless constructed Self as peaceful 




The struggle for peace, for implementation of the principle of peaceful co-
existence of countries with different social systems, is one of the most 
important forms of the peoples' struggle against imperialism, against the 
new wars it is preparing, against aggressive imperialist actions in colonial 
countries, against imperialist military bases on foreign territory, against the 
arms race, etc. (CPSU, 1963).  
 
This captures the empirical complexity of identity construction. On the one hand 
through bragging about Soviet nuclear superiority and threatening to use this strength 
at any time, Khrushchev was constructing a hyper-masculine highly competitive 
superpower identity. On the other hand, he was projecting an image of a policeman 
for disarmament maintaining that the US could only be forced into disarmament talks 
by the growing socialist military force (Khrushchev, 1956b). As in the period of 
acquisition, Soviet nuclear weapons were portrayed as serving peaceful purposes, 
while American weapons were cast as tools of terror, threats, and aggression.  To 
illustrate, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Anastas Mikoyan 
(1954, cited in Zubok, 2009: 126) stated: “Hydrogen weapons in the hands of the 
Soviet Union are a means for deterring aggressors and for waging peace”. In an 
analogous manner, Khrushchev reflected in his memoirs:  
 
now that we had nuclear bombs and the means to deliver them, we had no 
intention of starting a war. We stood firm on Lenin’s position of peaceful 
coexistence. We only wanted to deter the Americans’ threats, their 
aggressiveness and their attempts to terrorize us (Khrushchev, 1974: 53). 
 
Aforesaid constructions enacted and legitimised the arms race as it was carried out in 
the name of peace. The Soviets also reaffirmed their own rationality and morality 
when justifying the missile gap with the US: “What good does it do to annihilate a 
country twice? We’re not a bloodthirsty people” (Khrushchev, 1974: 530). Juxtaposing 
sagacious reasonable Self to the “bloodthirsty” radical Other kept Soviet nuclear 
identity stable and continuously enabled the arms race.  
 
The construction of a peaceful and responsible nuclear identity that acts in pursuit of 
admirable goals presents certain policy directions as unquestionable and even 
necessary, because they serve a noble purpose of protecting mankind from capitalist 
aggression. For example, in the aforementioned open letter, the Central Committee of 
the CPSU described the Cuban missile crisis as:  “a major victory for the policy of 
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reason, for the forces of peace and socialism; this was a defeat for the forces of 
imperialism, for the policy of war gambles” (CPSU, 1963). In the same vein, 
Khrushchev justified the testing of ‘Tsar bomba’ by emphasising that it was done in 
order to counter force “the enemies of peace”: “When the enemies of peace threaten 
us with force they must be and will be countered with force, and more impressive 
force, too” (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in DeGroot, 2005: 258). These constructions 
legitimised the arms race while excluding disarmament. The existence of the 
aggressive external Other that can only be countered by brute force would not make 
disarmament desirable. 
 
Arguably, a belief and an attempt to construct the exceptional character of their state 
enabled Soviet leaders to take on the responsibility to protect the world form the evil 
forces of capitalism acting far beyond their borders. The roots of the Soviet 
exceptionalism were introduced in Chapter 5 as grounded in the Russian history of 
constant struggle against numerous enemies and in ideas about the superiority of the 
Soviet socialist ideology and its greater purpose to achieve a communist world. 
Catching up with the US and acquiring an enormous military power enabled the 
Soviets to act upon the purpose of defending the world from the “aggressive forces of 
imperialism”. This reproduced a nuclear identity that acted altruistically in pursuit of 
admirable Marxist-Leninist goals such as disarmament or helping Cuba to defend its 
socialist regime, rather than acting out of self-interest. This identity was secured and 
reinforced through the simultaneous construction of the US as aggressors who are 
naturally constructed as opposing such goals: 
There are still powerful forces in the imperialist camp opposed to 
disarmament. But it is precisely to compel these forces to retreat that we 
must rouse the peoples' wrath against them, force them to comply with the 
will of the peoples […] This struggle is in the interests of the working class, 
of all the working people, and in that sense it is a class struggle (CPSU, 
1963). 
The frequent reiteration of the term ‘struggle’ affirms this self-proclaimed ‘burden of 
responsibility’ that the Soviets were imposing on themselves.  This echoes Truman’s 
‘struggle’ with deciding on which Japanese cities to drop the atomic bombs, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. These constructions both highlight and repress the dangers of 
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the arms race. In this sense, the Soviet motives behind the arms race were constructed 
as fundamentally different from those of the US:  
They use the arms race to enrich themselves and to hold the people in 
capitalist countries in a state of fear. But must we swim with the stream, 
must we follow in the wake of imperialism and refuse to mobilize all the 
forces to fight for peace and disarmament? No. That would mean 
surrendering to the aggressive forces, to the militarists and imperialists  
(CPSU, 1963). 
But both states were engaged in the same process – constructing the Other as aggressor 
and the Self as reluctant, responsible possessor of nuclear weapons. The US nuclear 
discourse also constructed the US Self as peace-loving. In fact, their discourse during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis is the mirror image of the Soviet one. To illustrate, Kennedy 
(1962, cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 328) stated: “We challenge the Soviet 
Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race”; and again in 1963: “Our goal is not 
the victory of might, but the vindication of right – not peace at the expense of freedom, 
but both peace and freedom” (Kennedy, 1963, cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 
328). Similar to the USSR, the US was securing a macho-masculine identity of the 
leader of the free democratic world. The presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 
close proximity from US borders inevitably destabilised this identity. Discursive 
representations of the Other as dangerous and aggressive reinforced the US identity as 
peaceful and stable. US officials constructed the Soviet Union as the enemy of peace 
and freedom: “The source of the world trouble is Moscow, not Berlin” (Kennedy, 1962, 
cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 328); “They will not settle for … a peaceful world 
but must settle for a Communist world” (Kennedy, 1963, cited in Eckhardt and White, 
1957: 328). Constructing and reinforcing a peace-loving nuclear identity via the 
juxtaposition to the aggressive and radical external Other was both a constitutive of 
and a product of decisions to rapidly arm and to proceed with dangerous policies 
involving nuclear weapons. This section showed how the US and the USSR continued 
to see the Other as the main threat to international stability, while constructing Self as 








This chapter explored Soviet nuclear identity constructions during the stage of the 
arms race from 1953 to 1964 under the leadership of Khrushchev. Three overlapping 
elements of Soviet nuclear identity – competition, masculinity, and peace-loving - 
continued to evolve through Soviet nuclear discourse with consequences for the 
direction of nuclear policy. During the stage of acquisition of nuclear weapons, the 
Soviets established a nuclear identity of the exceptional, competitive, masculine and 
peace-loving state to ensure it did not fall behind the capitalist West. It procured arms 
at a record pace and at any cost, to affirm its post-World War II greatness and 
superpower status, but not simply for material security. In this sense, an identity that is 
grounded in the might of the military-industrial complex has a direct connection with 
decisions to procure arms and to enlarge nuclear arsenals. Continuous investment in 
military capability and acquiring more nuclear weapons was necessary not only to 
balance arms with the adversary, as neorealists would argue, but also to secure this 
established nuclear identity that the Soviets were already constructing. Moreover, the 
Soviets continued to explore their identity as a nuclear weapons state as they acquired 
more weapons, each dimension of Soviet nuclear identity transformed.  
 
First, the Soviets were still in competition with the US. While it may have been 
sufficient for Soviet security to acquire enough arms for defence and deterrence 
purposes, stockpiling more than 6 000 missiles (or 31 000 in the US case) went 
beyond the need for retaliatory capabilities. Additionally, both sides accepted the 
doctrine of MAD, admitting that there would be no winners in a nuclear war, which 
rendered further armament unnecessary. However, due to the competitive nature of 
Soviet nuclear identity, simply catching up with the US was not enough. The Soviets 
continued to reinforce an identity of a powerful state that would not only match the 
US in military strength and influence but would also overtake it. Thinking, even if 
mistakenly, that they were ahead transformed this identity into the one of a nuclear 
superpower enabling even more dangerous policy decisions. The Soviets went far 
beyond security considerations by testing militarily useless ‘Tsar bomba’ as a way to 
reaffirm this identity or by posing an ultimatum in Berlin, which led to major 
instability and eventually to the complete split of the city. This shows that once 
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nuclear superpower identity was established, it needed to be nourished to stay stable; 
in the world where MAD was accepted and a nuclear war would have no winners, 
this could be done via other dangerous means that did not fall into the realm of 
‘rational’.  
 
Second, during the era of Khrushchev’s arms race, Soviet nuclear identity continued to 
be formulated around notions of hyper-masculinity, with aggressive and assertive 
traits. Accordingly, this chapter again emphasised the gendered hierarchical structure 
of nuclear discourse, where threatening to use force, emasculating the adversary, 
silencing disarmament discourses, and constructing the Other as fearful, were all 
tactics aimed at safeguarding an identity of a strong masculine state. Khrushchev’s 
infamous nuclear bluff and boasting may come across as confusing due to its lack of 
consistency and rationality. However, in the world ruled by men where nuclear 
weapons acted as the ultimate symbol of masculinity, these practices made sense and 
equating nuclear weapons acquisition with masculine power made rapid armament 
not only possible, but also necessary, whereas disarmament was seen as ‘wimpish’ 
and thus undesirable. Accepting the impossibility of a nuclear war did not make the 
world more secure, because as this chapter argued the masculine nature of nuclear 
identity was constitutive of dangerous policy moves such as the Cuban missile crisis.  
 
Finally, the peace-loving ethical dimension of Soviet nuclear identity also continued to 
evolve during the arms race stage. Similar to the stage of acquisition, ‘our’ weapons 
were constructed as peaceful and ‘theirs’ as aggressive. Such discourse thus justified 
acquiring more arms, because it was constructed as reasonable and appropriate 
behaviour when aimed at achieving peace and stability. Moreover, with more arms 
Soviet nuclear identity transformed into an identity of the global policeman of 
socialism beyond the borders of the USSR. The Soviets constructed themselves as 
responsible protectors of socialism against the evil capitalists. This identity made the 
deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba possible. Chapter 5 concluded that the USSR 
reinforced the idea that nuclear weapons were not just tools of security, but also tools 
of peace, which was also visible during the arms race stage. But acquiring more 
weapons that were even more powerful created possibilities for spreading this peace 
to other parts of the world, rationalising moves such as the one seen during the Cuban 
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missile crisis. Perhaps, the most comprehensive summary of Khrushchev’s policy 
making was provided by Kolkowicz (1971: 436): “Khrushchev tried to accomplish too 
much with too little, hoping to fill the gap between capabilities and objectives with a 
deceitful verbal overkill”.  
 
All three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity were performed simultaneously through 
the enactment of dangerous policy that nearly brought the world to a nuclear 
catastrophe. After the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy finally signed the 
limited test ban treaty. This laid foundations for Leonid Brezhnev’s politics of détente 
and Mikhail Gorbachev’s disarmament. The next chapter continues to examine Soviet 





































“Yet nuclear weapons are like a rifle hanging on the wall in a play written and staged 




Chapters 5 and 6 established that the emergence of Soviet nuclear identity was 
inherently linked to the challenges of the post-World War II period, when the Soviet 
self-conception as an exceptional triumphant superpower had to be asserted. Soviet 
nuclear identity emerged as competitive, masculine, and peace-loving, constituted 
through discursive writings of Self and a radical external Other (the US), and the 
constructions of threat and danger that the Other imposed. Soviet nuclear weapons 
acquisition under the rule of Stalin and consequential arms race during Khrushchev’s 
epoch were enabled and potentiated as an appropriate and necessary behaviour to re-
imagine the USSR as an exceptional nuclear superpower. It became the superpower 
that caught up with and overtook the capitalists and established Self as the global 
centre of Marxism-Leninism and the defender of socialism. To reiterate the main 
argument addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, the nuclear identity that was constructed vis-
à-vis a very radically different Other and as competitive, hyper-masculine, and acting 
in order to achieve admirable goals such as the preservation of peace and stability, 
enacts and legitimises armament policies simultaneously excluding and silencing 
disarmament discourses.  
 
This chapter continues to examine the evolution of Soviet nuclear identity and focuses 
on periods of détente and disarmament under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev who 
served as the General Secretary of the CPSU from 1964 until 1982 and Mikhail 
Gorbachev who held this post from 1985 until 1991.9 It examines texts produced 
during two interconnected periods of Soviet nuclear history. First, it looks at 
Brezhnev’s tenure which was characterised by the relative stabilisation and easing of 
post-Khrushchev tensions and strained relations with the US (détente), but also 
	
9  Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985) briefly replaced 
Brezhnev in office, but their leadership was too short to make any significant impact on the 
construction of the Soviet nuclear identity. 
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paradoxically by the largest and the most expensive nuclear build-up in Soviet history. 
Second, this chapter focuses on the stage of disarmament under Gorbachev’s rule from 
the mid-1980s until 1991, when both the USSR and the US managed to agree on the 
most significant arms reduction in nuclear history.  
 
This chapter argues that nuclear disarmament efforts were made possible due to the 
evolution of Soviet nuclear identity that manifested itself in three ways. First, the 
competitive dimension of nuclear identity with the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude at 
its core transitioned into cooperative. Second, the association of nuclear weapons with 
traditionally masculine attributes such as strength, competition, and superiority started 
to disappear from the Soviet nuclear discourse. Gorbachev was still constructing a 
masculine nuclear identity. However, it was no longer grounded in the might of the 
military-industrial complex, but in being the leader of disarmament with particular 
emphasis on the establishment of mutual trust and the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. Finally, while the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity 
remained prominent, there was no longer such a radical difference between ‘our’ 
weapons and ‘theirs’ – all nuclear weapons were perceived and constructed as equally 
dangerous to international security.  
 
In this period, we see that while the Soviets’ traditional Other – the US – was still 
constructed as different, it was no longer constructed as a uniquely dangerous enemy. 
Rather, Brezhnev’s and particularly Gorbachev’s Soviet nuclear identity was more 
often temporally constructed in juxtaposition to the earlier Soviet Self that competed, 
threatened to wage war and to use nuclear weapons, and engaged in aggressive 
nuclear armament. US officials, on the other hand, remained suspicious of the change 
in the Soviet approach to nuclear policy and did not support total disarmament. This is 
also in part an identity-driven decision, because to follow Gorbachev’s lead in 
advocating disarmament would mean surrendering to the Soviet initiative. This 
chapter begins with a short historical overview of Soviet nuclear policy during 
Brezhnev’s and Gorbachev’s time in office followed by the analysis of Soviet nuclear 
identity construction during the détente stage. The chapter then proceeds with the 
discussion of each dimension of Soviet nuclear identity focusing on how it evolved 
during Gorbachev’s rule with consequences for nuclear policy. 
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Historical Overview, 1964 – 1991 
 
According to Zubok (2009: 205), in 1965 and 1966 the Soviets doubled their arsenal 
of ICBMs catching up with the US strategic forces and consuming approximately 18% 
of the Soviet defence budget by 1968.  To illustrate quantitatively, the number of 
Soviet nuclear weapons increased from 5 221 warheads in 1964 to 45 000 in 1986. 
Meanwhile, the US stockpiled 29 463 warheads in 1964 and this number did not 
fluctuate dramatically in comparison to the USSR with the total number of warheads 
reaching 23 317 in 1986 (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 81). Despite the increasing 
nuclear build-up, Brezhnev’s administration provided the foundation for future arms 
reduction agreements through the initiation of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
with the US government in 1969 that resulted in the signature of two agreements 
setting the upper limits on both sides’ nuclear arsenals and delivery vehicles in May 
1972 (Atomic Archive, 2019). Notably, Brezhnev and US president Richard Nixon 
signed the SALT I Treaty limiting the numbers of ICBMs and the Treaty on Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems that limited each side’s ABM sites (Atomic Archive, 
2019). The Soviet leader and US president Jimmy Carter held talks regarding an even 
more detailed SALT II treaty in 1979, but due to the newly rising tensions between two 
states after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the treaty was removed from 
consideration (Atomic Archive, 2019).  
 
Historians note that Brezhnev’s epoch was characterized by the conflict and 
disagreements over the matters of national security and the formulation of military 
doctrine within the CPSU (see e.g. Kolkowicz, 1971; Strode and Strode, 1983; Zubok, 
2009). There seemed to be a clear division into two camps. Strode and Strode (1983: 
108) call them the Diplomacists and the Unilateralists, while Kolkowicz’s (1971: 446) 
formulation is the Conservatives and the Moderates.  Regardless of the labels, the 
essence of this division remains the same. On the one side, there is the old doctrine 
calling for increased defence spending and caution with regards to arms control and 
the US; on the other, is the prevention of excessive military spending and the 
emphasis on diplomacy and arms control. Brezhnev was caught somewhere in the 
middle, which explains apparent contradictions in his statements across the span of 
almost 20 years in office. After 1972, détente began to decline, as did Brezhnev’s 
health and personal interest in politics, which largely impacted Soviet policymaking in 
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the late 1970s. The ‘hard-liners’ from the military industrial complex continued to 
affirm the importance of nuclear build-up and the dangers of dancing the “détente 
waltz” with the Americans (Zubok, 2009: 223). This eventually led to the economic 
crisis and to the deterioration of the relationship with the US, which left Brezhnev’s 
successors in a rather precarious position. 
 
Brezhnev’s tenure marked an important transition period between Khrushchev’s 
brinkmanship and Gorbachev’s disarmament. Although total elimination of nuclear 
weapons had not been accomplished, as Gorbachev himself envisioned, the Soviets 
managed to initiate the most substantial arms reduction to date and a halt to decades 
of the Cold War arms race. Less than a month after becoming General Secretary, 
Gorbachev announced a moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range 
missiles in Europe and invited the US to follow suit (Mydans, 1985). He stressed the 
importance of the arms talks with the US that had already begun in Geneva in 
preparation for the main summit meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in 
November 1985 and called for a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons (Mydans, 1985). 
On July 29, 1985, Gorbachev announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that 
would begin on August 6 – the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
(Evangelista, 1986: 563). Gorbachev extended the Soviet moratorium on nuclear 
testing in January 1986 and again in August 1986 even though the US continued their 
nuclear testing. 
 
Historians sometimes attribute Gorbachev’s determination to reach an agreement with 
the US on disarmament to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 26, 1986 (see e.g. 
Rhodes, 2007: 25-26; Zubok, 2000; Zubok, 2009: 288). Zubok (2000) argues that 
Chernobyl forced the Soviets “to look at the task of disarmament as a moral imperative 
independent of political calculations”. It is also worth noting that one of the major 
security challenges for the Soviets during the 1980s was the American Strategic 
Defence Initiative (SDI) nicknamed ‘Star Wars’, which was a controversial research 
project on developing a space-based defence system that could protect the US from a 
nuclear attack ultimately making it invincible (Grogin, 2001: 329). In addition to the 
Chernobyl disaster, historians also link Gorbachev’s eager insistence on total 
disarmament with his fear of the SDI due to expensive research the Soviets would 
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have to undertake to defend themselves and the fact that such a defence system would 
technically put the US into the position of striking first without fear of retaliation (see 
e.g. Azrael and Sestanovich, 1985: 482; Evangelista, 1986: 568; Grogin, 2001: 331; 
Zubok, 2000).  
 
One of Gorbachev’s significant steps towards total disarmament was calling an 
emergency arms control summit with US president Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland. Both 
leaders met on the 11th and the 12th of October 1986 to discuss the prospects of arms 
control. After talking about mere reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, Gorbachev 
casually proposed to eliminate them all, to which Reagan responded positively 
(Grogin, 2001: 330; Zubok, 2000). However, when Gorbachev requested Reagan to 
give up SDI, he refused and the summit collapsed, ultimately ending in nothing. 
Eventually, Gorbachev’s persistence on arms control led to the signature of the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on December 8, 1987 that obliged the US 
and the USSR to completely dismantle their medium and short-range nuclear missiles 
(Grogin, 2001: 331). This was the first arms-control agreement to require the reduction 
of nuclear stockpiles rather than mere restriction (Holloway, 1988: 75). The second 
important achievement was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) signed by 
Gorbachev and US president George Bush on July 31, 1991 right before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev’s forced resignation. The treaty limited both sides 
to 6,000 warheads each. These were very significant accomplishments considering 
that the Soviets reached an absolute peak of nuclear armament in 1986 stockpiling a 
total of 45 000 warheads. Due to the tremendous efforts of Gorbachev and his 
advisors, the number of warheads was reduced by two thousand every year until 1997 
when the disarmament tempo had slowed down (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 82).  
 
Brezhnev and ‘Peace through Strength’ 
 
Following the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviet government faced the 
consequences of his aggressive threatening rhetoric and dangerous nuclear 
policymaking, in particular the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Khrushchev’s actions 
severely damaged Soviet superpower status and the credibility of USSR’s military 
forces, consequently raising the international standing of the US (Zubok, 2009: 193; 
Kolkowicz, 1971: 436). In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet identity of 
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an exceptional nuclear superpower was destabilised and threatened, because 
evidently the Soviet Union was not superior to the US in nuclear weapons technology 
or diplomacy, and the Soviets would not be the victors in a nuclear conflict.  
 
Preventing similar crises from occurring became the priority of the new Soviet 
leadership and required significant changes in the approach to foreign policy and 
nuclear proliferation. As Brezhnev (1972, cited in Zubok, 2009: 192) noted to the US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “We must conduct negotiations in a big way, not a 
small-minded way. And the arrangement we achieve should encourage tranquility in 
the world”. Brezhnev’s détente policy was seen as rather controversial both by the US 
government and by some more conservative Soviet politicians. Washington saw it as a 
camouflage for the Soviet plans of aggression and military superiority (Kolkowicz, 
1971: 436). Brezhnev and his colleagues saw the growth of Soviet military power as 
the primary basis for détente, because it would make the US more accommodating 
(Holloway, 1988: 67). The ‘hard-liners’ of Politburo saw détente as a fallacy, because 
the Americans “strive for world hegemony” and the Soviet Union should neither 
accommodate nor trust them (Polyansky, 1964, cited in Zubok, 2009: 194). The 
existence of these various perspectives and constructions made Soviet nuclear identity 
during Brezhnev’s tenure particularly contradictory. 
 
Historians often describe Brezhnev’s approach to policy-making as a “speak-softly-
while-you-are-carrying-a-big-stick” policy (Catudal, 1988: 58; Kolkowicz, 1971: 437) 
and “peace through strength” (Zubok, 2009: 225).  Kolkowicz (1971: 437) claims that 
the new government’s antidote to Khrushchev’s brinkmanship seemed to be “sobriety, 
pragmatism, and the establishment of credibility through the attainment of 
conspicuous capabilities to match objectives and declaratory policy”. Brezhnev 
himself noted: “We are striving to make our diplomacy vigorous and active, and at the 
same time we exhibit flexibility and caution” (Brezhnev, 1965, cited in Kolkowicz, 
1971: 437). In contrast to Khrushchev, Brezhnev constructed a nuclear identity not 
only in relation to the spatial radical Other - the US, but also temporally in relation to 
the earlier Soviet Self. Khrushchev damaged Soviet superpower identity and indeed 
the new Soviet government often publicly denounced his behaviour and policies in 
order to construct a refined Self. For example, as stated in an editorial in the 
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Communist Party’s main theoretical journal Kommunist, the approach of the new 
government was a policy of: 
 
opposing aggressive imperialist circles without allowing itself any sabre-
rattling or irresponsible talk… [designed to] assess the situation soberly and 
to find a precise orientation in it under all circumstances, favorable as well 
as adverse, [and] to weigh, in a sober manner, the possibilities which we 
have [rather than to] succumb to illusions (Kommunist XII, August 1965, 
cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 437). 
 
The emphasis on sobriety and responsibility exemplifies how the Soviets constructed a 
Self that was cautious, responsible, and also rational in opposition to the sabre-rattling, 
irresponsible, and delusional Self reinforced by Khrushchev. By referring to 
“aggressive imperialist circles”, the Soviets also constructed their identity vis-à-vis the 
US, thus implying that the Self was neither aggressive nor imperialist.  
 
More evidence of the Soviet temporal Other is found in statements made by Brezhnev 
and others where they frequently highlighted the ‘madness’ of Khrushchev’s policy-
making in an attempt to show that this was not what the USSR stood for anymore.  As 
emphasised by Brezhnev in 1966: “We almost slipped into a nuclear war! And what 
effort did it cost us to pull ourselves out if this, to make the world believe that we 
really want peace!” (Brezhnev, 1966, cited in Zubok, 2009: 203). And again in 1981: 
“It is dangerous madness to try to defeat each other in the arms race and to count on 
victory in nuclear war” (Brezhnev, 1981, cited in Catudal, 1988: 283) and “I will add 
only that he who had decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of 
emerging victorious from it” (Brezhnev, 1981, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 91). In 
the same vein, Minister of Defence Dmitrii Ustinov stated: “Sooner or later it will 
become evident how completely hopeless it is to gamble on military superiority. 
Indeed, it is senseless in conditions where the available armaments are more than 
sufficient to make biological life on earth impossible” (Ustinov, 1982, cited in Strode 
and Strode, 1983: 91-92). 
 
Here the Soviets constructed a Self that would not behave in an aggressive manner or 
threaten a nuclear war and indeed Brezhnev and his closest advisors never did. They 
kept reiterating the defensive nature of the Soviet nuclear programme: “The Soviet 
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Union does not threaten anybody, is not planning to attack anyone. Our military 
doctrine is of a defensive character” (Brezhnev, 1981, and the peaceful intentions of 
the Soviet government:  
 
Concern for peace is the dominant feature of the Soviet Union’s policy. We 
are convinced that no contradictions between states or groups of states, no 
differences in social systems, ways of life or ideologies, and no transient 
interests can eclipse the fundamental need common to all peoples, the 
need to safeguard peace and avert a nuclear war (Brezhnev, 1982). 
 
 
This echoes the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity established in the 
previous empirical chapters of this thesis. However, it was slightly different in this 
time period, because it was no longer attached to Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s 
aggressive othering of the US. Instead, it acknowledges that both sides’ nuclear 
weapons were dangerous, which as discussed later in this chapter, is an important 
factor for the enablement of decisive disarmament policies. In addition, Brezhnev’s 
rhetoric to an extent resonated with Gorbachev’s human security discourse, because 
he started to acknowledge that ideological differences should not be a hurdle to 
peace. The constructions of Soviet nuclear identity were always contradictory and 
during the period of disarmament, the peace-loving dimension started to dominate 
over the other two, whereas before it manifested itself to legitimise nuclear weapons, 
as seen in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
The above quote is an excerpt from Brezhnev’s pledge to the UN in 1982 where he 
declared that the USSR would not be the first to ever use the nuclear weapons. This 
illustrates how the Soviets continued to portray their nuclear identity of a peaceful 
nuclear state. Brezhnev constructed a superpower identity, but in comparison to 
Khrushchev’s boasting and threats, it was grounded in being the first state to declare 
the no first use. He constructed the USSR as a responsible state to be the world leader 
of peace negotiations. The ‘burden’ nature of this decision can be seen from the 
following quotes. First, as stated by Brezhnev in the same speech to the UN: 
 
The Soviet Union is assuming an obligation not to be the first to use 
nuclear weapons, being confident in the power of sound judgment and 
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believing in mankind's ability to avoid self-annihilation and to insure peace 
and progress for the present and coming generations (Brezhnev, 1982).  
  
And second, as remarked by Ustinov shortly after: 
 
In light of the growing aggressiveness of the policy of the United States and 
the NATO bloc it was not easy for the Soviet Union to take upon itself the 
unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (Ustiniov, 
1982, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 101). 
 
It can be seen from these quotes how the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear 
identity started to take a different shape. The Soviets in this era began to construct an 
identity of a responsible, prudent, manly state – the protector of the world from 
nuclear dangers, while simultaneously insisting on the continuous possession of 
nuclear weapons. During Brezhnev’s tenure, some masculine characteristics assigned 
to nuclear weapons and armament were minimised. This is evident from the near 
absence of ‘bragging’ about nuclear achievements and threatening to use force against 
the US. Instead, the Soviets placed more evidence on peace and an absolute 
avoidance of war. This made the SALT I and SALT II negotiations between the USSR 
and the US possible and even fruitful considering the signature of the SALT I treaty and 
the ABM treaty in 1972, which limited the number of both sides’ defence sites and 
offensive nuclear weapons launchers.   
 
However, these restrictions contained multiple loopholes that allowed both the Soviets 
and the US to continue with qualitative improvements and ultimately to keep 
developing new weapons (Catudal, 1988: 68, Grogin, 2001: 288). As remarked by the 
US political commentator George F. Will (1984, cited in Catudal, 1988: 73), 
“Americans see arms control as a way of freezing the status quo; the Soviets see it as 
one arena in a comprehensive, unending competition”. Despite constructing a Self 
that was peace-loving and similarly to the periods of acquisition and the arms race, 
Soviet officials continued to ground the superpower nuclear identity in the strength of 
the military-industrial complex with nuclear weapons still being perceived as the 
ultimate tool of political/masculine power, making the continuous competition with 
the US necessary.  
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The ‘peace through strength’ attitude prevalent during Brezhnev’s leadership 
demonstrates that the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear identity was 
continuously reinforced, although in a less macho way compared to Khrushchev’s 
stage of the arms race. The Soviets still armed rapidly, but generally abstained from 
showcasing those achievements in an aggressive form of threatening war and nuclear 
strikes. Rather, expanding nuclear arsenals helped to reaffirm the identity of a 
‘peaceful negotiator’, while still constructing disarmament as a weakness. For 
example, the head of the Committee for State Security (KGB) Yuri Andropov (cited in 
Zubok, 2009: 211) justified the continuous arms race during détente as: “Nobody 
wants to talk to the weak”. He also stated that the socialist achievements must be 
defended “if necessary, by the axe” (cited in Zubok, 2009: 213). Another relevant 
statement came from Molotov (1972, cited in Zubok, 2009: 227): “What should the 
Soviet Union fear? Only its own impotence, relaxation, laxity”. By ‘relaxation’ 
Molotov meant not carrying on with nuclear build-up. Moreover, linking it with 
impotence shows how despite the shifts in this era, masculine strength remained 
linked to military capability, competition, and superiority. This demonstrates that 
disarmament efforts continued to rest on a contradictory gendered assumption that 
peace could be achieved through the maintenance of military strength, because no 
one would dare to attack a heavily armed nuclear state. The presence of gendered 
hierarchies in nuclear discourse, where the more masculine side was favourable, 
made disarmament inappropriate.  
 
This section has already established that Soviet nuclear identity during Brezhnev’s rule 
was constructed temporally in opposition to the previously erratic threatening Self, 
reinforced by Khrushchev. This does not mean that the US ceased to be perceived as 
the Other. The old enemy constructions remained deeply embedded in the Soviet 
nuclear discourse, which was both constitutive of and a product of continuous Soviet 
armament. To illustrate, as stated by Brezhnev (1981): “All of it [the policy of the 
present US administration] is actually an opposite to détente, blunt disregard for the 
striving of all peoples for lasting peace”.  This constructs the US as ‘dangerous’ vis-à-
vis ‘peaceful’ Soviets. More evidence is found in Andropov’s statement: “We know it 
is useless to buy peace from the imperialists. It can be upheld only by resting upon the 
invincible might of the Soviet armed forces” (Andropov, 1982, cited in Strode and 
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Strode, 1983: 114). The discursive constructions of the Other as warmongering 
continued to establish inside/outside boundaries between the USSR and US: 
“Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the NATO bloc, do not 
show so far a serious interest in talks on all of these questions that are vital to mankind 
and its peaceful future” (Brezhnev, 1981). 
 
Such discourses helped to reproduce an idealised image of Self, establishing the USSR 
as a peaceful state that cared for mankind, but was yet obliged to continue arming. As 
stated by the Defence Minister Andrei Grechko (1968, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 445), 
“the Soviet Union has no right to ignore the constantly threatening danger of a new 
military attack by the predatory imperialists”. In this way, Soviet nuclear identity 
continued to be peace-loving and competitive simultaneously in ways similar to the 
acquisition and arms race stages discussed in the previous empirical chapters. 
 
As mentioned earlier, nuclear identity construction during Brezhnev’s tenure was 
particularly contradictory. On the one hand, as shown through the statements above, 
Soviet officials emphasised the danger and the madness of a nuclear arms race. On the 
other hand, the pattern of Soviet military spending and the magnitude of nuclear 
armament suggest that a ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude was still salient, and the 
Soviets continued to ground their identity in military strength, which also reinforced its 
predominantly masculine character. For example, at the very beginning of his time in 
office Brezhnev stated: “history has taught us that the stronger our army is, the more 
watchful we are, the stronger the peace on our frontier” (Brezhnev, 1965, cited in 
Kolkowicz, 1971: 445). He maintained a similar view almost twenty years later 
towards the end of his tenure: “Competition in military technology has sharply 
intensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new character. A lag in this competition is 
inadmissible” (Brezhnev, 1982, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 109).  In the same 
vein, Brezhnev stated: “And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military 
supremacy over the USSR. If necessary, the Soviet people will find opportunities for 
making any additional efforts, for doing everything necessary to ensure their country’s 
reliable defence” (Brezhnev, 1981). 
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It is clear from these quotes that the emphasis on military competition and superiority 
continued to shape Soviet nuclear identity making further rapid armament possible 
and even necessary. A member of the Defence Ministry’s Military Institute Nikolay 
Azovtsev:  
 
Under conditions of the rapid development of new weapons, 
radioelectronics and new combat technology, V. I. Lenin’s injunction that 
the army which fails to acquire all types of means and methods that the 
enemy possesses is irrational or even criminal, has become even more 
significant (Azovtsev, 1971, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 106). 
 
 
These constructions served to help enable the arms race and simultaneously silence 
disarmament efforts. Furthermore, Soviet nuclear identity was still to a significant 
extent grounded in military capability; although not as vocal, the arms race carried on 
at a rapid pace and continued to be perceived as the determinant of masculine 
strength and superpower status. The previously established identity of a nuclear 
superpower was destabilised and damaged after Khrushchev’s dangerous 
policymaking. Thus, continuous investment into nuclear technology and 
reinforcement of Soviet rationality, sobriety, peaceful intentions, but at the same time 
military might was necessary in order to affirm this identity. In addition, the emphasis 
on military strength, competition, prudence, and rationality shows that nuclear identity 
constructed by Brezhnev and his advisors continued to be very masculine meaning 
that decisive steps towards disarmament could not come to fruition, because arms 
reduction was to an extent still perceived as weak and wimpish, such perceptions 
acting as, to quote Cohn (1993: 235), “a pre-emptive deterrent to thought”.  
 
Lastly, while Soviet nuclear identity was constructed in relation to the earlier irrational 
and emotional Self of the Khrushchev’s era, the US continued to act as the key radical 
spatial Other in Soviet nuclear discourse. Constructing the Other as aggressive and 
dangerous reduced the possibility of disarmament, because it remained necessary to 
reach strategic parity and to go beyond it in order to defend the threatened Self. 
During the rapid decline of détente and a month before his death in 1982 Brezhnev 
declared that the US had “launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive” 
against the Soviet Union and had begun an “unprecedented arms race” (Brezhnev, 
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1982, cited in Holloway, 1988: 68). The deterioration of the Soviet-US relations and 
the ruins of the Soviet economy at the beginning of Gorbachev’s leadership in 1985 
presented the new Soviet government with multiple puzzles. 
 
Gorbachev and the Transition from Competitive to Cooperative Nuclear Identity 
 
The scope of this chapter and, in fact, of this whole thesis is too limited to capture the 
magnitude of Gorbachev’s restructuring and thinking about domestic politics, 
economics, security, and international relations. Nor is it possible to cover in great 
depths all the events that occurred as consequences of his ‘new thinking’ and 
revolutionary changes that he implemented into the Soviet policymaking. These 
include, but are not limited to democratisation of the USSR, the politics of glasnost 
(openness), economic restructuring, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany, the end of the Cold War, and ultimately 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This chapter is, however, concerned with 
nuclear identity that Gorbachev’s government constructed for the USSR and arms 
control policies that it enabled. 
 
A closer look at speeches and statements made at that time, using discourse analysis, 
reveals radical shifts in thinking about the Self, the Other, and nuclear weapons during 
the disarmament period. Gorbachev’s rhetoric significantly differed from his 
predecessors, as did his policymaking. The architect of glasnost and perestroika (a 
series of political and economic restructuring reforms), he switched the policy 
attention from competition and deterrence to cooperation, and from military might to 
economic needs and democratisation (Holloway, 1989/90: 6). His willingness to 
eventually dismantle all nuclear missiles in the Soviet Union and to allow verification 
checks by the US puts the rational deterrence theory argument about the 
peacekeeping qualities of nuclear weaponry and their significance for national 
security to the test. When recalling the disarmament efforts of the 1980s, Gorbachev 
stated: “I am also convinced that nuclear deterrence, instead of protecting the world, 
is keeping it in constant jeopardy” (Gorbachev, 2019). These beliefs enabled 




Gorbachev was the only Soviet leader to ever publicly question the military usefulness 
of nuclear weapons. In comparison to the Soviet leaders during the acquisition and the 
arms race periods, Gorbachev and his advisors constructed the nuclear identity of a 
state that actively reduced its nuclear stockpiles, aimed to be free from nuclear 
weapons, and led by example encouraging disarmament everywhere else in the 
world. Gorbachev’s view of peaceful coexistence was not ‘peace through strength’, 
but peace through cooperation and the actual abolition of nuclear weapons. 
Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ and new direction of policy transformed all three 
dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity. This section focuses on the transition from 
competition to cooperation.  
 
According to Holloway (1988: 70), the problems that Gorbachev’s administration 
encountered were not only practical, but also conceptual. Brezhnev’s legacy raised 
questions about the relationship between peace and socialism. Although peaceful 
coexistence was desired, it still existed as a form of the class struggle (Holloway, 1988: 
70). The belief in the superiority of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology over capitalism 
was visible during Brezhnev’s rule as seen from the quotes in the previous section that 
reinforce the Otherness of the US. In Gorbachev’s view, Brezhnev’s administration put 
socialist values above common human values, which prevented not only decisive arms 
control and disarmament agreements, but also agreements more generally (Holloway, 
1988: 70).  
 
The evolution of Soviet nuclear identity from competitive to cooperative manifested 
itself in two interconnected ways: through the emergence of human security discourse 
and through the narratives of the universal danger of nuclear weapons.  First, the 
emergence of human security discourse put emphasis on universal human values and 
emphasised security and survival of humans rather than security of states. To illustrate, 
during his first year as General Secretary, Gorbachev gave an open interview to TIME 
Magazine, where he stated: “While insisting on the cessation of the arms race, we also 
believe it is immoral to waste hundreds of billions on developing means of 
annihilation, while hundreds of millions of people go hungry and are deprived of 
elementary essentials” (Gorbachev, 1985c). 
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Disarmament was not only constructed as necessary in order to avoid nuclear war, but 
also as necessary in order to tackle other issues existent in the world: “The pattern 
imposed by militarism – arms in place of development – must be replaced by the 
reverse order of things – disarmament for development” (Gorbachev, 1987b: 44). This 
manufactured a new Soviet Self that was different to the one that engaged in an 
unprecedented expensive arms race. 
 
Compared to his predecessors, Gorbachev entered the General Secretary office with 
the belief that socialism and capitalism did not develop in isolation and were part of 
the same human civilisation and their ideological differences should not affect their 
relations, because their values were the same (Holloway, 1988: 71). For example, 
Gorbachev (1987b: 37) remarked: “What is required here is that we should rise above 
national selfishness, tactical considerations, differences and disputes, whose 
significance is nothing compared to the preservation of what is most cherished – peace 
and a secure future”. 
 
In the similar manner, the CPSU secretary responsible for ideology Vadim Medvedev 
(1988, cited in Holloway, 1988: 71) stated: “Today, when universal values are 
embodied with utmost specificity, primarily in ensuring mankind’s survival, they come 
to the foreground of international relations and constitute the nucleus of the new 
political thinking”. 
 
This shows how during Gorbachev’s rule the Soviets continuously reimagined and 
explored their nuclear identity. The fundamental ideological difference between Self 
and Other was no longer reinforced in the form of competition. In fact, Gorbachev’s 
rhetoric suggests that those differences did not matter at all. Rather, what mattered was 
the preservation of human life across the globe: 
 
Initiating active steps to halt the arms race and reduce weapons is a 
necessary prerequisite for coping with increasingly acute global problems – 
those of the deteriorating state of man’s environment and the need to find 
energy sources and combat economic backwardness, hunger and disease 
(Gorbachev, 1987b: 44). 
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This is important, because, as seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and the arms race was to a large extent fuelled by the ideological struggle 
between socialism and capitalism. As noted by Gorbachev himself (1985c), “our 
initiatives should wreck the version of the Soviet Union being the ‘focus of evil’ and 
the source of universal danger, which in fact underlies the entire arms race policy”. By 
saying this, Gorbachev was stripping the Soviet nuclear identity of the ideological 
dogma. This is not to say that Gorbachev’s rhetoric did not defend Soviet socialism at 
all. For example, Gorbachev (1985a) stated that the people and the Party “will do 
everything for our Soviet motherland to become still more rich and powerful and for 
the creative forces of socialism to reveal themselves more fully”.  In the similar manner 
in his speech at the UN General Assembly, Gorbachev (1988b) stated: “We are not 
giving up our convictions, philosophy, or traditions. Neither are we calling on anyone 
to give up theirs. Yet we are not going to shut ourselves up within the range of our 
values”. 
 
However, in comparison to his predecessors, Gorbachev did not stress the necessity to 
become the most powerful state or more powerful than the US, nor did he emphasise 
the superiority of socialism over capitalism. More evidence of this can be found in the 
following statement from Gorbachev’s abovementioned speech to the UN: “The very 
tackling of global problems requires a new "volume" and "quality" of cooperation by 
states and socio-political currents regardless of ideological and other differences” 
(Gorbachev, 1988b). 
 
The second shift that made the transition from competitive to cooperative nuclear 
identity possible was the reiteration of dangers of nuclear competition, rather than a 
‘catch up and overtake’ attitude. Previous Soviet leaders made nuclear competition 
necessary, because lagging behind would make the Soviets look weak and backward 
and it would “unleash US aggression”, “it won’t do for Bolsheviks”. Gorbachev 
constructed a different nuclear identity for the USSR as seen in his first speech as the 
USSR leader on March 11, 1985 where he bluntly laid out his disarmament intentions: 
 
Never before has so terrible a threat loomed so large and dark over 
mankind as these days. The only reasonable way out of the existing 
situation is agreement of the confronting forces on an immediate 
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termination of the race in arms, above all, nuclear arms […] An agreement 
which would help all to advance toward the cherished goal – the complete 
elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons for good (Gorbachev, 
1985a). 
 
This sets out Gorbachev’s the desire to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, which 
was not in the foreground previously. All Soviet leaders talked about arms control and 
reduction; they also talked about the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and 
how abolishing them would benefit the world. However, as seen in the previous 
empirical chapters, the notion of total disarmament never figured to any significant 
extent to their construction of Soviet nuclear identity. Gorbachev presented the 
complete abolition of nuclear weapons as the “cherished goal” and “the central 
direction of [Soviet] foreign policy for the coming years” (Gorbachev, 1986, cited in 
Evangelista, 1986: 561). At the end of his first speech Gorbachev made a remark about 
the Soviet motherland becoming more rich and powerful as discussed above. This is 
important, because it shows that the superpower status was no longer associated with 
the possession of nuclear weapons, but in fact with their abolition. Gorbachev 
constructed a nuclear identity of a rational state with the aim to cooperate with the US 
rather than compete. He asked: “The question arises: Where further can we go, is it 
not time for those who shape the policy of states to stop, think and prevent the 
adoption of decisions that would push the world to a nuclear catastrophe?” 
(Gorbachev, 1985, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 561). 
 
Constructions of cooperative nuclear identity made Gorbachev’s moratoria on Soviet 
nuclear testing appropriate and necessary in order to assert this identity. He stated that 
the Soviet Union was taking the action “to facilitate the termination of the dangerous 
competition in building up nuclear arsenals and wishing to set a good example” 
(Gorbachev, 1985b). Similar to the earlier USSR leaders, Gorbachev was constructing 
an identity of a responsible nuclear state that set an example to the rest of the world, 
albeit through different means. Rather than increasing the nuclear build-up, the Soviets 
were reducing it. “Undoubtedly, a mutual moratorium by the USSR and the United 
States on any nuclear blasts would be a good example also to other states possessing 
nuclear weapons” (Gorbachev, 1985b). Gorbachev was in fact reinforcing a 
superpower identity, but this identity was not affirmed by the size and achievements of 
the military-industrial complex. Rather, it was grounded in being the first state that 
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took decisive action to halt nuclear proliferation not just in the Soviet Union, but also 
in the world: “A complete end to nuclear tests would halt the nuclear arms race in the 
most dangerous area, that of qualitative improvement, and it would also seriously 
contribute to maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” 
(Gorbachev, 1985c).  
 
Gorbachev constructed the Soviet Union as exceptional due to its unique peace and 
disarmament ambitions. Catching up with and overtaking the US was not being 
constructed as a key part of the Soviet exceptionalism anymore. Instead, Gorbachev 
continuously emphasised how dangerous a nuclear competition was for international 
security. Soviet nuclear identity evolved from being a competitive nuclear superpower 
that could not afford to lag behind the West to a state that cooperated, led the world 
towards disarmament and was ready to give up ALL of its nuclear weapons. To 
illustrate: 
 
It is clear to every sober-minded person that if we embark upon the road of 
deep cuts and then complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is essential 
to rule out any possibility which could be used by either the Soviet or the 
U.S. side for gaining unilateral military superiority (Gorbachev, 1986b). 
 
 
This is an important shift, because previously Soviet leaders strove for unilateral 
military superiority, which enabled an aggressive armament programme. Instead, 
Gorbachev stressed the senselessness of seeking nuclear superiority, which shows how 
he constructed a nuclear identity in relation to the temporal Other, the earlier Soviet 
Self, and in relation to the spatial other, the US, simultaneously demonstrating that the 
USSR would not be senseless again and calling the US government to make that 
change too. To an extent, Gorbachev was taking a higher moral ground: 
 
It is a reality of today’s world that it is senseless to seek greater security for 
oneself through new types of weapons. At present, every step in the arms 
race increases the danger and the risk for both sides, and for all humankind 
(Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 561). 
 
This resonates with what Hansen’s (2006: 50) notion of an ethical identity, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. To reiterate, articulations of an ethical identity imply 
discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility (Hansen, 2006: 50). In 
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this sense, articulations of policy invoke a particular moral force or a call for action. 
Gorbachev’s concern for humanity and continuous reinforcement of human security 
discourse helped to reproduce an ethical identity that enabled and legitimised his 
disarmament efforts. Earlier Soviet leaders as well as US leaders frequently expressed a 
moral responsibility to protect either the Self or the free people or the 
capitalist/socialist world from certain dangers that were naturally attributed to the 
Other. This has been discussed extensively in Chapters 5 and 6. However, these 
constructions enabled nuclear policies that were different from Gorbachev’s (e.g. the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, the rapid arms race) due to a hyper-masculine and 
competitive nuclear identity that those leaders were constructing.  
 
This section concludes that Soviet nuclear identity during the stage of disarmament 
was reconstructed and reinforced through discourses of human security, cooperation, 
and the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. Rather than projecting an image of a 
state that would not give up on the competition and achieve parity with the capitalists, 
Gorbachev’s government emphasised madness and danger of such competition to 
human life. The articulation of an ethical identity that is interconnected with 
cooperative and peace-loving dimensions that Gorbachev was constructing 
simultaneously constitutes and is a product of intensified disarmament talks and more 
concrete policy decisions such as the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing and the 
INF treaty, which will be discussed in detail below.  
 
The Soviet Union as the Peace-loving Global Leader of Disarmament 
 
The cooperation dimension of Gorbachev’s nuclear identity is directly interlinked with 
the peace-loving dimension. This section focuses on statements that refer more 
explicitly to peace. At all stages in their nuclear history, the Soviets constructed 
themselves as peace-loving. However, during nuclear weapons acquisition and the 
arms race stages, the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity was asserted 
through the differentiation from the warmongering US, which made acquisition and 
further armament appropriate and necessary. In essence, Soviet nuclear weapons were 
seen as peaceful and serving noble purposes, while the American ones posed threats 
to international stability and security. During Gorbachev’s tenure, the Soviets also 
constructed Self as peace-loving, but this peace was redefined in the way that it was 
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not the Soviet weapons that would protect the world from a nuclear catastrophe, but a 
total disarmament. The peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity was not 
grounded in the necessity to counterbalance the US thus preventing a first strike, but 
in the desire to cooperate with the US regardless of their ideological differences and to 
eventually get rid of all nuclear weapons. To illustrate, Gorbachev (1987b: 45) stated: 
 
In questions of preserving peace and saving mankind from the threat of 
nuclear war, let no one remain indifferent or stand aloof. This concerns 
all and everyone. Each state, large or small, socialist or capitalist, has an 
important contribution to make. 
 
This displays a significant shift from the rhetoric of saving mankind from the forces of 
imperialism by means of arming, as shown in previous empirical chapters. As such, 
the discourse reconstructs the Other – the US and wider West – from a reconstruction 
of the Self, with previous binary oppositions becoming less prominent. Gorbachev’s 
articulation of the commitment to peace, emphasis on the dangers of nuclear 
weapons, and reinforcement of the need for total disarmament is what ultimately 
constitutes the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity at the disarmament 
stage: “There is no shortage today of statements professing commitment to peace. 
What is in short supply are concrete actions to strengthen the foundations of peace. 
All too often peaceful words conceal war preparations and power politics” 
(Gorbachev, 1987b: 45). 
 
During the periods of nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race, the peace-loving 
dimension came across as particularly ambiguous due to the simultaneous 
reinforcement of highly competitive and hyper-masculine nuclear identity. Of course, 
no state would construct a Self that is warmongering and threatening but framing 
aggressive arming as means of pursuing admirable goals such as achieving peace and 
stability or protecting the world from the US threat made the arms race possible and 
desirable simultaneously reaffirming Soviet morally sound nuclear superpower status. 
At those stages, the abolishment of nuclear weapons did not figure into Soviet nuclear 
identity, whereas during Gorbachev’s rule it was not only the centrepiece of his 





By the end of 1999 there will be no nuclear weapons on earth. A universal 
accord will be drawn up that such weapons should never again come into 
being […] the USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional 
verification measures (Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 565). 
 
And in a similar manner he reinforced the necessity for the total disarmament a year 
later: 
 
It is our duty to take full advantage of that chance [signing the INF Treaty] 
and move together toward a nuclear free world, which holds children, the 
promise of a fulfilling and happy life, without fear and without a senseless 
waste of resources on weapons of destruction (Gorbachev, 1987, cited in 
Catudal, 1988: 298).  
 
By frequently affirming their duty to eliminate nuclear weapons the Soviets not only 
constructed themselves as peaceful, but they also took on the responsibility of being 
the global leader of disarmament, being the state that sets an example. This 
demonstrates a continuous affirmation of Soviet ethical identity as discussed in the 
previous section of this chapter. To illustrate this further, Gorbachev stated:  
 
The Soviet Union cannot indefinitely display unilateral restraint with regard 
to nuclear tests. But the stakes are too high and the responsibility too great 
for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of others by 
force of example (Gorbachev, 1987b: 39). 
 
In January 1986, Gorbachev became the first politician to come up with a precise and 
detailed proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons that would start 
immediately and end by the year 2000 (Gorbachev, 1987b 37-38). At the core of 
Gorbachev’s disarmament discourse was the rejection of the neorealist notion that 
nuclear-strategic parity provides sufficient guarantees for peace, which completely 
redefined the Cold War concept of peace based on the doctrine of MAD. For example, 
he stated: 
 
Even if one country would constantly be arming itself, and the other would 
do nothing, then this first country still would gain nothing. For the weak 
side may simply detonate all its nuclear devices, even on its own territory, 
and it would mean suicide for it and a slow killing for the adversary 
(Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Zubok, 2000). 
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The Chernobyl accident further enabled Gorbachev to make statements about the 
dangers of nuclear weapons in order to reinforce the construction of the USSR as a 
peace-loving state and as being uniquely qualified to lead the way on disarmament. 
This made future agreements on arms reduction even more necessary. To illustrate: 
“The accident at Chernobyl showed again what an abyss will open if nuclear war 
befalls mankind. For inherent in the nuclear arsenals stockpiled are thousands upon 
thousands of disasters far more horrible than the Chernobyl one” (Gorbachev, 1986a). 
 
Previous empirical chapters have shown how the destabilised identity that was 
competitive and hyper-masculine by nature was asserted and reproduced through the 
formulation and legitimation of the rapid nuclear build-up. During the period of 
disarmament, in addition to human security, cooperation, and peace, Soviet nuclear 
identity was articulated through the discourses of danger that nuclear weapons posed 
to international security and through the rejection of realist notion that nuclear 
weapons were the ultimate guarantors of peace and security. Rather than boasting that 
the Soviet Union would catch up with and overtake the capitalists, Gorbachev 
constructed a Self that is correct and constructive in its course for disarmament and a 
Self that takes responsibility and a higher moral ground, as also seen in the previous 
section of this chapter. To illustrate, Gorbachev (1986, cited in Zubok, 2000) stated: 
“The discussion on nuclear disarmament has advanced to the new, higher level, from 
which we must expand further the struggle for liquidation and full ban on nuclear 
weapons, to continue actively our peace offensive”.  
 
Gorbachev’s nuclear identity constructions re-imagined the USSR as a peacemaker in a 
new sense: as a world leader in peace and disarmament. This shows that the Soviets 
continued to reinforce an identity that was exceptional by nature, taking on the role to 
save the world from the dangers of nuclear weaponry. The reproduction of such 
nuclear identity to a large extent enabled a breakthrough in arms control agreements 
with the US and significant arms reductions during Gorbachev’s tenure. 
 
Masculinity Reshaped: Strength in Cooperation, Peacekeeping, and Disarmament 
  
The two preceding empirical chapters have explained how the masculine dimension 
of Soviet nuclear identity contributed to the formulation and legitimation of the 
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acquisition of nuclear weapons and the arms race with the US. Consequently, these 
policies reproduced and reaffirmed an identity that was hyper-masculine by nature. 
The first half of this chapter has shown how, during Brezhnev’s era, the association of 
nuclear weapons with traditionally masculine qualities such as strength, prudence, 
and rationality and the grounding of Soviet nuclear identity in military capability and 
competition, prevented decisive disarmament efforts and instead continuously enabled 
the arms race.  
 
This section returns to some of Gorbachev’s statements already discussed above in 
order to flesh out the masculine dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity at the stage of 
disarmament. It has been noted that nuclear identity manufactured by Gorbachev’s 
government significantly differed from the earlier Soviet nuclear identity. In essence, 
the reshaping of the masculine dimension of the nuclear identity that Gorbachev was 
constructing is evident in all these shifts: competition transitioned to cooperation; 
ideological differences to the embracement of universal human values; peacekeeping 
through means of arming against the US to peacekeeping through means of disarming 
unilaterally and leading others towards disarmament; and the moral responsibility to 
protect the socialist peoples from evil capitalists to moral responsibility to protect the 
world from all nuclear weapons. However, this is not to suggest that this identity 
became ‘feminine’. Rather, Gorbachev constructed a different kind of masculinity that 
was not linked with preparedness to compete and threaten war, but with preparedness 
to disarm and preserve peace. To illustrate: “Why flex muscles needlessly? Why stage 
noisy shows and transfer the methods of domestic struggles to the relations between 
two nuclear powers? In them the language of strength is useless and dangerous” 
(Gorbachev, 1985c).  
 
Feminist IR scholars explain how the gender-dichotomised pairings where traditionally 
masculine side is valued more highly than the feminine one are woven through 
national security and nuclear discourses – through the way we think and talk about 
nuclear weapons (see e.g. Cohn, 1993: 230; Cohn et al., 2006: 2; Duncanson and 
Eschle, 2008: 546). The previous two chapters have illustrated how during the stages 
of acquisition and the arms race a masculine side of Soviet nuclear discourse was 
associated with achieving military superiority and threatening to use force. This was 
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possible through the linkage of traditionally masculine characteristics (strength, power, 
might, rationality, prudence) to the possession of nuclear weapons and to the 
competition against the Other, the US. Gorbachev also constructed a masculine 
identity, but the source of strength in his discourse did not come from nuclear 
weapons: 
 
In general, I would have to say that the Soviet Union’s strength today lies in 
its unity, dynamism, and the political activity of its people […] But we are 
opposed to playing power games, for this is an extremely dangerous thing 
in the nuclear-missile age (Gorbachev, 1987b: 59). 
 
In a way, Gorbachev devalued the idea that nuclear weapons were the main source of 
strength, instead placing more emphasis on the importance of human security and 
peace as shown in the previous sections. According to Connell (2000: 30), “Some of 
the qualities in ‘traditional’ definitions of masculinity (e.g. courage, steadfastness, 
ambition) are certainly needed in the cause of peace”. Referring to his own approach 
as a ‘peace offensive’ shows how Gorbachev was still constructing a masculine 
identity of a rational strong superpower, but a superpower that waged peace, not war. 
As seen from the quotes above, Gorbachev frequently reiterated that the arms race and 
nuclear weapons were senseless, while disarmament should be “clear to every sober-
minded person”. Thus, what had changed during the stage of disarmament was not the 
nature of Soviet nuclear identity – it was still masculine – but the idea of what it 
actually meant to be masculine. The power games of the earlier Soviet Self were 
disparaged. They were hyper-masculine, excessively aggressive, and risky, compared 
to the rational, moderate, civil/political masculinity being constructed for the USSR by 
Gorbachev. This reshaped the masculinity that was woven through the other changed 
dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity, which made disarmament possible and even 
necessary. 
The previous section established that Gorbachev was constructing a nuclear identity of 
a superpower that was the leader of disarmament as seen from numerous quotes 
where he asserted the Soviet duty and responsibility to disarm and to influence 
disarmament everywhere else. To reiterate, “But the stakes are too high and the 
responsibility too great for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of 
others by force of example” (Gorbachev, 1987b: 39). Such discursive practices 
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constructed a nuclear identity that was paternalistic by nature. As explained by Hearn 
and Collinson (1998: 215), paternalism is a specifically masculine discourse that 
“seeks to exercise power by emphasising the moral basis of cooperation; the 
importance of personal trust relations […] that draws on the familial metaphor of the 
‘rule of the father’ who is authoritative, benevolent, self-disciplined and wise”.   
Indeed, as explained in detail above, during Gorbachev’s rule the Soviets constructed 
a cooperative and ethical identity with human security and total disarmament at its 
core. By maintaining that spending billions on dangerous arms races is senseless and 
immoral, Gorbachev was constructing the USSR as moral and wise. Central to 
paternalism is exercising power in ways that “enhance subordinates’ self-interest; such 
practices are usually represented as ‘benefitting’ and ‘protecting’ its victims” 
(Collinson, 1998: 216).  Gorbachev’s human security discourse frequently highlighted 
the need to protect human life on earth and to save mankind from a nuclear threat, 
which was one of the ways to construct a paternalistic masculine identity. In addition, 
he emphasised the benefits this would bring to mankind – nuclear disarmament being 
a prerequisite for coping with global issues, such as economic backwardness, hunger, 
and disease – but also supposedly looked after the US interests. To illustrate, in his 
interview to TIME magazine Gorbachev (1985c) stated:  
That is our firm position [ban on the militarization of space] and it is based 
on our assessment, an assessment that we regard as being highly 
responsible, an assessment that takes into account not only our own 
interests but the interests of the U.S. as well. 
Gorbachev was moulding an identity of a responsible and rational superpower that 
took everyone’s interest into account and acted to pursue admirable goals such as 
tackling global issues as mentioned above. These constructions were in a way similar 
to the acquisition and the arms race periods, but the masculinity of Soviet nuclear 
identity was no longer reinforced through the showcase of military strength and 
competition, but through cooperation, peace, and disarmament. As stated by 
Gorbachev (1987a), “The new mode of thinking with its humane, universal criteria 
and values is penetrating diverse strata. Its strength lies in the fact that it accords with 
people's common sense”. This made policies such as the unilateral nuclear 
moratorium possible, because this is what a paternalistic state was meant to do – be 
wise and lead by example. In addition, as stated above, although the US was still 
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different it was no longer constructed as the radically different evil Other. This 
absence of a threatening enemy in the nuclear discourse also made disarmament 
agreements and verification inspections possible.  
Regardless of a peace-loving cooperative nuclear identity that Gorbachev reinforced, 
nuclear abolition was never achieved. The association of nuclear weapons with 
masculine strength and disarmament with weakness did not completely disappear 
from Soviet nuclear discourse and particularly not from the American one. In fact, the 
connection between nuclear weapons and international politics in general and 
masculinity was too well established to perish. Partially this could explain why 
Gorbachev started to lose trust and popularity among his Soviet colleagues. To 
illustrate, the former Soviet foreign minister Gromyko stated: “I wonder how puzzled 
must be the US and other NATO countries. It is a mystery for them why Gorbachev 
and his friends in the Politburo cannot comprehend how to use force and pressure for 
defending their state interests” (Gromyko, cited in Zubok, 2009: 318). 
 
Gorbachev’s colleagues frequently criticised him for the reluctance to use force 
claiming that he “had no guts for blood” or that he was “incapable not only of using 
dictatorial measures, but even of resorting to hard-line administrative means” (cited in 
Zubok, 2009: 319). This shows how gendered hierarchies continued to be present in 
Soviet political and security discourses. Friends and foes alike criticised Gorbachev’s 
disarmament efforts. For example, Cohn (1993: 235) discusses how American security 
specialists referred to Gorbachev and his entourage: “I’ve met these Soviet ‘new 
thinkers’ and they’re a bunch of pussies” or “They’re a bunch of pussies for pulling out 
of Eastern Europe”.   
 
This demonstrates that despite the shift towards the construction of a different kind of 
masculinity, within the universal national security discourse the symbolic association 
of military force and nuclear weapons with masculinity remained strong. Cohn et al. 
(2006: 3) argue that the real barriers to disarmament “are created by the ways in 
which masculine identities and roles have become conjoint with weapons possession 
for many ‘male’ combatants”. This is one of the reasons why Gorbachev lost support 
at home. In their perception, he was too ‘soft’ to be in power and the US exploited his 
weaknesses to achieve their goals. As reflected later by one of the critics of 
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Gorbachev’s regime Russian politician Vladimir Lukin, “Firmness was necessary in 
such a country as Russia, not to mention the Soviet Union” (cited in Zubok, 2009: 
319). However, reshaping of the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear identity 
during Gorbachev’s rule is significant to our understanding of the symbolic value and 
meaning of nuclear weapons as a centre of disarmament efforts, because when this 
value was deflated and ascribed to cooperation, human security, and the abolition of 
nuclear weapons, the most significant disarmament agreements became possible and 
desirable. 
 
The US as the Soviet Spatial Other  
 
Lastly, this chapter looks at the Soviet key spatial Other – the US. In line with the 
poststructuralist insight that identities are always constituted relationally, Chapters 5 
and 6 established that representations of the US were an important discursive 
characteristic of Soviet nuclear identity. The Soviet constructions of the US during 
Gorbachev’s rule were different from the previous Soviet leaders. In addition, the 
courses of both states’ nuclear policies drifted apart for a period of time in a sense that 
the USSR halted nuclear testing and started to take decisive steps towards 
disarmament, while the US continued testing and often rejected Soviet proposals.  
 
As discussed above, the Soviet constructions of the US as a radical aggressive Other 
gradually disappeared from Soviet nuclear discourse during the early stages of détente 
under Brezhnev’s rule and more noticeably during Gorbachev’s time in office, which 
made certain arms control agreements possible. It is important to note that the US 
became the less radical Other once the emphasis on the ideological differences 
between socialism and capitalism started to disappear from Soviet nuclear discourse. 
To reiterate, in comparison to his predecessors, Gorbachev constructed a nuclear 
identity that was cooperative, peace-loving, paternalistic, and ethical with human 
security and total disarmament at its core rather than reliant on competition, military 
strength, and ideological/military superiority over the US. However, this is not to say 
that the US stopped acting as a key external other. Its differences to the Soviet Self to 
an extent remained and Soviet nuclear identity was reproduced vis-à-vis those 
differences. To illustrate, after the failure to make an agreement with the US in 
Reykjavik, Gorbachev stated (1986b): 
	 172	
 
What was being thoroughly disguised previously is now becoming more 
clear: among U.S. and West European ruling circles, there are powerful 
forces which seek to frustrate the process of nuclear disarmament. Some 
people began to assert again that nuclear weapons are almost a boon. 
 
Gorbachev’s othering of the US was different, because he did not construct the 
Americans as a threat to the Soviet Union per se, which in the past would further 
enable the arms race, but as a threat to nuclear disarmament. The main differences 
between the US and the USSR during the period of disarmament were neither 
ideological nor related to the superiority/inferiority in a nuclear competition. Rather, 
the main difference was grounded in the US non-compliance with the Soviet 
disarmament initiative. As such, in Soviet nuclear discourse the US became hyper-
masculine and attached to its nuclear weapons. Gorbachev reproduced Soviet nuclear 
identity by emphasising the main differences between the Soviet and the American 
thinking about disarmament. For example:  
 
It would be irresponsible on our part to underestimate the forces of 
resistance to change. Those are influential and very aggressive forces 
blinded by hatred for everything progressive. They exist in various quarters 
of the Western world, but the largest concentration of them is observed 
among those who cater directly for the military-industrial complex, both 
ideologically and politically, and who live on it (Gorbachev, 1987a).   
 
This quote shows how Gorbachev constructed an identity of a responsible progressive 
state rejecting the relevance of military strength and ideology. The US on the other 
hand was thus reinforced as being non-progressive and ideologically driven. In 
comparison to his predecessors, Gorbachev did not formulate the US as aggressive 
dangerous imperialists. On the contrary, he consciously refrained from aggressive 
rhetoric: “In this critical situation Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its 
pronouncements about the US; it is not resorting to anti-American campaigns, nor is it 
fomenting hatred for your country” (Gorbachev, 1985c). Soviet nuclear identity was 
no longer competitive or aggressively macho and rather than engaging in threats and 
insults, Gorbachev dismissed the American images of the Soviet Union without the 
need for affirming manhood: “If an evil empire does exist, let it exist. I’m sure re-
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making the Soviet Union is not a goal of the United States” (Gorbachev, 1985, cited in 
Catudal, 1988: 278).  More evidence of this can be seen from the quote below: 
Militarist and anti-Soviet forces are clearly concerned lest the interest 
among the people and political quarters of the West in what is happening 
in the Soviet Union today and the growing understanding of its foreign 
policy erase the artificially created "image of the enemy", an image which 
they have been exploiting unashamedly for years. Well, it's their business 
after all. But we shall firmly follow the road of restructuring and new 
thinking (Gorbachev, 1987a). 
 
The key difference between the Self and the Other reinforced during the stage of 
disarmament was related to the US non-compliance with the Soviet proposals of total 
disarmament or moratoria on nuclear testing and American continuous insistence on 
the SDI initiative. In a way, the US acted similar to the earlier aggressive Soviet self 
when it came to peacekeeping: “assurances of peace intentions, which we often hear 
from US officials are immediately accompanied, at one go, so to speak, by the lauding 
of ‘power politics’” (Gorbachev, 1987a). The new Soviet Self on the other hand 
rejected power politics: “But to play a power game, we do not want this. This is an 
extremely dangerous activity, in our rocket nuclear age” (Gorbachev, 1986b). The 
Soviets continued to reaffirm their ethical identity of the peaceful leader of global 
disarmament: “We were guided by the motive of freeing the European peoples from 
the fear of nuclear catastrophe and then could move on to eliminating all nuclear 
weapons” (Gorbachev, 1986b).  This identity constituted and was a product of 
disarmament decisions such as continuous unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing and 
insisting on more arms control talks with the US in order to achieve results. This 
would not have been possible if the Soviet nuclear identity was constructed vis-à-vis a 
(very) radical dangerous and aggressive other, because as seen in the previous 




This chapter examined the articulations of Soviet nuclear identity during the period of 
détente under Brezhnev from 1964 until 1982, and the stage of disarmament under 
the leadership of Gorbachev from 1985 until 1991. It argued that the evolution of 
Soviet nuclear identity enabled a different course of policy, moving from the rapid 
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arms race to the most significant arms reduction in history from 1986 to 1991. First, it 
looked at Brezhnev’s tenure, which marked the transitional period between 
Khrushchev’s nuclear sabre-rattling and Gorbachev’s total disarmament initiatives. 
During the period of détente, the Soviet Union’s nuclear identity transformed from 
machoistic and aggressively competitive yet peaceful, to responsible, prudent, 
cautious, and masculine. These changes enabled an easing of tensions between the 
USSR and the United States for some time and made arms control agreements such as 
the ABM treaty and the SALT I treaty possible. However, these agreements failed to 
halt the arms race enabling both states to continue developing new missiles, which led 
to the Soviet Union stockpiling a total of 45 000 nuclear warheads in 1986.  
 
Despite recognising the universal dangers of nuclear weapons and of the arms race in 
broad terms, during Brezhnev’s tenure Soviet nuclear identity continued to be 
grounded in the strength and might of the military-industrial complex and the ‘catch 
up and overtake’ the US attitude. Disarmament and falling behind in the arms race 
were still considered as weakness and many orthodox Soviet politicians still retained 
the old view of ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism constructing the 
US as warmongering aggressive imperialists. The existence of such constructions 
prevented decisive disarmament agreements that would actually compel both sides to 
reduce their stockpiles, and the arms race continued at a rapid pace. In addition, the 
continuous discursive production of threat and danger about the US made total 
disarmament undesirable, because the Soviets needed to arm in order to defend 
themselves.  
 
This chapter demonstrated that nuclear identity constructions during Brezhnev’s era 
were particularly contradictory, which enabled a correspondingly paradoxical course 
of policy. On the one hand, Brezhnev announced the no first use policy and initiated 
a series of arms limitation talks. On the other hand, he approved an increase in 
defence spending and supported the most expensive and rapid leg of the Soviet arms 
race. Nevertheless, this transition was necessary to enable disarmament at a later 
stage, because a nuclear identity that was grounded in rationality and prudence did 
not constitute, nor was a product of aggressive war threatening rhetoric or dangerous 
policy moves as seen in the previous empirical chapters. Additionally, the Brezhnev 
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section elaborated on how the Soviet nuclear identity was not only constructed in 
relation to the spatial Other – the US – but also in relation to the temporal Other – the 
old Soviet self. This exemplifies the evolution of the Soviet nuclear identity, which 
made some agreements possible recognising the mistakes of the past. As pointed out 
by Bahr (1996, cited in Zubok, 2009: 226): “Brezhnev was necessary for transition to 
Gorbachev; what the latter accomplished, the former introduced. He was an asset for 
world peace”. 
 
The chapter then proceeded with the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions 
during the period of disarmament under the leadership of Gorbachev. This was when 
most significant transitions in the Soviet articulation of Self and Other occurred. First, 
the Soviets were no longer constructing a competitive identity of a state that could not 
lag behind the capitalists. Rather, Gorbachev constructed an identity of a cooperative 
and responsible state with the human security rather than ideology at its core. As a 
result, Soviet nuclear identity transitioned from the mighty military superpower to the 
global leader of disarmament. The frequent reiteration of the importance of peace and 
total disarmament enabled decisions such as a unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
testing that the Soviet government put in place and extended twice. It also enabled 
active negotiations with the US that were previously not seen between the two sides. 
 
Second, the Soviets still constructed a peace-loving nuclear identity. However, rather 
than constructing it vis-à-vis the warmongering US seeing their weapons as a problem 
and the Soviet ones as an antidote, Gorbachev stressed the dangers of ALL nuclear 
weapons. He constructed a nuclear identity with total disarmament at its core in 
relation to the earlier Soviet Self that heavily invested in nuclear weaponry. 
Gorbachev’s total disarmament discourse emphasised an ethical dimension to Soviet 
nuclear identity meaning that the Soviets saw themselves as the policemen of 
disarmament leading by example, invoking a particular moral force and responsibility, 
and encouraging others to follow suit. Such identity continuously enabled Soviet 
policy moves towards disarmament.  
 
Third, Soviet nuclear identity during Gorbachev’s time in office was still masculine. 
However, the nature of this masculinity has changed with strength being associated 
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not with military or nuclear might, but with disarmament. This is important, because it 
illustrates the significance of the arguments advanced by feminist IR scholars, who 
emphasise that traditionally masculine attributes attached to nuclear weapons prevent 
decisive disarmament policy. Devaluing these associations and reshaping the national 
security discourse as seen in Gorbachev’s case, was crucial in order for agreements 
and nuclear stockpiles reduction to come into being. The masculinity of Soviet nuclear 
identity took on a paternalistic character, which was closely interlinked with the 
reinforcement of the ethical dimension. Gorbachev did not associate disarmament 
with being weak, but in fact with being strong and rational, and the core of Soviet 
strength was grounded not in the might of the military-industrial complex and 
ideological superiority, but in cooperation, human security, equality, and peace. This 
highlights how the forms of masculinity may shift over time, which is significant 
because, as pointed out by Hooper (2001: 76), the fluidity of definitions of masculinity 
and challenges to hegemonic masculine conceptions open up space for change. This 
provides feminist IR scholars and those struggling against nuclear proliferation with 
potential routes to develop their arguments further. The next chapter will draw 
conclusions and discuss the implications and contributions of this analysis to our 
understanding of the connection between identity constructions and Soviet nuclear 





















Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
 
Overview of the Thesis 
 
This thesis set out to explore the constructions of Soviet nuclear identity across the 
span of the Cold War, and to demonstrate the significance of this identity to the 
enactment and justification of Soviet nuclear policy from Stalin’s nuclear weapons 
acquisition to Gorbachev’s disarmament. Much has been written about the need to 
expand our knowledge and understanding of nuclear proliferation and non-
proliferation beyond rationalist thought, as discussed in Chapter 2. Emerging after the 
end of the Cold War, identity-focused approaches to nuclear politics established that 
identity constructions significantly matter when it comes to states’ decisions to 
proliferate nuclear weapons or to disarm. These studies emphasise that nuclear 
weapons are much more than tools of security and power-maximisation, as materialist 
approaches such as neorealism would argue; they are to a large extent tools through 
the possession (or non-possession) of which states build and reinforce their identity. 
Yet, it remains unclear in the IR literature how this applies to the case of nuclear 
policy in the Soviet Union. Filling this gap in our knowledge of the Soviet case was the 
primary objective of this thesis. To achieve this objective, I asked: how did the Soviet 
elites construct Soviet nuclear identity? How did Soviet nuclear identity evolve over 
time? How did nuclear identity constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible? 
 
My ambition was to present a poststructuralist, gender-mindful, and interpretive 
account of Soviet nuclear identity and policy during the Cold War. Chapter 3 
conceptualised a nuclear identity as discursively reproduced through political elites’ 
nuclear weapons discourse and performatively enacted through nuclear policy. 
Nuclear identity is articulated in relation to a multiplicity of Others that take on 
different forms of Otherness. It was argued that it is imperative to be analytically open 
to articulations of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities in order to capture the 
complexities and ambiguity of identity constructions. Nuclear identity was also 
conceptualised as masculine, because it is reproduced through nuclear discourse that 
is underpinned by powerful ideas of masculinity, which state leaders historically 
attached to nuclear weapons. Such were the theoretical roots of this thesis. 
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Consequently, Chapter 4 developed an explicit poststructuralist discourse analytical 
methodology to go with the theoretical framework. Finally, to bring both theory and 
methodology together, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 engaged in a detailed analysis of Soviet 
nuclear identity constructions and the enactment of policy that took place during three 
different time periods: the bomb’s acquisition, 1941-1949; the arms race, 1953-1964; 
and détente and disarmament, 1964-1991.  
 
This concluding chapter ties together the theoretical and empirical insights of this 
thesis and presents the conclusions that can be drawn from them. Firstly, it synthesises 
the key findings of the empirical chapters. Secondly, it fleshes out the specific 
contributions that this thesis makes to the IR literature on nuclear proliferation. Finally, 
it sketches out a set of suggestions for potential future research on the subject.  
 
Constructions of Soviet Nuclear Identity and Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev 
 
The poststructuralist discourse analysis of Soviet nuclear discourse revealed the extent 
to which identity played a role in Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. Chapters 
5 and 6 argued that an articulation of a competitive, hypermasculine superpower 
identity enabled and necessitated nuclear weapons acquisition in the Soviet Union in 
the 1940s and the aggressive politics of rapid armament from the early 1950s until the 
mid-1980s.  Chapter 7 argued that a radical change in the direction of Soviet nuclear 
policy from the arms race to significant reductions of nuclear stockpiles and arms 
control agreements after 1986 was made possible and desirable through the 
continuous articulation of a cooperative, paternalistic, and peaceful nuclear identity. 
This section unpacks these two central arguments and reflects on how the findings 
discussed in the empirical chapters answer my three research questions outlined in the 
introduction. The first sub-section explains how the Soviet leaders constructed a 
nuclear identity for the USSR; the second subsection focuses on how this nuclear 
identity evolved over time and how it made Soviet nuclear policy possible.  
 
Spatial, Temporal, and Ethical Constructions: How was Soviet Nuclear Identity 
Articulated 
During all three of the time periods analysed in this thesis – nuclear weapons 
acquisition, the arms race, disarmament - Soviet nuclear identity was constructed and 
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articulated in relation to the key spatial Other – the United States. However, the 
analysis revealed that the Otherness of the US during the periods of nuclear weapons 
acquisition and the arms race was constructed in a different manner than during the 
disarmament period. During the rules of Stalin and Khrushchev, the difference 
between the US and the USSR took on the form of extreme Otherness, with Soviet 
leaders constantly reinforcing its dangerous and threatening nature. As such, the Soviet 
‘inside’ was sharply differentiated from the capitalist ‘outside’ who rendered security 
and armament necessary. The production of danger about the outside was prominent 
during these time periods in the Soviet discourse, as seen in the Soviet leaders’ 
portrayal of the US as dangerous, warmongering, threatening to the ‘peaceful peoples’, 
bloodthirsty, and so on. These constructions made nuclear weapons proliferation not 
only possible, but necessary. Moreover, the discursive constructions of threat and 
danger were essential for the successful stabilisation of Soviet nuclear identity and the 
legitimisation of Soviet nuclear policy. This goes in line with Campbell’s (1992) and 
Connolly’s (1991) arguments addressed in Chapter 3: political leaders have historically 
legitimised their security policies through the construction of spatial Others as 
threatening to the national Self. Soviet nuclear discourse was no exception, and these 
constructions appeared across a wide range of the analysed texts.  
 
However, Chapters 3 and 4 also argued that identity constructions can take on more 
ambiguous forms, and the degree of Otherness may also vary. Indeed, what we see 
during the period of disarmament is that the Other – the US – was no longer 
constituted as radically different or dangerous and threatening to the USSR. Rather, it 
was constructed along the ethical dimension; as non-progressive and ideologically 
driven, due to their initial rejection of Gorbachev’s disarmament proposals.  Arguably, 
when nuclear identity is constituted through relations that are not directly oppositional 
or threatening, it challenges the entire structure of dichotomous thinking, opening up 
spaces for cooperation and agreement.  
 
Furthermore, Soviet nuclear identity was also constructed in relation to temporal 
Others. The themes of progress and development featured prominently in Soviet 
official discourse. For example, Chapter 5 argued that Stalin’s ‘catch up and overtake 
discourse’ constructed a nuclear identity that was temporally inferior to the Other – 
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the US – due to the USSR’s lagging behind the capitalists in nuclear weapons 
production. But because this nuclear identity also emerged as competitive and 
exceptional, these temporal constructions of the Other necessitated the rapid 
development of the Soviet nuclear program. During this period, the Soviets also 
constructed an identity in relation to the Soviets’ own pre-Bolshevik past. Stalin 
reinforced the idea that the new Soviet Self was superior to the old Tsarist Russia, 
which was underdeveloped, backward, weak, and beaten. Such temporal 
constructions enabled progressive politics, as seen in Stalin’s efforts regarding the 
rapid industrialisation of the USSR. Brezhnev and Gorbachev also articulated an 
identity in relation to the temporal Soviet Self, whereby the Soviet peace-loving, 
cooperative identity was juxtaposed to the previous, aggressive Soviet Self that was 
obsessed with nuclear armament and aggressive politics. These narratives of past 
struggles, defeats, or mistakes are essential for the establishment and the refinement of 
Self (Hansen, 2006: 49). This serves as a justification for policy action, because 
progress and change become necessary. The articulations of the new refined Self 
during the period of disarmament both enabled and resulted from the change in the 
course of Soviet nuclear policy.  
 
Finally, the analysis revealed that, during all time periods, the Soviets constructed a 
nuclear identity through articulations of national and international responsibility that 
legitimised their choices of policy. During the periods of nuclear weapons acquisition 
and the arms race, as Chapters 5 and 6 argued, this responsibility was grounded in 
‘saving’ the socialist world from capitalist nuclear weapons by acquiring more 
weapons. The narratives of American irresponsibility and aggressiveness constructed 
the Soviet Self as acting in pursuit of admirable and peaceful goals, enabling and 
necessitating the production of nuclear weapons to defend themselves and to preserve 
peace and stability. During the period of disarmament, Soviet leaders articulated a Self 
that was responsible for freeing the world from nuclear weapons. The construction of 
the Other as still different, but no longer threatening or aggressive, enabled the 





The Evolution of Soviet Nuclear Identity and Policy 
i. From competitive to cooperative nuclear identity 
Chapter 5 argued that Soviet leaders began to re-imagine their state as a nuclear 
weapons state 4 years before the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 
August 1949. Soviet nuclear identity emerged within a discourse that emphasised the 
imperative to ‘catch up and overtake’ the US. This was in reaction to the US dropping 
two atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Soviet 
nuclear identity emerged as highly competitive, because being behind the US in 
anything, particularly in the development of new weapons of extraordinary power was 
a priori not an option for the Soviet leaders. It undermined their self-conception as a 
global superpower following the Soviet victory against Nazi Germany in World War II. 
The analysis revealed that the ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse was grounded in 
Soviet leaders’ belief in and the desire to maintain, first, the ideological superiority of 
socialism over capitalism and, second, the exceptional character of the Soviet state. As 
such, ideas about Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet exceptionalism frequently 
figured in official governmental discourse throughout the period of acquisition and the 
arms race, fuelling the Soviet struggle for superiority and the construction of a 
competitive nuclear identity. 
 
Over the course of the next 40 years, ‘catch up and overtake’ remained a dominant 
and relatively stable discourse. The totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union largely 
silenced competing discourses, leaving very little space for alternative identity 
constructions. Any attempt that was made never reached any discursive stability, as 
seen in the discussion of the Soviet attitude towards MAD in Chapter 6, whereby any 
comment on Soviet potential vulnerability to the American nuclear attack was seen as 
dangerous, because there could be no doubt that the Soviets would not win a nuclear 
war. The Soviets refused to accept any idea of vulnerability to an American nuclear 
attack, as this destabilised their competitive and exceptional nuclear identity. From 
Stalin to Brezhnev, the Soviets grounded this nuclear identity in the strength of the 
military-industrial complex, which, in turn, enabled the military-industrial complex to 
grow. This belief in Soviet exceptionalism enabled a long-lasting nuclear arms race, 
culminating in a peak of 45 000 nuclear warheads in Soviet stockpiles in 1986. Every 
time Soviet nuclear identity was destabilised as a consequence of US retaliatory 
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arming responses, the Soviets reasserted it through aggressive Othering and the 
production of danger about the “warmongering”, “blood-thirsty” capitalists, which 
enabled and legitimised further aggressive armament and nuclear testing. Furthermore, 
the nuclear superpower identity that emerged during Khrushchev’s tenure, as the 
Soviets developed retaliatory nuclear capability, enabled dangerous nuclear politics, 
such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1992 and the testing of ‘Tsar’ bomba’ – the most 
powerful nuclear bomb ever denotated, albeit militarily useless.   
 
However, in the 1980s we see a change of policy. Following Gorbachev’s rise to 
power in 1985, there was transformation in the Soviet approach to international and 
domestic politics. He introduced considerable democratisation, namely the policies of 
glasnost and perestroika. In this era, we see the ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse lose 
its dominant status and give way to a discourse of cooperation. Rather than focusing 
on the importance of the competition with the US, Soviet leaders reinforced ideas of 
cooperation, human security, peacekeeping, and the importance of total disarmament. 
Moreover, the Self was no longer constructed as ideologically superior to the capitalist 
Other – it was of course different, but now articulated as an equal. Chapter 7 details 
this evolution in Soviet nuclear identity from competitive to cooperative, which over 
time enabled a halt to the nuclear arms race, moratoria on Soviet nuclear testing, and 
decisive steps towards disarmament talks with the US.  
 
ii. From hyper-masculine to paternalistic nuclear identity 
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that Soviet nuclear identity emerged as hyper-
masculine, with significant consequences for nuclear politics. Soviet leaders, to a large 
extent, linked the possession of nuclear weapons to traditionally masculine attributes, 
such as strength, potency, rationality, and invincibility. This identity was constructed 
in relation to the US, which it positioned as subordinate: as emotional, unstable, even 
fearful. The politics of nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race was constitutive 
of, and a product of, Soviet officials’ practices of ‘affirming manhood’. The arguments 
of Carol Cohn and other feminist IR scholars hold firmly, because the nature of the 
Soviet dominant competitive nuclear discourse was deeply gendered, with the 
masculine side being privileged over the feminine side. Nuclear weapons served as 
“the ultimate arbiter of political/masculine power” (Cohn et al., 2006: 3). Such 
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constructions evoked a ‘feminised’ image on any attempt to reach an arms control 
agreement or indeed disarmament, because to Stalin’s, Khrushchev’s, and to an extent 
Brezhnev’s governments, it represented weakness, lack of will and potency, and being 
a ‘wimp’.  
 
During the period of disarmament, we see that Soviet nuclear discourse continued to 
reproduce a gendered identity. However, we can see a significant transition in how 
Soviet nuclear identity was constructed. It was still masculine, yet the ideas of what 
strength and power meant in Soviet nuclear discourse went through a noticeable 
transformation. The traditionally masculine attributes previously linked to the 
possession of nuclear weapons and aggressive armament were instead linked to 
disarmament and arms control. Gorbachev’s government constructed disarmament as 
a rational, strong, responsible, and powerful act rather than as a weakness. As such, 
gendered hierarchies, with a masculine side being privileged over a more feminine 
side, did not disappear from the official Soviet nuclear discourse. What changed was 
the source of this ‘strength’ and ‘power’. Referring to his own approach as a “peace 
offensive”, Gorbachev was still constructing a masculine nuclear identity, but it took 
on a more paternalistic form due to the reinforcement of global cooperation on 
disarmament and the evolution of Soviet identity from being a nuclear superpower to 
becoming a world leader of disarmament. This both enabled and resulted from a shift 
into the direction of disarmament and the easing of tensions with the US, with both 
states’ leaders eventually signing the INF treaty and starting to dismantle their nuclear 
stockpiles.   
 
However, despite the shift towards the construction of a more ‘peaceful’ masculinity, 
Chapter 7 also demonstrated that the symbolic association of nuclear weapons with 
the traditional ideas of masculine strength and potency did not disappear from the 
Soviet nuclear discourse. This is where competing discourses became particularly 
prominent. Gorbachev and his closest advisors were emasculated by both the 
Americans and other Soviet politicians, and were accused of being ‘soft’, ‘weak’, and 
a ‘bunch of pussies’. This shows that the masculinisation of nuclear weaponry is 
deeply embedded in foreign policy discourses, but this does not mean that change is 
not possible. The most important point to make here is that the case of Soviet 
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disarmament in the 1980s demonstrates that when masculinity is linked to the 
practices of cooperation, conflict resolution, and disarmament, with the possession of 
nuclear weapons being continuously questioned and devalued by state leaders, 
changes in the course of nuclear policy become possible and even desirable.  
 
iii. From the ‘peace-loving’ proliferator to the peace-loving leader of global 
disarmament 
As with any process of identity construction, Soviet nuclear identity constructions 
were always contradictory. One notable contradiction was that during all of the 
analysed time periods, the Soviets constructed a Self that was peace-loving. However, 
the contradiction lies in the fact that, aside from the period of arms control and 
disarmament, constructions of a peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity 
also paradoxically enabled nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race. Alongside 
the narratives of masculine strength and competition, as Chapters 5 and 6 established, 
the Soviets articulated a peace-loving nuclear identity through narratives of 
cooperation and peacekeeping. This identity was constructed in relation to the very 
radical ‘warmongering’ US, while the Soviet Self was portrayed as responsible and 
peaceful. It is through the peacekeeping discourse that the Soviets articulated their 
ethical identity and a higher moral ground. The frequent reiteration of the danger of 
US nuclear weapons and the aggressive nature of American politics legitimised and 
necessitated, first, the Soviet nuclear project, and second, both Khrushchev’s and 
Brezhnev’s arms race. These constructions attempted to reinforce the USSR as a 
responsible moral leader that would save the world from the capitalists’ nuclear 
weapons by means of arming. In this sense, the Soviet weapons were constructed as 
(necessarily) peaceful, whereas the American weapons were (necessarily) aggressive.  
 
During Gorbachev’s tenure, peacekeeping discourse replaced ‘catch up and overtake’ 
discourse and became dominant. Compared to the period of acquisition and the arms 
race, the idea of ‘peace’ was redefined in a way that ALL nuclear weapons were 
dangerous; there was no longer a difference between the weapons of Self and Other. 
The Soviets still constructed themselves as peaceful and responsible. But this 
responsibility was grounded in the idea of disarmament, which continuously enabled 
and legitimised Gorbachev’s efforts to reach an arms control agreement with the US 
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government and to proclaim moratoria on Soviet nuclear testing. Through the 
articulation of these policies, Soviet nuclear identity kept evolving into an identity of a 
world leader of peace and disarmament with responsibility to influence disarmament 
everywhere else. Chapter 7 demonstrated that when ethical and peace-loving identity 
constructions take on the dominant form in the official policy discourse, the course of 
nuclear policy that remained static for 40 years may be reversed.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Bringing together the key findings of this thesis, it can thus be concluded that nuclear 
discourses that reproduced a competitive, hyper-masculine identity constructed in 
opposition to the very radical dangerous Other, both constituted and were a product 
of the Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition and the rapid Cold War arms race. When 
these discourses became dominant and stable, they precluded the possibility of 
successful disarmament efforts. While the USSR leadership articulated the need for 
disarmament, the presence of these constructions made it far more difficult, if not 
politically impossible to achieve. All three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity were 
performed simultaneously through the enactment of dangerous policy that nearly 
brought the world to a nuclear catastrophe during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 
However, the constitution and reinforcement of a cooperative, peace-loving, and 
paternalistic identity constructed in relation to the Other that was not radically 
different or portrayed as a dangerous enemy, opened up spaces for cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, enabling significant and continuous 
reductions of nuclear arsenals and the signature of the INF treaty in 1987. This 
demonstrates the role that identity played in Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold 
War taking our understanding beyond rationalist logic of rational deterrence and 
security. And if identity is important, it means that change is possible.  
 
Contributions of the Thesis 
 
This thesis makes several interconnected contributions to IR studies of nuclear 
proliferation and disarmament, and to the broader field of poststructuralist and 
feminist IR research on the significance of identity constructions in global politics. 
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First, it makes an empirical contribution by taking our understanding of Soviet nuclear 
policy beyond traditional, rationalist, and security-based explanations. By showing 
how identity constructions were at the heart of Soviet nuclear policy, it re-emphasises 
the key argument of ideational IR scholarship on nuclear weapons, which posits that 
not all nuclear decisions are rational or security-driven and identity constructions 
shape these decisions to a large extent. No volume in the IR literature has satisfactorily 
explored the significance of identity constructions to the course of Soviet nuclear 
policy. Traditionally, IR as a Western discipline has tended to privilege the study of the 
United States, and even critical works like those of Campbell (1992) tell us a lot about 
the US but very little about Russia. My research helps us understand this ‘other side’ of 
Cold War nuclear identity politics, which has previously gone under researched.  
 
As such, this thesis makes an important contribution to IR literature on nuclear 
proliferation by fleshing out this lesser known case and showing how identity 
constructions can shape not only nuclear weapons acquisition, but also the arms race, 
arms control, and disarmament. It fills the gap in our understanding of the most 
aggressive vertical nuclear proliferation in history, which neither rationalist nor 
ideational scholars focus on in-depth. It also provides a better understanding of events 
such as the testing of strategically useless weaponry, emphasising that nuclear politics 
can be shaped by ideas, beliefs, and identities, just as much as by security and rational 
deterrence calculations. This is important, because if not all state decision-making 
regarding nuclear weapons is rational and security-driven, then our approaches to the 
politics of global disarmament cannot be solely based on deflating the security value 
of nuclear weapons. At the same time, if the biggest proliferators of nuclear weapons 
such as Russia ground their identity in the possession of nuclear weapons to such an 
extent as has been revealed by this thesis, then achieving total disarmament becomes 
particularly challenging.  
 
This thesis also makes a theoretical contribution to poststructuralist and feminist IR 
scholarship, in two distinct ways. It expands our application of poststructuralism to 
identity-focused IR studies of nuclear weapons proliferation and disarmament, which 
have been dominated by various strands of constructivism. This thesis demonstrates 
that understanding identity as discursively constituted, relational, and existing in a 
	 187	
mutually constitutive relationship with policy, can take our understanding of the 
connection between identity and policy beyond causality. Such conceptualisations of 
identity enable a deeper understanding of how identities function in discourse and 
how policies are legitimised. It shows how ideas and material factors are intertwined 
to an extent that they become inseparable. This approach thus helps us to understand 
how some actions can be made possible, while others are precluded. Furthermore, the 
poststructuralist emphasis on the historical contingency of identity and policy 
challenges rationalist claims to objectivity and universalism, demonstrating how 
different historical modes of representation carry different political consequences. This 
is important, because it helps us to see nuclear policy and disarmament as dynamic 
processes that are not fixed or universal, which may explain why the latter presents 
such a challenge to its advocates. This thesis also demonstrated the importance of 
seeing identities as existing not only in relation to dangerous radical Others, because it 
helps us to engage with processes though which identities become stable and change 
over time, which is imperative to achieving any change in policy direction. 
 
In addition, it contributes to feminist IR scholarship on nuclear proliferation by 
incorporating gender into a poststructuralist discourse analytical framework. By 
exposing the gendered nature of nuclear discourse, the analysis demonstrated that 
when the link between masculinity and aggressive nuclear politics becomes 
destabilised, there is a possibility for progressive change in nuclear politics.  As such, 
it is possible to challenge traditional gendered hierarchies where a more masculine 
side, associated with possessing nuclear weapons, is privileged over the more 
feminine side, associated with disarmament. The change can be achieved through the 
deconstruction of traditional gender dichotomies and the encouragement of relations 
of mutual respect and non-radical Otherness between Self and Other.  
 
Future Research Agenda 
 
The last point to address are the kinds of questions and future research agendas which 
can be drawn from this thesis. This analysis only focused on a snapshot of a particular 
period of time in a particular state. More research can be done by expanding the time 
frame to modern day Vladimir Putin’s Russia and studying how Russian nuclear 
identity is constructed now and how it enables policy action, such as the termination 
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of the INF treaty in 2019. Similar research can be done in cases of any nuclear state. 
Exploring the historical development of nuclear identities can help us to gain a better 
understanding of how states’ nuclear choices come about and what particular 
constructions enable them.   
 
At relevant moments, this thesis also explored the constructions of US nuclear identity 
to demonstrate that the mutually-constitutive relationship between identity and policy 
was not unique to the Soviet Union. As such, the Cold War could be understood as 
not just the battle of material capabilities, but a battle of identities. Future research 
could focus on fleshing this comparison out and focusing more on the US side. The 
Americans also reduced their nuclear arsenals in the 1980s and it would be useful to 
carefully study their identity constructions in terms of the degree of Otherness, the 
multiplicity of Others, and spatial, temporal, and ethical constructions of identity and 
difference. Furthermore, a poststructuralist approach can be adopted to study the 
Putin-Trump dynamic now and its consequences for the possibility of future 
disarmament or potential further armament.  
 
Finally, this thesis emphasised that because identity constructions matter, change in 
nuclear politics is possible and pursuing it is worthwhile. Even the constructions of 
hegemonic masculinity in a totalitarian state such as the USSR were not monolithic 
and changed over time with consequences for policy. Important shifts in the meanings 
assigned to capabilities such as nuclear weapons can occur. As such, future 
poststructuralist and feminist IR studies could focus on ways of reconceptualising these 
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